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Abstract
Worldwide, the protection of minority shareholders in public corporations has received most of
the corporate scholars’ attention. This tendency, therefore, has been reflected in the negligence of
the same group but in close corporations. A close corporation minority shareholder confronts
distinctive issues caused by the locked-in structure of close corporations. The lack of liquid
secondary market, the oppression by majority shareholders, and the high expectations held by
minority shareholders all contribute to the minority shareholders’ concern that they may be
deprived of a voice in management or opportunistically be taken advantage of by those in power.
Although these structural issues are hardly touched upon in the international corporate debates,
jurisdictions have varied in their approaches to addressing these issues and providing protection
for minority shareholders. The protection may flow from the contractual approach, the statutory
approach, the judicial approach, or a combination of the three approaches.

This research demonstrates these issues, and the approaches developed to address them. After that,
it explores in depth the statutory approach adopted in the Saudi Companies Law of 2015 to protect
the interests of shareholders as the Law advances different rules for corporate governance than
their counterparts in other jurisdictions. The study also evaluates the strengths and defects in the
Law as it presents an analysis and critique of the statutory treatment of minority shareholders’
problems, their statutory protection as well as the public and private enforcement. Finally, the
research identifies areas where reforms and changes are needed and thus propound some policy
prescriptions to the Saudi legislature to optimize its corporate governance. A new approach to the
corporate governance of close corporations, one that is perceptive of their unique nature and
features, is necessary to strengthen the statutory protection for minority shareholders, who fail to
protect themselves contractually.
Keywords: close corporation, minority shareholder protection, controlling shareholder, Saudi
corporate law, corporate governance, director compensation, related-party transactions,
shareholder assembly, shareholder oppression.
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Introductory Chapter
“[P]eople enter closely held businesses in the same manner as they enter marriage:
optimistically and ill-prepared.”1

Part I. Preface
In the corporate world, joint-stock corporations have been of great significance to lure
investors into investments in major economic projects. This has placed a burden upon the
legislative bodies around the world to keep up with their rapidly changing activities and behaviors
and regulate them accordingly. Laws and regulations, in general, have worked effectively toward
achieving their goals to enhance the market and encourage huge capitals to invest in such
corporations.
Despite the continuous qualitative and quantitative development given to the laws and
regulations of this type of entity, several issues in some jurisdictions are still unsolved. Such issues
appear from the inevitable division between majority shareholders and minority shareholders as a
consequence of the nature of the dominant ownership structure. Most of the time such a partition
entails the oppression of minority shareholders and the obstruction of right exercising, mainly in
close corporations. It is thought that the oppression of minority shareholders has been considered
as “an inherent structural characteristic of the close corporation form.” 2
Many close corporations are founded based on companionships, familial bonds, and close
relationships between shareholders.3 However, these relationships do not form a legal shield upon

1

Charles W. Murdock, Evolution of Effective Remedies for Minority Shareholders and Its Impact upon
Valuation of Minority Shares, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 425, 426 (1990).
2
See Benjamin Means, A Voice-Based Framework for Evaluating Claims of Minority Shareholder
Oppression in the Close Corporation, 97 GEO. L.J. 1207, 1256 (2009).
3
See infra Chapter 1, Part I, B.

1

which the minority shareholders can rely. Close corporations have recorded most of the conflicts
and shareholder battles in courts. In response to the widespread dilemma, legislatures around the
world have approached the issue in a variety of ways, including reviewing and reforming corporate
governance principles and decision-making process within the entity. Other countries have
enhanced judicial scrutiny as the voice of the minority is muted or obstructed.
The ninth of November of 2015 was a significant turning point in the history of the corporation
in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as the long-awaited Companies Law was enacted and introduced
to the public, which superseded the forty-four-year-old Companies Law.4 It was a sweeping change
and development in response to the increasing demand to fill the gaps and correspond to national
and international changes. The new Law enhances corporate governance principles and ensures an
encouraging corporate atmosphere that is conducive to corporations enhancing their values,
activities, and growth as well as their contributions to the Saudi Arabian economy. 5
The change in the corporate field and the dire need to examine the newly-introduced Law
enthused me as a researcher to probe and assess the legislative approach into protecting minority
shareholders in close corporations. Therefore, I devote this research to explore the issues of
minority shareholders, evaluate the statutory protection they enjoy in light of the 2015 Companies
Law in Saudi Arabia, appraise the enforcement’s quality of the Law, and introduce some lessons
to be gained from far-off jurisdictions to improve and reform existing laws, if any.

4

See infra Chapter 2, Part I, A (2 and 4).
See New Saudi Arabian Companies Law, DLA Piper, November 12, 2015
[https://www.dlapiper.com/en/saudiarabia/insights/publications/2015/11/new-saudi-arabian-companieslaw/].
5

2

Part II. The Importance of the Topic
Several causes inspired me to commit my doctoral thesis to the study of minority shareholders’
protection in closely held corporations in Saudi Arabia, given its growing importance, legally,
socially and economically. First, the Saudi market encompasses thousands of closely held
corporations that make significant contributions to the economy. Nevertheless, most of these
corporations, if not all, have ignored the rights of minority shareholders to actively take part in the
corporate management, or at least oversee the corporate activities as specified by the Law.
Second, since these minority shareholders are the weak, they are often oblivious to their
fundamental rights. Some of these rights are attached to the shares (e.g., the right to vote and the
right to receive dividends), while others are guaranteed by the Law (e.g., preemptive rights, the
right to a representative and the right of access to corporate books and records).
Third, the oppression of minority shareholders and the obstruction of exercising their rights
have been regarded as one of the controversial issues in the corporate world today as some
scholarly writings have discussed the subject worldwide. Accordingly, countries vary in
approaching and addressing the issue. The variation is attributable to the dominating ownership
structure in the state. Some countries, for instance, have dispersed ownership (e.g., the U.S. and
U.K.) while others, such as Saudi Arabia, have concentrated ownership. 6 Consequently, different
ownership structures differ in their impacts on the corporate governance principles needed to
redress the issue, such as the extent of board independence and derivatives’ procedures.
Most importantly, one of the themes of the Saudi 2030 Vision is “opening Saudi Arabia for
further businesses […] and improving its business environment.” Such a vision can be achieved
only if does the market gain the trust and confidence of foreign investors to invest their capitals in

6

See infra Chapter 2, Part II,

3

the market. This involves that related-investment laws and regulations are protective of minority
shareholders and able to earn investors’ confidence in “the resilience and potential of [Saudi]
national economy.”
Since this study is regarded as one of the first academic studies that undertake the analysis and
assessment of the corporate governance of the 2015 Companies Law, it will be of great help for
the Saudi legislature and for the Saudi public to look at the law and the protection it promotes
through an academic lens. Given the importance and the size of the Saudi market alongside the
pivotal role played by corporations, such an area of law should receive much attention from legal
scholars who examine current laws and reconsider its concepts and principles. Academics, more
than others, should study and criticize contemporary laws to ensure that they serve their proclaimed
objectives.
For the reasons mentioned above, I devote my SJD research to articulate the dilemma of
minority shareholders in closely held companies in Saudi Arabia. The study carries out an in-depth
academic investigation about the minority shareholders with a thoroughly analytical and critical
review of the Companies Law. The primary goal of this research is threefold: first, to spot the
loopholes in the Law and its failure to statutorily protect minority shareholders; second, explore
and accentuate the protective aspects of the 2015 Companies Law; and third, make several
recommendations to improve the quality of the legal system and enhance the enforcement of the
law.

Part IV. Research Questions and Challenges
The study answers the fundamental question of whether minority shareholders of the jointstock companies are protected in Saudi Arabia theoretically and practically. In answering this
question, the following questions emerge:

4

1. What is the significance of answering this main question?
2. Why should minority shareholders be protected?
3. What is the difference between ex ante and ex post protection?
4. What does “minority shareholders” mean? What constitutes minority shareholders and vice
versa?
5. What is the importance of statutory protection for minority shareholders?
6. What kind of legal aspects should the legislature protect?
7. How has the Saudi legislature protected the interest of minority shareholders via the new Law?
8. Has the new Law failed in corresponding to issues concerning the minority?
9. What are the practical obstacles in the way of statutory protection for minority shareholders?
10. What legislative improvements should be made to the Saudi Companies Law?
11. What are the legal measures to bring about the necessary improvements?

Part V. Methodology and Research Approach
The goal of the thesis is mainly to explore the statutory protection for minority shareholders
under the Companies Law of 2015. Therefore, both the methodology and method for the research
have been selected accordingly.
The thesis is built upon a case study approach. Stake defines the case study approach as “the
study of the particularity and complexity of a single case, coming to understand its activity within
important circumstances.” 7 it gains more importance if the conducted research has “a very special
of interest.”8 A pair of reasons can justify the choice of the case study to approach the research
questions and attain the research objectives. First of all, the legal system of Saudi Arabia is

7
8

See ROBERT STAKE, THE ART OF CASE STUDY RESEARCH (SAGE PUB. LTD. 1995).
Id.

5

regarded as a very complicated legal system that has always caused legal perplexity, “not only for
foreigners but also among Saudis themselves.”9 A lot of inconsistency and uncertainty have been
attributed to the double nature of its legal institutions where “modern legal arrangements and
institutions combine and interact in a rather contradictory way, with Islamic applications and
attitudes.”10 To deal with such complex settings, the case study methodology has been believed to
be best positioned to the scrutiny of a particular condition of the position of a specific case. 11
The scarcity of sources and writings about the Saudi legal system in general and the subject
matter, in particular, is another ground justifying the case study approach, as it is deemed a
significant methodology when there is a gap in the literature encompassing the legal position of a
specific case.12
To accomplish the thesis’s goals and to answer the questions above, some research methods
have been rejected in favor of the normative study. The dissertation is mainly normative within a
conceptual and analytical framework. To that end, the research, as mentioned above, aims at
presenting issues concerning the Saudi regulations of joint-stock companies, particularly exploring
and analyzing the 2015 Companies Law and then assessing the efficacy of its statutory protection
for minority shareholders by comparing its protective aspects to more advanced laws and
regulations of other legal systems. In this regard, it has been pointed out that one of the main
objectives of comparative law is to facilitate legislative reforms and legal improvements. 13 Laws

9

FAHAD M. ALMAJID, A CONCEPTUAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR REFORMING SAUDI CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE (LAMBERT ACAD. PUB. 2014).
10
Id.
11
See CATHERINE CASSELL & GILLIAN SYMON, ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO QUALITATIVE METHODS IN
ORGANIZATIONAL RESEARCH, 324 (SAGE PUB. LTD 2004).
12
See Izak Benbasat, David K. Goldstein and Melissa Mead, The Case Research Strategy in Studies of
Information Systems 11 MIS QUARTERLY 396, 370 (1987).
13
See Jonathan Hill, Comparative Law, Law Reform and Legal Theory, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 101,
115 (1989).

6

such as the United States and the United Kingdom’s are broadly used as guidelines for the needed
reforms in most developing and transitional countries, including Saudi Arabia. Note that this is not
a comparative study. Instead, it utilizes comparison as a way to advance and support an argument
on the one hand, or refute and exemplify a position on the other.
Primary and secondary sources are used throughout the study. However, due to the dearth of
academic literature dealing with businesses in Saudi Arabia and the apparent lack of secondary
resources on the subject matter, it is essential to refer to the secondary resources of other advanced
legal systems in analyzing and discussing the case of Saudi Arabia.
A. Primary Resources
The study mainly undertakes the analysis and evaluation of the protection for minority
shareholders in close corporations in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, many regulations and laws
governing the corporation in Saudi Arabia are the starting point of this thesis. Such laws and
regulations are the Companies Law of 2015, the Law of Commercial Court, and other regulations
and ministerial guidelines.14
In the context of cases and precedents concerning the topic, the recentness of a reporting
system⎯alongside the newness of the Law⎯ in Saudi Arabia makes it challenging to acquire
details of judicial decisions, so it is difficult to articulate on the judicial approach in interpreting
and applying the Law. In addition, policy statements, guidelines and administrative decisions by
authorities (e.g., the Ministry of Commerce and Investment) concerning the close corporations are
of paramount importance to the study and analysis in this thesis. Last, Other primary resources of
other advanced legal systems (e.g., the Model Business Corporation Act in the United States) are

14

See generally infra Chapter two, Part I.
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of great help in achieving the aims of the study.
B. Secondary Resources
The research questions and challenges demand a thorough investigation of different sources
from several disciplines, including those concerning finance, politics and the theories of
regulations. The thesis often references secondary resources (e.g., books, law review articles, and
reports) to draw a full and clear vision of the theoretical and practical aspects of the subject matter.
As articulated above, the research builds on several previous academic writings (in other
countries) that have elaborated on the issues of minority shareholders in close corporations. These
resources are sometimes used to propose a blueprint for reforming related-Saudi laws. Journal
articles and internet sources provide essential, up-to-date information and qualitative analyses to
the research to mirror what has been on the ground.
All primary and secondary sources are fully referenced throughout the thesis in compliance
with the Bluebook standard for citation of legal resources. It should be emphasized that most of
the references are secondary even though primary sources of the laws and the regulations are
favored continuously and given primacy over secondary sources. It is wished that the weight of
referencing does not disturb the quality and the course of the arguments demonstrated throughout
the research.

Part VI. The Structure of the Thesis
The thesis is divided into an introduction, five chapters, and a conclusion. At the outset of
every chapter, there is a motivating hypothetical that illustrates the issue and helps the reader have
a clear sense of the subject matter under the spotlight.
Chapter one is a foundational, expository chapter that establishes a necessary layer to
comprehend the issues that minority shareholder status triggers in close corporations. It is divided
8

into three sections. First, it starts with defining the terms “minority shareholder” and “close
corporation”. Second, it spotlights common issues that arise out of the close corporation’s structure
worldwide. The third section contains a conceptual categorization of strategies that are used to
tackle the issues. The categorization is premised upon the source from which each strategy flows.
The second chapter aims at delineating the corporate arena in Saudi Arabia and establishes the
legal ground upon which a corporation is incorporated and regulated. It is divided into two
sections. The first section offers a comprehensive overview of the legal structure governing Saudi
corporations. This includes a historical snapshot of the inception and the developments of the Saudi
corporate laws and regulations. The second section maps out the unique structure of ownership in
the region. This encapsulates, on the one hand, the ownership structure of publicly-traded
corporations—including state-controlled corporations, and family-controlled corporations— and
the ownership structure of closely held corporations by state and family, on the other hand.
Chapter three investigates the internal legal framework of joint-stock corporations in Saudi
Arabia according to the default rules of the Law regulating corporate institutions, operations, and
other corporate affairs. This chapter is intended to dissect the rules through an analytical and
critical lens, rather than descriptive one, yet the description of the rules is provided to comprehend
better the detailed analysis and constructive criticism of the Law that follows. First, it starts with
a straight procedural section about the incorporation requirements, including the incorporation of
a one-person corporation. Second, it casts light on the role of shareholder and shareholder
meetings, through which they exercise most of their rights, yet it does not exhaust all shareholder
matters as most of them are examined in a later chapter designated to the statutory protection of
minority shareholders. Third, the chapter probes the rules of corporate management, including the
composition of the board of directors, its meetings, and its duties and responsibilities along with
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the remuneration-rewards rules. Fourth, it casts light on the role of the external auditor, including
its appointment, powers, and tasks. In the end, the chapter concludes with an in-depth analysis of
the procedural and substantive rules regulating close corporations.
Turning to chapter four, it presents a case study of minority shareholder protection in Saudi
Arabia. It is divided into five sections. The first part introduces the reader to minority shareholders’
issues in Saudi Arabia and the factors that affected the change in the policy of protecting their
interests, leading to an indispensable role of the law in the region. The second part offers an
analysis of the statutory shareholder rights, including defining the “statutory right” and
categorizing them into two groups. The third part demonstrates⎯through analytical reading⎯how
the Law is an effective device to curtail oppressive conduct, and how it handles minority
shareholders’ issues, including minority’s directorial representation, dilution of interests,
unmarketability of shares. The fourth part underscores the role of formalism in the Law in one
section and highlights some issues and limitations associated with this statutory approach in the
other.
The fifth chapter scrutinizes the second component of the research theory, enforcement of the
Law in Saudi Arabia as it is a major player in protecting minority shareholder’s interests. Laws
and rules alone do not suffice to protect minority shareholders. Instead, they are to exist
interdependently. For this reason, this chapter expounds the role of the judiciary ex post, as it is
the sanctuary for all disgruntled and oppressed shareholders on the one hand, and the principal
enforcer of the law on the other. To do so, the chapter first provides a foundational stone of the
historical development of the corporate judiciary in Saudi Arabia. Second, the chapter
differentiates between the role of the judiciary in enforcement into two subsections: public
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enforcement and private enforcement. Under each category, the chapter examines the nature of the
judicial interventions ex post and accentuates the protective aspects of such interventions.
The conclusion features the findings of previous analyzed chapters. It also provides overall
recommendations that have emerged from the analysis as well as illuminate the obstructions and
limitations that have been tackled in the study and offer some suggestions for future research.

Part VII. The Scope of the Study
The dissertation covers the regulations and laws of closely held corporations in Saudi Arabia.
Public corporations are excluded because they have been the subject of several scholarly studies.
In a few stances, I refer to the corporate law of a member country of the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) due to the possible integration of the six states facilitated by their cultural, social, and
ideological similarities.

15

Overall, it should be emphasized that the examination of the Saudi

aspects is given greater weight than models from other countries to allow for better solutions and
recommendations and to comply with the research methodology of case-studying the protection of
minority shareholders within Saudi Arabia.
Turning to the research tools, interviews and questionnaires were thought unsuitable because
such methods would meet practical barriers due to language differences, a possible lack of
cooperation, and difficulties to access unpublished cases and precedents. Moreover, the possibility
of subjective bias among individual actors involved in the examined system (along with the
political, regulatory and commercial requirements of confidentiality) would hinder any reliable

15

The GCC is an Arab regional organization of six Arab countries; United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman. It was founded in 1981, and its headquarters are in Riyadh, the
capital of Saudi Arabia. These countries are the most productive oil countries in the Middle East Plus,
articles that make up the laws of most GCC countries are identical. In addition, Qatar, the United Arab
Emirates, and the State of Kuwait have recently introduced new companies laws. For this reason, the
study sometimes refers to their corporate laws rather than considering all six countries.
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evaluation. Although the Saudi judiciary (namely commercial courts) has recently begun
publishing cases and judicial rulings on its website, the system lacks the proper codification
system⎯which would otherwise ease the search for rulings related to the subject matter.
Furthermore, given the scarcity of English-written references about the Saudi laws in general
and the subject matter in particular, a great deal of Arabic-English translation is required. This
limitation appears to be a chance to take the lead in presenting the Saudi Companies Law of 2015
to Western readers with the hope that it becomes an essential reference for future research on the
topic.
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Chapter One: The Concept of Minority Shareholders in Close Corporation
“There are 51 shares that are worth $250,000. There are 49 shares that are not worth a . . .” 16
John H. Doyle

Motivating Hypothetical
Saad, a teacher with no business background, is pondering over a business opportunity that his
father, Fahad, has invited him to join him in launching a new business, which needs a statutory
minimum of two shareholders to incorporate a joint-stock corporation under the 2015 Saudi
Companies Law. The offer is to contribute 10% of the company’s capital or 25% if his brother
wants to join. Saad has no knowledge in business and no background about the law, so in his risk
assessment phase, he is wondering about the legal risks associated with the proposed ownership in
this sort of corporation.

The Scope of Chapter One
This foundational, expository chapter establishes a primary layer to comprehend the issues that the
minority shareholder status triggers in close corporations. It is divided into three sections. First, it
starts with defining the terms “minority shareholder” and “close corporation”. Second, it spotlights
common issues that arise out of the close corporation’s structure. The third section provides a
conceptual categorization of strategies that are used to tackle the issues. These strategies are
divided based on the source from which each strategy flows.

See Humphrys v. Winous Co., 165 Ohio St. 45, 50, 133 N.E.2d 780, 783 (1956) (quoting John Doyle’s
address before the 1893 annual meeting of the Ohio State Bar).
16
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Part I. Definition
A.

The Definition of Minority Shareholder

The minority term in a corporate context is commonly understood as the possession of less
than half of the corporation’s capital. However, there are two common standards to define minority
shareholders. First, the quantitative measure. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, minority
shareholder means “[a] shareholder who owns less than half the total shares outstanding and thus
cannot control the corporation’s management or singlehandedly elect directors.” 17 This
shareholding may belong to one person or a group of shareholders.
Another measure applied to define minority shareholders is the qualitative standard. This
measure depends on an evaluation of the control exerted over the corporation. Sometimes a
shareholder has minority status according to the quantitative standard, yet the shareholder exerts
control over the corporation and has managerial and directorial powers. These powers often come
through ax ante contracting and other arrangements. In this sense, a quantitatively-defined
minority shareholder with veto power over some transactions becomes a qualitatively-defined
majority. Both standards go hand in hand and are of paramount significance in a court of law to
prove the entitlement of minority shareholders to the statutory and judicial protection. 18
The minority concept arises following the recognition of separate legal personality for the
corporation, and then the domination of major shareholders over the corporation in a way that
results in oppression for other disgruntled shareholders, or later so-called the minority. Given the
importance of the shareholder’s role in corporations, it is of necessity to intervene and re-balance

BRYAN A. GARNER, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 1586 (10.ed 2014).
see Julian Javier Garza, Rethinking Corporate Governance: The Role of Minority Shareholders - A
Comparative Study, 31 ST. MARY'S L.J. 613, 620 (2000).
17
18
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the relationships between the minority and the majority for the sake of the entity and its objectives.
The intervention has taken various styles worldwide.
In the review of the Saudi Arabian statutes and laws regulating close corporations, however, it
appears that the Saudi legislature has not adopted a precise definition of the minority, and it has
not singled out a specific chapter or section of its corporate law for the treatment of corporate
minorities. This seems similar to other corporate laws of various jurisdictions. 19 Nevertheless, this
does not negate the existence of the statutory protection for minority shareholders under the Saudi
Companies Law of 2015 as it is illustrated later in this thesis.
For this study and in avoidance of the perplexity of the terminology, the term “minority
shareholder” denotes powerless shareholders who are destitute of control over the corporation’s
decisions and its board of directors, irrespective to their ownership interests in the corporate
capital. In most circumstances, if not all, these minorities own less than fifty percent of the capital,
but there are situations where minorities own more than the half, yet they are considered minorities
due to the fact that their ownerships are widely dispersed, or because of the privileges and
preferences the dominant shareholder has secured by contract.
B.

The Definition of Close Corporation

The Saudi Companies Law has neither defined the close corporation status nor has it capped
the number of shareholders the corporation may have. Instead, an enterprise is considered to have
the close corporation status as long as its shares are neither listed on nor traded through the capital
market, irrelevant to the number of its shareholders.

19

See Generally REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE
AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 89–99 (Oxford Univ. Press 2nd. ed. 2009) (presenting that minority
concepts are well articulated by judicial rulings in a number of jurisdictions, such as the United States, the
United Kingdom, Japan, Italy, Germany and France).
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Comparatively, some U.S. state courts have set several definitions that orbit around the special
features of the close corporation. Such features are (1) legal personality, (2) limited liability, (3)
the small number of owners, (4) illiquidity of shares due to the absence of a ready market, and (5)
centralized management.20 Comparably, the Black’s Law Dictionary defines a close corporation
as “[a] corporation whose stock is not freely traded and is held by only a few shareholders (often
with the same family).”21
Alternatively, some jurisdictions have statutorily recognized close corporations as separate
status from the public corporation status and thus have enacted special statutes regulating close
corporations.22 To elect the close corporation status, the law requires that the number of
shareholders not to exceed the statutory cap (e.g., ten or fewer shareholders) to be eligible for such
election. Statutory close corporations differ from regular close corporations whose owners do not
affirmatively elect at the time of incorporation to be a statutory close corporation, and thus subject
to the general corporation law.23
For the purpose of this research, the term “close corporation” is used to indicate incorporated
enterprises with capitals divided into shares that have no ready market through which holders of

20

See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
BRYAN A. GARNER, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 416 (10.ed 2014) (including closely held corporation
and closed corporation in its definition of the close corporation).
22
Such states are California, Delaware, and Arizona.
23
For further discussion about the status of statutory close corporations and its advantages and
disadvantages, see Don Berger, Statutory Close or Closely Held Corporation, 11 PAC. L. J. 699 (1980).
21
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these shares would trade. The terms close corporation, closely held corporation, 24 and joint-stock
company are used interchangeably in this research to mean the same unless otherwise noted. 25

Part II. Minority shareholders’ predicaments in Close Corporations 26
Minority shareholder’s dilemma may seem to be universal in terms of the nature of the issues
minorities across jurisdictions confront.27 Such issues are unmarketability of shares, dilution of
ownership interests, the absence of managerial involvement combined with different expectations
held by minority shareholders, shareholder oppression, and majority opportunism. It is worth
noting that these issues may overlap and interlock, which creates difficulty under which issue a
given scenario should be placed.

24

REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, 12 (Oxford Univ. Press 2nd. ed. 2009) (differentiating between closely held
corporations, whose shares are owned by a few shareholders with important “interpersonal relationships .
. . to the management of the firm,” and widely held corporations, “whose shares are not freely tradeable
but that nevertheless have hundreds or thousands of shareholders.”)
25
Contra the terms of public company, public corporation, quoted companies, and publicly traded
companies are used interchangeably to represent corporations whose shares are listed on and traded
through a stock exchange.
26
Due to the lack of literature about the subject matter in Saudi Arabia, the U.S. literature has been
selected to provide a broad overview about the minority shareholders’ problems in American close
corporations that may take place in Saudi close corporations as well. It is worth keeping in mind that this
article does not excessively cover the development of minority shareholder oppression and other issues in
the United States, rather it provides the reader with a short-cut background and the gist of the subject
matter in an effort to create a blueprint upon which the analysis and exploration of the Saudi Companies
Law is premised.
27
See John H. Matheson & R. Kevin Maler, A Simple Statutory Solution to Minority Oppression in the
Closely Held Business, 91 MINN. L. REV. 657, 758 (2007) (asserting that the issues of minority
shareholders in close corporations are non-conclusive to the United States, but rather “they are part of the
fabric of modern business organization law on a global scale.”) See, e.g., A.J. BOYLE, MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS' REMEDIES 38–59, 90–118 (2002) (demonstrating the company law governing
minority shareholders' remedies from historical, theoretical, and comparative perspectives in the United
Kingdom); Cindy A. Schipani & Junhai Liu, Corporate Governance in China: Then & Now, 2002
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 36–38 (2002) (raising concerns about the severity of minority oppression in
China); Nigel Furry, The Statutory Protection of Minority Shareholders in United Kingdom, 22 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 81 (1987) (analyzing the willingness of the U.K courts to shelter minority
shareholders’ interests).
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A.

Unmarketability of Shares

One of the fundamental features of the corporation is that the interests of business partners are
originally transferable.28 Transferability of shares provides free rein for the corporation to operate
and accomplish its objectives regardless of the change in its owners, who in principle enjoy
liquidity of their interests.29
In close corporations, however, shareholders’ right to transfer their shares does not imply the
tradability of shares. Unlike public companies,30 close corporations lack the market where
shareholders would sell their interests and exit the firm for a fair price. The absence of an
established market entails that displeased shareholders cannot escape from the entity without their
interests being undervalued as a result of the deduction of risks associated with their interests
(minority discount).31 32
As the shares in close corporations lack marketability, they oftentimes undergo a wide range
of restrictions on their transferability. Given the small number of shareholders in the close
corporation and the interpersonal relationships between them, shareholders prefer to place

28

See REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, 11 (Oxford Univ. Press 2nd. ed. 2009) (explaining that transferability of shares
is “[a] basic characteristic of the business corporation”, which makes it distinguishable from the
partnership form, another vehicle to carry out businesses).
29
Id. at 11, footnote 8, (asserting that liquidity of shareholders’ interests gives shareholders an advantage
to have diversified portfolios as free tradability, on the other hand, boosts the liquidity of investments).
30
The traditional corporate norm of free transferability is better associated with publicly held corporations
where a separation between ownership and management exists. “Traditional corporate norms, oriented as
they are toward publicly held corporations, proved unsuitable for close corporations.” See Robert B.
Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 BUS. LAW. 699, 702 (1992).
31
See F. Hodge O’Neal & Walter G. Moeling, IV, Problems of Minority shareholders in Michigan Close
Corporations, 723, 724 14 W AYNE L. REV. 723 (1968); O’KELLEY THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS ch.5 (Aspen Publishers 6th ed. 2010).
32
See Arthur R. Pinto, Protection of Close Corporation Minority Shareholders in the United States, 62
AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 361, 370 Footnote 56 (2014) (“A minority discount reflects the fact that minority
shareholder often lack corporate decision-making power while a lack of marketability discount further
reduces the value of shares because no ready market exists where the shares could be sold or resold. The
prospect of obtaining the minority's shares, and doing so at a discount from ”fair” value, may create
incentives for the majority to squeeze out the minority by one means or another . . . .”)
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restrictions on their shares in an effort to maintain their interests within the group and avoid any
entry of a third party they may dislike. Notwithstanding the rationale behind placing these
restrictions, they are, nevertheless, recognized by corporate laws in most jurisdictions, including
Saudi Arabia, yet the treatment of these restrictions may differ from one to another. 33
B.

Dilution of the Ownership Interests34

Another issue that minority shareholders in close corporations worry about is the dilution of
their shareholdings due to share issuance. As the majority rules the corporation and has the ultimate
say in the corporation’s resolutions, it may at some point issue additional shares and sell them to
itself, or a third party at a favorable price.35 The problem of share issuance exacerbates when the
default law of the pre-emptive rights is eliminated by the bylaws of the corporation or its certificate
of incorporation.36 Otherwise, the majority issues shares at a time when the minority is unable to
exercise its right due to a lack of money to participate in the capital raising.37

33

See REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, 12 (Oxford Univ. Press 2nd. ed. 2009) (emphasizing that “all jurisdictions . . .
provide mechanisms for restricting transferability.”)
34
The statutory treatment for this issue will be extensively discussed and reviewed in another chapter
probing the rules and regulations of joint-stock companies in the Saudi Companies Law of 2015. The
Saudi Companies Law, akin to its counterparts, regulates the issuance of new shares and sets forth rules
for the exercise of preemptive rights in such situations.
35
See F. Hodge O’Neal & Walter G. Moeling, IV, Problems of Minority shareholders in Michigan Close
Corporations, 723, 724 14 W AYNE L. REV. 748 (1968).
36
“[T]he preemptive right of shareholders means to acquire newly issued shares from the corporation of
which they are shareholders is considered to refer to their right to purchase a portion of such shares pro
rata to their existing holdings.” Andrew L. Nichols, Shareholder Preemptive Rights, 39 BOSTON BAR J. 4,
5 (1995).
37
In such cases in the United States, minority shareholders may, based on the fiduciary duty, have a claim
against the majority. See, e.g., Kullgren v. Navy Gas & Supply Co., 110 Colo. 454, 135 P.2d 1007 (1943),
as dominant shareholders wanted to issue shares just to empower themselves. However, if the issuance of
shares were for a good business reason and at a fair price, it would be likely difficult to challenge such a
corporate resolution. See generally Pinto, Protection in the U.S. at 367. See, e.g., Hyman v. Velsicol
Corp., 342 Ill. App. 489, 97 N.E.2d 122 (1951).
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C.

Shareholder Expectations

One of the traditional attributes of the close corporation is the small number of its
shareholders.38 These shareholders act as co-owners of the business, and most of the time they
treat each other as partners.39 Despite the delegation of the management to a separate directorial
body (as a unique facet of the corporation),40 shareholders in close corporations expect to co-run
the business and have a say in its decision-making process.41 The expectations of these
shareholders intensify when the relationships between shareholders embody interpersonal ties and
familial bonds.42 Not only do they advance money for the corporation capital, but they also invest
skills and devote time, hoping to obtain in return not only dividends but also salaried positions in
their corporations.

38

See supra § I, 2.
Close corporations are commonly considered as intimate enterprises that lack the separation between
ownership and management, giving rise to expectations of shareholders far beyond what corporate laws
aim to protect. See Adam Chernichaw, Oppressed Shareholders in Close Corporations: A Market
Oriented Statutory Remedy, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 501, 507 (1994).
40
Delegated management is an essential stone in the corporation personality, and this is what makes
corporations stand out from partnerships, limited liability companies, and business trusts as they “cannot
have a board structure similar to . . . a typical corporation.” See REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, 12 (Oxford Univ.
Press 2nd. ed. 2009)
41
See Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 BUS. LAW. 699, 702
(1992) (“Shareholders in a close corporation usually expect employment and a meaningful role in
management.as well as a return on the money paid for the shares.”)
42
O’KELLEY THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS
447 (Aspen Publishers 6th ed. 2010) (describing close corporations as intimate enterprises that may
conflict with the long-rooted norms of corporate law, such as the lack of separation between the
management of the corporation and its owners’ investments. the relationships between the owners of the
corporation commonly “overlap family or other close personal ties, adding another layer of expectations
and creating various means of interaction beyond that those provided by the structures of entity law.”)
Close corporations built upon close relationships between their shareholders can be also called
“archetypical close corporations,” see Chares O’kelley, Jr., Commentary, Filling Gaps in the Close
Corporations Contract: A Transaction Cost Analysis, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 216, 238 (1992).
39
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This may sound ideal; however, such expectations by minority shareholders put a burden upon
them to secure these positions through contracting ex ante.43 Nevertheless, given the deficiency of
bargaining power and the absence of well-suited corporate law norms to the close corporation’s
extraordinary nature,44 minority shareholders should accept the reality of the majority primacy.45
As long as the majority discharges its duties in good faith and pursuant to its fiduciary duties of
care and loyalty (e.g., lawful elimination of returns on investments or lawful removal from a
directorial or managerial position), the minority does not have much but to be under the majority’s
mercy, given that the statutory remedies are unlikely triggered.46
The absence of the management participation⎯not being on the board of directors or serving
as an officer⎯triggers another issue that the minority shareholders become unaware of the
corporation’s activities and unable to access the corporation’s books and records.47 The blocking
of or the limitation on the access to information has adverse impacts on the exercise of
shareholder’s rights, such as informed voting.48 Also, it leads to an undervaluation of their shares;
these shares are, and will probably be, underpriced because of the risks of uncertainty and lack of
power linked to them.49

43

Contractual protection is claimed to offer greater protection for the minority as it will be shortly
explained. See infra § III, C.
44
See supra § I, B.
45
See, e.g., John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Cooperation, Relationship Management, and
the Trialogical Imperative for Corporate Law, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1443, 1461 (1994) (explaining the
shareholder primacy model as it has the right for the majority to select the corporation’s fate and
formulate its policies and goals
46
See Pinto, Protection in the U.S. at 366, (“Unless there is such a showing or some contractual right or
understanding that dividends should be paid, there is no right to receive a return through a dividend.”)
47
See Keith Rogers, Protecting Minority Shareholders in Alaska Close Corporations, 24 ALASKA L. REV.
45, 58 (2007).
48
The right to access the books and records of a corporation under the Saudi Companies Law of 2015 is
discussed in a subsequent chapter.
49
As shown under the Unmarketability subtitle, closely held corporations lack the liquidity feature that is
recognized in publicly traded corporations. Shareholders in these corporations cannot easily liquidate
their investments or at least get fair value for their interests without deduction of the risks involved in
such ownership interests. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, when the minority shareholders are neither elected nor selected for corporate paid
positions, the only remaining hope for them is to at least receive dividends in return for their
investments in the corporate capital. However, the decision to distribute dividends is at the
majority’s discretion.50 Unless the majority abuses its discretion or acts in bad faith, minority
shareholders appear to be handcuffed and “in danger of being frozen out”51 as the returns on their
investments may be eliminated for an indefinite period.52 Of course, the abuse of power and refusal
to declare dividends are subject to, and a question of fact left to, the judiciary deciding case by
case and checking whether the majority has breached its fiduciary duties.53 Failure to meet the
expectations of minority shareholders may, the court finds, constitute oppression as a cause of
action and thus a justifiable claim for remedy.54
D.

Majority Opportunism and Oppression55

Due to the minority shareholder’s vulnerable position, the majority may find it tempting to
take actions that may sound oppressive of minority shareholders. In other words, the fragile

50

However, some corporate laws have quite different treatments for dividend distributions. The rules of
dividends in the Saudi Companies Law will be explained later in this research.
51
See Keith Rogers, Protecting Minority Shareholders in Alaska Close Corporations, 24 ALASKA L. REV.
45, 58 (2007) (asserting that “the two ways…for an investor to receive a return on her investment . . . are
through employment with the company and through dividends. Unless a minority shareholder is able to
secure her rights through a shareholders’ agreement or a supermajority voting provision in the charter at
the inception of a close corporation, . . . the majority can use its voting power to deny her a job and refuse
to declare dividends.”) See Also F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL’S CLOSE
CORPORATIONS §1.09 (3d ed. 1994).
52
See Michael E. Brown, Missouri Close Corporations: Proposals to Strengthen Protections for Minority
Shareholders, 68 UMKC L. REV. 145, 146 (1999).
53
See, e.g., Miller v. Magline, Inc., 256 N.W.2d 761 (Mich. App. 1977) (stipulating that denying dividend
to shareholders was a breach of fiduciary duty owed by the directors according to their history); Nixon v.
Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993) (rejecting the equal opportunity doctrine that offer greater
protection for shareholders of close corporations).
54
See Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 BUS. LAW. 699, 708
(1992) (“Oppressive conduct by the majority …is listed widely in most state dissolution statutes, and…
the principal vehicle used by legislatures, courts, and litigants to address the particular needs of close
corporations.”)
55
Sometimes statues and corporate laws refer to oppression as “unfairly prejudicial.” See e.g., Alaska,
California, and Minnesota.
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standing of minority shareholders may adversely incentivize the majority to perform
opportunistically. The majority opportunism⎯along with the subsequent conflict of interests
between the majority and the minority⎯ is also considered one of the agency problems,56 as
Kraakman and his co-authors refer to it as “the second agency problem.”57
Oppression of minority shareholders transpires when an individual or a group of owners
decides to ostracize or minimize the influence of their partners, whose expectations then become
defeated and frustrated. The rationale behind these oppressive activities varies from one case to
another, ranging from hunger for power, the dream of avarice, and personality clashes to the death
of the founder.58
In general, the concept of minority shareholder oppression has been the subject of both
legislative and judicial interventions. In terms of the legislative response, several corporate laws
and statutes have warranted a finding of oppression of minority shareholders in close corporations
a cause of action for the termination of the business and the dissolution of the corporation.59
Nevertheless, the legislatures have left the door open for the judiciary to interpret and define
oppression and then filter, via case-by-case analysis, what actions could establish it.

56

An agency problem is an economic term used whenever the welfare of one party (the principal)
depends upon the actions taken by another party (the agent). It is also known as the principal-agent
problem. REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, 35 (Oxford Univ. Press 2nd. ed. 2009).
57
In the corporate context, the second agency problem occurs as a result of a conflict of interest between
the majority shareholder (the principal) and the minority shareholders (the agent). However, it is worth
noting that this problem raises to the surface whenever a group of the business’s owners has power over
the resolutions impacting the remainder of owners. For example, minority shareholders with veto rights
See Id. at 36.
58
The death of the founder of the business seems to be a common motive for oppression in Saudi Arabia,
given the special nature of Sharia inheritance rules. See infra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
59
See, e.g., Missouri Revised Statutes, MO. Rev. Stat § 351.494 (2012) (citing grounds for judicial
dissolution).
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Unlike fraudulent and illegal acts,60 the definition of oppression has been judicially-developed
to be different from fraud and illegality.61 Many states in the United States, have found that
oppression should be construed to encompass an array of circumstances dealing with abusive
conduct, such as a lack of shareholder’s integrity, harsh treatment toward the minority, and
prejudice against it.62 Without the oppression concept and its judicially-widened definition,
minority shareholders would otherwise have no cause of action and no ground to bring a lawsuit
since these actions are beyond the illegality and fraud theories.63
The issues of minority shareholders⎯the absence of the ready market, the owners’
expectations, and the dilution of ownership interests⎯ have all together paved the way for the

60

See J. A. C. Hetherington, Defining the Scope of Controlling Shareholders' Fiduciary Responsibilities,
22 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 9, 40 (1987) (drawing a distinction among the terms fraud, illegality, and
oppression. On the one hand “illegality and fraud are terms with relatively clear legal meanings and
include violations of statutory requirements and misappropriations of corporate assets.” On the other
hand, “[oppression] must refer to conduct not embraced by either of these terms.”)
61
Another distinction between fraud and illegality on the one hand and oppression of the other is that the
former appears to be directed at only “the shareholder’s investment in the corporation,” while oppression
is directed at the shareholder himself. See Pinto, Protection in the U.S. at footnote 79.
62
In the famous case Matter of Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1180 (N.Y. 1984), the court sets
a test for what may constitutes oppression, stating that “[defining oppressive conduct] has been resolved
by considering oppressive actions to refer to conduct that substantially defeats the "reasonable
expectations" held by minority shareholders in committing their capital to the particular enterprise . . . A
shareholder who reasonably expected that ownership in the corporation would entitle him or her to a job,
a share of corporate earnings, a place in corporate management, or some other form of security, would be
oppressed in an authentic sisense when others in the corporation seek to defeat those expectations.” See
also McLaughlin v. Schenck, 220 P.3d 146, 150 (Utah 2009), which ruled that the shareholder majority
owes a duty of “utmost faith” to the minority counterpart.
63
Some scholars who have been influenced by law and economics, “dominant mode of corporate
scholarships,” have criticized the common use of “reasonable expectations” criterion by courts of almost
all states across the United States, except Delaware, Kansas, and Oklahoma, which have turned down the
exceptional protection for minority shareholders in close corporations. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
273 (1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6804(d) (1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 1094 (West 1987).
Generally See, Benjamin Means, A Contractual Approach to Shareholder Oppression Law, 79 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1161, 1163 (2010); Douglas K. Moll, Reasonable Expectations v. Implied-in-Fact Contracts: Is
the Shareholder Oppression Doctrine Needed?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 989, 1002 (2001) (spotting the increase
use of reasonable expectations standard); Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to
the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
129, 142 (2003) (Defending the longstanding employment of law and economics as a “ dominant
theoretical paradigm” to perceive and evaluate law and policy). See, e.g., Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d
1366, 1379–81 (Del. 1993); Richards v. Bryan, 879 P.2d 638, 648 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994).
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majority to engage in oppressive conduct. The oppression of minority shareholders may strike by
limitless devices that can be cataloged into two categories in conjunction with the on-ground
consequence each technique generates: squeeze-out and freeze-out devices. The squeeze-out
devices are actions that are taken by the majority to remove the unwelcome minority. Such actions
include merger consolidation,64 dissolution, and compulsory share exchange. 65
The second category includes devices that deprive the minority of any return on their
investments or exit the company for a fair price for their interests. These devices lock the minority
in the company, divest them of their voice in the corporation management, and freeze their
interests. Such actions include withholding of dividends, paying high compensations to the
managers and officers of the majority shareholders,66 siphoning off corporate assets, 67 abusing
share issuance rights, and the misappropriating corporate opportunity. 68
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The merger is an effective procedure that is deemed to be useful to get rid of the minority shareholders.
See, e.g., Matteson v. Ziebarth, 40 Wash. 2d 286, 242 P.2d 1025 (1952).
65
Accord F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL’S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS ch.1, § 1.01, at 1 (2d ed. 1997) (defining oppressive conduct as “the use by some of the
owners or participants in a business enterprise of strategic position, inside information, or powers of
control, or the utilization of some legal device or technique, to eliminate from the enterprise one or more
of its owners or participants.” The authors go further to subcategorize squeeze-outs to “partial squeezeouts” and define them as mechanisms that “reduces the participation or powers of a group of participants
in the enterprise, diminishes their claims or earnings or assets, or otherwise deprives them of business
income or advantages to which they are entitled." See Id. at 1–2, (discussing a partial squeeze-out).
66
Large remunerations for directors and officers coupled with the refusal to declare dividends establish a
cause of action and claim for relief. See O’Neal & Moeling, Michigan Close Corporations, footnote 42.
67
In many cases, majority shareholders execute a contract between the corporation and another
corporation they own to drain the corporation’s assets; see O’Neal & Moeling, Michigan Close
Corporations at 734. another way to deploy the corporation’s monetary resources is “[by] form of high
salaries or rents, insulated from judicial review by the business judgment rule.” See Thompson, Cause of
Action at 703.
68
For detailed freeze-outs devices such as management buyouts, short-form mergers, and reverse stock
splits, see Julian Javier Garza, Rethinking Corporate Governance: The Role of Minority Shareholders - A
Comparative Study, 31 ST. MARY'S L.J. 613, 622–625 (2000); 2 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B.
THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS ch.8, § 8.13, at 67–68 (3d ed. 1998); JAMES D. COX ET AL.,
CORPORATIONS § 23.2, at 611 (1997).
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Along with the negative impacts on the business generated by the oppressive conduct, disputes
and dissension among the owners also produce negative publicity that makes potential investors
hearing about the oppressive conduct inside the corporation shun investing in it.69

Part III. Strategies to Protect the Minority Shareholders
Overview
The issues of minority shareholders in close corporations are addressed differently by each
state and country. However, the approaches to solving the minority conundrum can be narrowed
down into three strategies: the legislative strategy, the judicial strategy, and the contractual
strategy.
Moreover, the timing of these strategies plays a pivotal role in the investment decisions as
individuals advance and risk some of their fortunes in expectation of a job or role in the corporate
management along with returns on their investments in the business.70
For instance, the contractual strategy or the contractual protection of minority shareholders is
an ex ante approach, as shareholders together decide (in advance and before committing their
money for the sake of the business) on the provisions that redesign the corporation’s default
features in order to make it more suitable to meet their own needs.
On the contrary, the judicial strategy serves as ex post protection for minority shareholders.
Grieved shareholders afflicted by oppressive conduct by opportunistic majority shareholders
demand justice and ask for oppression to be lifted. Flip thinking of the judicial protection shows
that even if the role of the judiciary appears after the occurrence of the dispute, lawyers and

See O’Neal & Moeling, Michigan Close Corporations at 731.
See Thompson, Cause of Action at 702, (arguing that close corporations as described intimate
enterprises are not only channels for investments of monetary contributions in the capital, but also an
opportunity for the investment of human capital).
69
70
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counselors drafting bylaws, shareholder agreements, or other organizational documents may
benefit from the existing rules to anticipate potential issues their clients may encounter down the
road.71
The legislative strategy, or so-called statutory protection, embraces the protection for the
minority shareholders both ex ante and ex post. Note that both ex ante and ex post forms of
protection predate the incorporation of an entity; the statutory protection is already out there in the
form of corporate law, regulation, supplement, or statute. However, these statutory protective
provisions may be classified based on the nature of the subject matter to which each rule or article
is applicable. For example, articles concerning the operation of the board of directors, the
regulations of shareholder assemblies and share issuance are thought to be ex ante, as they aim at
ensuring the minimum requirements for healthy operation of the company. The ex post protection
for the minority shareholders is a mixture of rules and articles that take place after the occurrence
of disputed conduct, such as oppression or the criminal accountability of corporate officers in
intentional mismanagement. Such misconduct triggers the related rules and thus bring into the
arena the ex post role of the judiciary.
In sum, the protection of minority shareholders can be divided into three sorts based on what
each strategy yields: statutory protection, judicial protection, and contractual protection.
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The researcher is of the opinion that lawyers in the United States, for example, have a crystal image of
the judicial treatment for minority shareholder’s oppression due to the massive literature and legal
scholarships of the subject matter, as well as the large body of case precedent to rely upon. In contrast, it
seems to be challenging for lawyers practicing in Saudi Arabia to have a clear perception about the
treatment of the Saudi Judiciary due to many factors, such as the shortage publications of courts’ rulings
in the subject matter and the novelty of the statute concerning it. Therefore, it still seems that the judicial
approach in Saudi Arabia lacks the ex ante protection that may be found in the United States or other
jurisdictions.
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A.

The Statutory Protection

In reviewing the statutory protection of minority shareholders across several jurisdictions, one
can conclude that corporate laws along with other related regulations vary in their degrees of
protecting minority shareholders.72 Some jurisdictions offer a greater protective system for the
minority, as opposed to the ones with limited legislative resources for minority shareholder
protection. The forms of legislative protection may be signified in the adoption of strong corporate
governance practices, the special statutory treatment for close corporations, the approval of the
heightened duties upon majority shareholders, statutory remedies, the mandatory buyouts, and the
statutory criminalization of the abuse of power and mismanagement by directors and officers. All
of which are indicators that are utilized to determine whether an X jurisdiction is more or less
favorable to protect its minority shareholders. 73
1. Strengthening Corporate Governance and Boosting Shareholder’s Rights
The Statutory adoption of good corporate governance rules confidently enhances the protection
for minority shareholders in close corporations.74 Such an adoption should be followed by vigorous
enforcement of the statutory shareholder rights stipulated in corporate laws. However, these rights
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See, e.g., Matheson & Maler, Simple Solution at 700, (conducting a comprehensive state-by-state
analysis of the minority shareholder protection premised upon both cases ruled by courts and statutes and
laws enacted by legislatures regarding oppression in fifty states).
73
This statutory approach has, nevertheless, received some criticism. According to the opposite side,
statutory protection is overreaching and extends its protection for the minority shareholders who did not
contract for such protection. See Arthur R. Pinto, Protection of Close Corporation Minority Shareholders
in the United States, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 361, 370, 376 (2014) (criticizing the statutory approach as
it “could undermine private ordering, the freedom to bargain, and the important role of contracting ex
ante for protection and the most efficient results).
74
See Julian Javier Garza, Rethinking Corporate Governance: The Role of Minority Shareholders - A
Comparative Study, 31 ST. MARY’S L.J. 613, 696 (2000) (“Minority shareholders may not control the
company, but their role in a corporation through minority rights, fiduciary duties, requirements of fair
dealing and good faith, private agreements, and derivative suits influences corporate governance and
makes minority shareholders significant players in the corporate world.”)
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vary in conjunction with the legislatures’ desires and how far they are willing to go to protect the
minority shareholders and improve their positions.
Several rights and rules enshrined in the corporate law can mirror the robustness of its
corporate governance and its stand for minority shareholders. Some of these rules, for instance,
are the adoption of the cumulative voting system, the statutory shareholder meeting, the separation
between the chairperson and the C.E.O, and the constraints on the number and duration of the
members of the board.
2. Special Statutory Treatment for Close Corporations
Another indicator of strong statutory protection for minority shareholders comes from the
special treatment that close corporations enjoy in some jurisdictions. For a long time, legislative
bodies in most jurisdictions have deviated the fact that close corporations are of special nature and
thus should not be dealt with as public corporations.
In response, a number of jurisdictions have enacted some special rules and regulations that are
well-designed to satisfy the increasing needs of close corporations. These regulations and
supplements often provide tailored corporate governance rules that suit the nature of the close
corporations.
3. Statutory Remedies
a. Dissolution
Dissolution is widely listed in most states’ dissolution laws as “the principal vehicle used by
legislatures, courts, and litigants to address the particular needs of close corporations.” 75 Most
states offer the minority statutory grounds based upon which it may seek dissolution of the
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See Thompson, Cause of Action at 709.
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corporation.76 Nevertheless, courts have differed in the circumstances under which they grant this
harsh remedy as corporate statutes lay various grounds for judicial dissolution.77
b. Alternative Remedies
With respect to the severity of involuntary dissolution and in avoidance of such an extreme
remedy,78 legislatures have provided courts with greater flexibility to impose less drastic remedies
in oppression cases for on-going businesses (instead of these viable businesses’ being wrecked by
dissolution). The courts, in turn, are more inclined to grant alternative reliefs short of dissolution. 79
Some alternative reliefs that corporate statutes make available to the courts are the appointment of
the custodian, reorganization of the corporation’s charter and bylaws, or a forced buy-out.
One of the judicially-applied alternative remedies is mandatory buyouts.80 The buy-out
provision forces corporations to buy the shareholding of the complaining shareholder at a fair
market price. Some courts may order a buy-out even in the absence of statutory or judicial
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Except in Delaware, Kansans, and Oklahoma states, these states deny the involuntary dissolution of a
close corporation unless it has two shareholders with equally divided ownership interests. See supra note
63. Note that these three states have adopted alternative remedies to solve the dilemma of minority
shareholder oppression. Such an alternative is the appointment of custodians. Also, Delaware and Kansan
have special statutes for close corporations that offer additional remedies, if the corporation elects the
close corporation status. See Thompson, Cause of Action at 709.
77
See, e.g., Rogers, Alaska Close Corporations at 58, (A minority shareholder may sue based on the
available grounds for dissolution, which “[includes]: (1) that the majority has engaged in the gross
misconduct []; (2) that there is deadlock; and, (3) in the case of corporations with fewer than thirty-five
shareholders.” Dissolution is reasonably necessary for the protection of the rights or interests of the
complaining shareholders.)
78
See Matthew C. Lucas, Revoking the Irrevocable Buyout: Aligning Equity with Due Diligence in
Corporate Dissolution, 75 ALB. L. REV. 15, 15 (2011) (referring dissolution of the business as “one of the
most acrimonious, expensive, and, by almost all accounts, unpopular of legal remedies available in
business litigation.”)
79
Some of the alternative remedies include changes or cancelation of any provision of the incorporation’s
articles, the bylaws, corporate decisions, the sale of the corporate property and franchises of the
corporation to a specific purchaser, removing officers or directors, requiring an accounting ,or ordering
payment of dividends or damages. See, e.g., The Model Statutory Close Corporation Supplement,
embraced by several states, has nine examples of remedies.
80
See, e.g., Matheson & Maler, Simple Solution, at 665, (asserting that a “buyout of the complaining
shareholder's shares is also the rule in eighty percent of the states: about forty states provide this remedy,
either through statute or through common law.”)
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authorization, or even in the absence of a request to the court by the corporation or a majority
shareholder.
4. The Statutory Criminalization
Another statutory approach to protect the corporation and the interests of its shareholders is
the statutory criminalization of some malfeasance by corporate officers and directors.
Criminalizing misconduct acts as a deterrence, especially when it entails severe penalties, such as
fines, incarceration or both. 81
B.

The Judicial Protection

Courtrooms are the battlefields for the oppressed to restore justice and have some sense of
fairness as the management of their corporations along with their business partners deprives them
of their rights. This puts a burden upon the courts to re-balance the relationships between the
owners in light of the special nature of the close corporations on the one hand, and the fairness and
equity principles on the other.
The courts play an indispensable role in promoting justice and fashioning doctrines and rules
that are applicable to close corporations, while legislatures might have overlooked the differences
between public corporations and close corporations in drafting corporate statutes and codes. In the
United States, for instance, courts across the country have given birth to several judicially-created
doctrines and principles that fill the gaps the legislative left in the handling of the close
corporations.82 They have always intermeshed laws with the altering business atmosphere.
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It will be thoroughly analyzed later in this research.
This claim, however, is not without controversy; the Delaware Supreme Court in Nixon v. Blackwell
ruled against the creation of judicial doctrine to shelter minority shareholders from oppression, and
asserted that it is within the legislative branch to formulate such a doctrine or rule. See Matheson &
Maler, Simple Solution at 663.
82
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Along with Common law, some state legislatures have empowered courts with an array of
delegations over the close corporation matters. For example, defining oppression as a cause of
action,83 and imposing statutory remedies such as dissolution, buyouts, and the assignment of a
receiver or custodian. Some courts have even gone beyond the statutory functions (and sometimes
authorization)84 assigned to them in the protection of minority shareholders, so they manufactured
the heightened partnership duty on majority shareholders, in addition to the conventional corporate
duties of care and loyalty owed by majority shareholders, as directors and officers, to the
corporation.
The Heightened Partnership Duty upon Majority Shareholders
A number of U.S. courts have adopted an enhanced duty that a close corporation majority, in
its shareholder’s capacity, owes the minority shareholders a heightened duty of care akin to the
duty upon partners in the partnership, where the relationship between partners is of “utmost good
faith”85 and trust and confidence. 86 Judges have become more inclined to broaden the minority
shareholders’ ability to file a direct cause of action against the majority’s breach of duty. 87
The birth of the partner-like fiduciary duty offers a greater extent of protection for the minority
shareholders because this sort of protection is assumed to be tailored to any given circumstances,
in aid for the trapped and oppressed minority shareholders.88 To find a breach of this duty is a
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See the discussion about oppression and the U.S. judicial definition in § II, D.
See Thompson, Cause of Action, footnote 70, (emphasizing that courts lean to grant alternative
remedies even in the absence of legislative ground or statutory authorization to grant a remedy).
85
James M. Jr. Van Vliet & Mark D. Snider, The Evolving Fiduciary Duty Solution for Shareholders
Caught in a Closely Held Corporation Trap, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 239, 252 (1998) (referring to the
heightened duty of shareholders as a “golden rule” in a corporate setting).
86
See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Schenck, 220 P.3d 146, 150 (Utah 2009) (confirming that minority
shareholders are owed a fiduciary duty of “utmost good faith”); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328
N.E.2d 505, 512 (Mass. 1975) (“Just as in a partnership, the relationship among the stockholders must be
one of trust, confidence and absolute loyalty if the enterprise is to succeed.”)
87
supra note 84.
88
Id.
84
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question of facts, yet the breach of the duty in close corporations oftentimes arises out of the
disproportionate treatment against the minority, the frustration of its reasonable expectations, or
the freeze-out or squeeze-out action.89 Without a heightened duty, some conduct may be
considered oppressive, unfair to the minority, yet their legality would be undoubted if courts
examined the action under the ordinary duties of care and loyalty.90
However, the degree of the protection afforded to the minority shareholders by the judiciary
(by its broadened definition of oppression or the creation of the enhanced duty) has received a
great deal of criticism, namely by the advocates of the contractarian view and the scholars of law
and economics. An optimal level of protection for minority shareholders, they contend, is reached
by shareholder’s contracting ex ante.
C.

Contractual Protection

In the view of contractarians,91 the corporation is a nexus of contracts into which individuals
out of their own free will enter.92 In this context, shareholders should contract for their protection.
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For further thorough illustration of the three categories and U.S authorities on the subject matter, See
Id. 525–561.
90
In opposition to this claim, another competing viewpoint, in accordance to standard law and economics,
argues that imposing an additional duty upon the majority shareholders factually wrongly empowers the
minority with an additional weapon, and the understanding of close corporations in Delaware will
eventually dominate in the corporate law. Instead, shareholders are better protected by contracting ex
ante. For an insightful look at this counterargument, see Mary Siegel, Fiduciary Duty Myths in Close
Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 490 (2004).
91
See Benjamin Means, A Contractual Approach to Shareholder Oppression Law, 79 FORDHAM L. REV.
1161 (2011) (citing contractarians as those who “view corporate law as simply a modest extension of
contract law.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on
the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1619 (1989).
92
See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 830 (2002) (asserting that a
corporation is a “web of explicit and implicit contracts establishing rights and obligations . . . ”); Michael
Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 779–80
(2006).
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Contracting before investing is often believed to be the best approach for the minority shareholders
to guarantee their rights, safeguard their expectations, and preclude the shareholder opportunism.93
The contractual protection for minority shareholders comes in a variety of devices that are
tailored to meet the expectations of shareholders and affirmatively shield them from opportunistic
or oppressive conduct. Some predominant devices commonly used in the protection of the
shareholder expectations are shareholder agreement, long-term employment contract, and the
incorporation of protective provisions in the corporation bylaws and charter.94
1. Shareholder Agreement
The shareholder agreement is a prominent device to protect the interests of not only the
minority shareholders but also the majority ones.95 It is a contract frequently utilized in support of
the efficient and sustainable operation of the firm. Moreover, it serves as a gap-filling device for
the loopholes that are left unfilled by the legislation.96 To keep up with the rapidity norm of the
business, contracts are undoubtedly faster to respond to corporate contingencies than enacting new
laws or amending current ones.97
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For insightful discussion about the contractual approach to shareholder protection, see Paula J. Dalley,
The Misguided Doctrine of Stockholder Fiduciary Duties, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 175, 221 (2004)
(opposing the courts’ intervention as it may “rewrite the contract and provide a windfall to the minority”);
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 229
(1991) (emphasizing the importance of contractual devices to ensure the flow of returns on investments);
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 830 (2002) (stating that shareholders
who desire more freedom to dissolve the corporations should bargain for such a right before investing).
94
F. HODGE O’NEAL, “SQUEEZE-OUTS” OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS – EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF
BUSINESS ASSOCIATES (1975)
95
A consensual shareholders’ agreement represents a comprehensive understanding among all
shareholders about the expectations of each one of them before they embark upon a business.
96
See Charles R. Jr. O’Kelley, Filling Gaps in the Close Corporation Contract: A Transaction Cost
Analysis, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 216, 253 (1992) (“The close corporation contract assigns primary gap-filling
authority to majority shareholders, and gives secondary, discretionary gap-filling authority to courts.”)
97
See F. Hodge O'Neal, Oppression of Minority Shareholders: Protecting Minority Rights, 35 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 121, 143–146 (1987).
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Drafting such a contract requires in-depth knowledge of the existing corporate-related laws
and case laws, as well as skills to extrapolate the future from the status quo of the would-be
business partners. 98 Many of the business partners’ clashes and conflicts are negative outcomes
following shareholders’ oblivion to what awaits them down the road. 99 At the outset of the
business, shareholders are often short-sighted as they fail to apprehend the potential struggles and
oppression in the absence of the protective provisions beforehand.100
For a robust protective shareholder agreement, attorneys and legal practitioners are well-suited
to perform such work. It is exceedingly advised that soon-to-be shareholders should have their
legal representatives draft and review this agreement before they are bound to it. Such
representatives are widely acquainted with the regulatory framework of the corporations, and more
familiar with the judicial decisions involving a close corporation’s wrangle. They shoulder the
burden to examine shareholders and figure out any potential dissension that may occur during the
lifetime of the corporation. 101
The protection of minority shareholders through the shareholder agreement comes in forms of
a non-exhaustive list of protective and preventive provisions and clauses that can be fashioned to
meet the shareholders’ needs case-by-case. Such clauses are, for instance, veto power, restriction
on the transfer of shares, and a choice of law clause. 102 It is of the attorneys’ duty to point out to
shareholders the consequences of each provision, such as the advantages and disadvantages of the
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Id.
See infra note 107.
100
See infra note 107.
101
Molano Leon, Ricardo, Shareholders' Agreements in Close Corporations and Their Enforcement, the
Student Works and Orgs. at Digital Commons, Georgia Law, paper. 89 (2006).
102
Supra note 97.
99
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provision and any substitutional course of action as well as the problems it entails in a court of
law.103
2. Long-Term Employment Contract
In return on their capital investments, shareholders expect to occupy salaried positions in their
corporations. A well-fashioned employment contract can fence such an expectation in a precaution
against exclusion or deprivation of working for the corporation. 104 To have a protective
employment contract, shareholders are advised to tie part of their remunerations with the
prosperity of the corporation in the form of, for example, bounces or percentages of profits.
Another protective clause is one that guards the shareholder-employee against any oppressive
termination of employment, failure to renew the contract or breach of it. Examples of this sort of
clause are liquidated damages, severance package, mandatory offer to purchase the shareholder’s
shares or a lifetime pension.105
3. Protective Provisions in Corporate Charters and Bylaws
Another contractual approach to effective protection for the minority shareholders is to include
the corporate charters and bylaws some provisions that ensure the minority shareholder’s
participation in the management and decision-making.106 Such a provision is the unanimity or
super-majority vote requirement for appointing the members of the board or deciding on
fundamental corporate actions (e.g., mergers and share issuance). These provisions implicitly
embolden shareholders to veto opportunistic transactions. To back up these provisions, minority
shareholders should be continuously represented in the board of directors to exercise their
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Id.
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bargained-for rights, which can be attained by, for example, the share classification and the
staggered board provision.
Tackling close corporation issues beforehand through contracting may sound ideal on the book,
yet this is not always the case in the world of close corporations, which are dominantly owned by
family or people sharing interpersonal bonds. 107 In reality, the enthusiasm to commence the
business with blind trust among shareholders hypnotizes them so that they cannot foresee anything
but success and a lucrative business ahead.108 Furthermore, minority shareholders at the kickoff of
a business often lack the bargaining power to contract for their rights. Also, this approach requires
minority shareholders to squander much time and bear high costs.109 In addition, contracts demand
reliability upon the judiciary to construe and enforce them, yet the judicial bodies of developing
countries at large still run behind the rapidly-developed business sector, including corporations. 110
Therefore, this infers that vigorous interventions by the statutory and judicial branches to monitor
and keep corporations in check are of great necessity.111
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See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 108 (2010) (stating that
shareholders of close corporation oftentimes “lack either the foresight to plan for the breakdown of their
relationship, or could not easily figure out how to balance the dangers of freeze-in against the risk that a
member would use a power to dissolve the corporation to oust a comember.”); Benjamin Means, A
Contractual Approach to Shareholder Oppression Law, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1163 (2011) (“[F]ellow
investors are often family members or friends. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that investors
often fail to anticipate and bargain against future oppression, especially regarding problems that may not
surface until later generations assume control of the business.”)
108
Id.
109
Id. at 1164, (claiming that “if an investor has plenty of both, and thinks added clarity is worth the
bother, there is a limit to what can be effectively dealt with ahead of time”).
110
See, e.g., Bernard S. Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law,109
HARV. L. REV. 1911 (1996) ([A] company law that depends on fast and reliable judicial decisions is
simply out of the question in many emerging markets.); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling
Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1620 (1989)
(contending that long-term contract requires “judicial involvement[that] is not an aberration but an
integral part of such contracting”). Coffee characterizes the judicial monitoring as a “key tradeoff” in that
“we counterbalance contractual freedom with ex post judicial review.” Id. at 1621.
111
See Benjamin Means, A Contractual Approach to Shareholder Oppression Law, 79 FORDHAM L. REV.
1163 (2011) (“In a long-term contract rife with gaps that a party can exploit to further its own interests at
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In sum, if the minority shareholders fail to defend their expectations and protect their own
interests through bargaining for their rights,112 they still should be sheltered by a protective
legislature and judiciary. Even if each approach has its role, they all work hand in hand to serve
the trapped minority shareholders and their interests in close corporations in conjunction with the
corporate norms.

Conclusion
Although the terminology of minority shareholders and close corporations breed confusion, it
is of importance to settle upon the meaning of these terms throughout the research as they describe
shareholders with no power over the management of the corporation that is unlisted on a securities
market. This definition of minority shareholders and close corporations offers a broader meaning
since it is not only limited to who owns less than a half of the capital but also it embraces
shareholders who have majority ownership interests but lack the power over the corporation’s
administration. In addition, it encompasses close corporations that would not have the close status
under the numerical limit on shareholders.
Worldwide, the close corporation’s structure has often caused inherent difficulties for some
shareholders. The minority shareholders often fear being trapped in a corporation whose shares
are not freely alienable. Furthermore, these shareholders commonly expect to occupy a managerial
capacity as it is the primary source of return on their investments. Such expectations, however, are
often frustrated unless they are bargained-for. Also, the special feature of centralized management

the expense of the other parties to the agreement, the possibility of bad-faith opportunism12 is everpresent and robust judicial monitoring seems not only helpful, but necessary.”)
112
See Robert B. Thompson, The Law’s Limits on Contracts in a Corporation, 15 J. CORP. L. 377, 394
(1990) (highlighting the significance of the judicial branch in shareholders’ arrangements as “a close
corporation is like a long-term relational contract in which benefits for all parties necessarily depend on
unstated assumptions. A fully contingent contract cannot be drafted, so some ex post settling up by courts
is used to support these assumptions”).
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may lure majority shareholders into engaging in oppressive or opportunistic conduct against
others. These widespread issues of minority shareholders in closely held company call for the
intervention to rectify the minority’s situation.
In response to the those above and in protection of the vulnerable standing of the minority
shareholders, the legislative and judicial branches have intervened to recognize the distinctive
needs of the close corporations and the knotty problems they pose. This recognition comes in a
variety of forms (such as the judicially-developed “reasonable expectation” standard in the U.S.
or the special statutory supplement designed for close corporations) to ultimately protect the
minority and curb any abusive conduct by the majority. These curative interventions come as some
minorities fail to protect their expectations and prevent any potential misconduct and oppression
against the minority through ex ante contracting. The contractual approach is another device to
address minority shareholder problems, yet such an approach is less effective in the absence of
equal bargaining power among parties.
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Chapter Two: Corporate Laws and Regulations of Business Organizations
in Saudi Arabia
“Laws should be like clothes. They should be made to fit the people they are meant to serve.”
Clarence Darrow

Motivating Hypothetical
After Saad realizes the issues associated with his father’s offer and the complexity of the
corporation structure, he is now wondering how corporations operate in Saudi Arabia, and by what
laws and regulations his father and he will be bound. Before jumping into the internal legal system
of the corporation, he wants to learn about the regulatory framework governing the corporation
and be educated about how public companies differ from close ones.

The Scope of Chapter Two
This chapter aims at delineating the corporate arena in Saudi Arabia and sets up the legal ground
upon which the corporation is incorporated and regulated. It is divided into two sections. The first
section offers a comprehensive overview of the legal structure governing Saudi corporations. This
includes a historical snapshot of the inception and the developments of the Saudi corporate laws
and regulations. The second section maps out the unique structure of the ownership in the region.
This encapsulates, on the one hand, the ownership structure of publicly-traded corporations
(including state-controlled corporations, and family-controlled corporations) and the ownership
structure of closely held corporations by state and family, on the other hand.

40

Part I. Laws and Regulations of Saudi Corporations
A. Principal Laws
1. The Commercial Court Law (CCL)
In 1931 and before the unification of the Kingdom, the Commercial Court Law launched the
advent of regulating commerce in the region.113 It consists of 633 articles that govern a range of
commercial activities, such as the bills of exchange, maritime commerce, and the corporation.114
Only seven out of 633 articles were cut to regulate corporations. These articles provided no
elaborate guidelines but the types of business organizations it considered lawful at that time. 115
The deficiency of the CCL to regulate broad aspects of corporate activities (e.g., the incorporation,
the governance, the dissolution, and the liquidation) alongside the growing number of the
companies necessitated the enactment of a new and separate law recognizing the recent
socioeconomic developments.116
2. The Companies Law of 1965
In response to the call of modernization following the oil discovery in the region and the
absence of governing rules for corporations, the state issued its first-ever corporate law to regulate
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The founder of the Third Kingdom, King Abdulaziz, promulgated the Commercial Court Law on the
second of June of 1931 by royal decree No. 32. This Law was mainly drawn on it French counterpart, and
“ . . . was among other civil, maritime, criminal and civil and criminal [sic] procedural legal changes
brought about in the [nineteenth].” See AlMajid at 174. See Also George N. Sfeir, The Saudi Approach to
Law Reform, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 729, 730 (1988).
114
AlMajid, at 174.
115
These organizations included general partnership, limited liability partnership and joint-stock
corporation. See Almajid, at 176 (attributing the adoption of these organizations to their origin in the
Islamic literature).
116
Id. (asserting that even though the Law is still “valid in principle”, a bunch of its articles and rules
were superseded by more specialized statues and laws in different areas. For example, companies law,
negotiable instruments, and “other single-purpose regulations with limited competence and scope”).
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all sorts of organizations existing at that time. 117 It raised the number of forms of organizations
allowed to operate to seven.118 Like other Saudi laws and regulations at that phase, the Law copied
virtually the Egyptian Companies Act, which was fashioned after the French Companies Code. 119
Emphasis should be added that the Law affirmed strict conformity with Sharia in implementing
the Law.120
In a nutshell, the law comprised of 233 articles formulating the regulatory framework for all
organizations in the region, including the close corporations—principal to the present thesis.
Chapter five of the Law regulated all aspects of joint-stock corporations (close and public) in 100
articles.121 Such aspects were the incorporation, shareholder meetings, shareholder rights, merger
rules, and public offerings. It also embraced a modest level of corporate governance principles in
terms of the corporation’s internal institutions, involving the board of directors’ responsibilities
and duties.122 Overall, the Law was argued to have complied with half of the corporate governance
guidelines recommended by the Institution of International Finance. 123
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Id. n. 618, (questioning the lengthy period (around 34 years) the Saudi legislator took to realize the
insufficiency of the Commercial Court Law to regulate companies in the region, and claiming that
discovery of oil laid the foundation for a new era for economic, financial, and social changes).
118
In addition to the business organizations listed in note 115, the Law included in mutual partnership,
limited liability company, syndicate company, and company limited by shares. See Article two of the
Companies Law of 1965.
119
Compare AlMajid, at 177 with Bandar O. Alrasheed, Corporate Governance of The Saudi Arabian
Publicly Traded Companies: an Appraisal and Proposals for Improvement, p.64 (2014) (Unpublished
SJD dissertation, University of Pittsburgh) [hereinafter Alrasheed] (on file with the author) (claiming that
the business culture in the region is American-oriented, and attributing that to “the pioneer oil prospecting
concession granted to [an] American oil company and the unique political alliance and economic
partnership between the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia”).
120
E.g., Article two of the 1965 Companies Law declared that “[w]ithout prejudice to such companies
known in Islamic jurisprudence, any company that does not assume one of the mentioned forms shall be
considered null and void, and the persons who have made contracts in its name shall be personally and
jointly liable for the obligations arising from such a contract.” Notice that the article exempted companies
recognized by Sharia from assuming a form of the seven enumerated in the Law without being nulled.
121
Articles 48–148.
122
For further insight, see Youseif A. Alzahrani, Rights of Shareholders under Saudi Company Law 1965
(2013) (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Brunel University) (on file with the author).
123
Alrasheed, n. 11 at 3.
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The Law underwent several amendments during its lifespan. However, the forty-four-year-old
could not withhold the bitter criticism about its deficiency and its failure to meet the demands of
the modern market. What served the country in 1965 and during the transition period became
incompetent to stand in an ear of largescale financial connectivity and volatility. That resulted in
the fact that many corporate matters were regulated by scattered ministerial ordinances and
circulars.124 In addition, the introduction of the Capital Market Law 125 and the formation of the
Capital Market Authority abridged the Companies Law’s jurisdiction over public corporations.126
3. The Capital Market Law of 2003 and the Accompanying Rules
Earlier before the passing of the Capital Market Law, the securities market127 had been
regulated in an ad hoc approach that did not correspond with the increase in the economy and the
governmental trend to enhance the private sector. 128 The market was subject to various regulations,
every one of which was intended to attain different ends, but holistically they aimed at regulating
the market in principle. Not to mention the overlap among ill-defined authorities in charge of
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AlMajid, at 177, 180.
See infra Chapter 2. Part I. A. 3.
126
AlMajid, at 179.
127
It is claimed that the beginning of the modern trading system for shares is traced back to two
occasions: first, the establishment of a ministerial committee, comprised the Minister of Finance, the
Minister of Commerce and the Governor of Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, and responsible for almost
all security-related activities, such as establishing a share-trading system and supervising it, by Royal
decree No1230/8, on April 24th, 1983. The second was the establishment of the Saudi Share Registration
Company, in charge of administering shareholders’ records, share certificates, and facilitating the
transferring of share ownership. For further history about the inception of Saudi securities market, See
FAHAD M. ALMAJID, A CONCEPTUAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR REFORMING SAUDI
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, p. 180–184, Lambert Academic Publishing (2014); Sultan
Alabdulkarim, An Evaluation of Investors Protection in Secondary Securities Market: A Comparative
Study of Regulatory Regimes in the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia, p.248–254 (2012) (Unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Newcastle University) (on file with the author); Mohammed T. Alsanosi, Corporate
Governance: The Saudi Arabian Capital Market and International Standards, Ch.4 (2010) (Unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Leicester) (on file with the author).
128
Sultan Alabdulkarim, An Evaluation of Investors Protection in Secondary Securities Market: A
Comparative Study of Regulatory Regimes in the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia, p. 248–254 (2012)
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Newcastle University) (on file with the author) [hereinafter
Alabdulkarim].
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fulfilling their creation’s purposes made it difficult for foreign investors to risk their capitals in
such a market.
As the economy was growing, and the necessity to attract direct foreign investments was
escalating, the country sensed the need for a more explicit, yet comprehensive legal framework
that would gain the trust and confidence of investors, mainly foreign ones.129 Evidently, economic
changes, as argued, precede legal developments.130 While the economic and financial sources
abounded in the region, the country suffered from a scarcity of regulatory foundations.
Therefore, in 2003 the country introduced a significant piece of legislation that crafted the
foundation for a new world for investments in the Saudi securities market. 131 The Capital Market
Law passage marked the end of chaotic sittings deterring the entry of foreign capitals and blocking
the prosperity of the Saudi economy.
The sixty-seven-article Law guarantees flexibility and efficiency of the market. To do so, a
governmental authority with financial, administrative autonomy was created as enshrined in article
four of the Law.132 Moreover, to promote the protection for investors and shareholders, the Law
ordered the establishment of the Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes.133
In exercise of its power, the board of the Capital Market Authority, since its establishment, has
issued a cluster of rules and implementing regulations controlling the market, listed corporations,
and would-be ones. Such regulations include the Listing Rules of 2004, the Corporate Governance
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Id. at 225.
George N. Sfeir, The Saudi Approach to Law Reform, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 750 (1988).
131
It was issued by Royal Decree No. M/30, on July 31, 2003.
132
Article 4.A stipulates that “[a]n Authority to be named the ‘Capital Market Authority’ shall be
established in the Kingdom and shall report directly to the President of the Council of Ministers. It shall
have a corporate personality as well as financial and administrative independence. It shall be vested with
all powers necessary to discharge its duties and functions under this Law. The Authority shall enjoy
exemptions and facilities enjoyed by public corporations. Its staff shall be subject to the Labor Law.”
133
Article 25.G.
130
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Regulations of 2006, Prudential Rules, Merger and Acquisition Regulations, Market Conduct
Regulations, Authorized Persons Regulations and the Corporate Governance of 2017.134
In sum, with a deficient corporate law at that time, the Capital Market Authority played an
essential role in supervising and monitoring not only the stock market but also the public
corporations. The Capital Market Law empowers the Authority, with well-defined capacity, to
build investors’ confidence and preserve the integrity of the market’s framework and institutions
by all means.
4.The Companies Law of 2015 (CL)
Since the enthronement of King Salman (January 23rd, 2015), after the death of his
predecessor, King Abdullah, the country has been experiencing far-reaching changes in its policies
across the board.135 One of the noteworthy changes was the passage of the most long-awaited piece
of legislation, the Companies Law of 2015. 136 The Law has been enthusiastically welcomed by the

For additional regulations and rules, see the Capital Market Authority’s website, https://cma.org.sa.
One of the significant changes the country has ever experienced, on political level, were the rewriting
of the royal succession and the advancing of assertive foreign policy. See David Blair, Saudi Arabia’s
Quiet Revolution as King Salman changes Royal Succession, Tel.: World News (Apr. 29, 2015),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/saudiarabia/11571482/Saudi-Arabias-quietrevolution-as-King-Salman-changes-royal-succession.html (last visited Sep. 16, 2017), and Ben Hubbard,
Saudi King Rewrites Succession, Replacing Heir With Son, 31,( June 21, 2017), N.Y. Times: Middle East,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/21/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-crown-prince-mohammed-binsalman.html (last visited Sep. 16, 2017).
136
There is no exaggeration in describing this law as “the most long-awaited piece of legislation.”
Almajid in his book, which was his Ph.D. thesis, notes that “[a]ccording to the Minister of Commerce,
Abdullah Yamani, the bill of the new Companies Law has been passed to the Prime Minister, King
Abdullah, waiting for the issuance of the new law by a royal decree . . . ” The Minister’s press
announcement was on January 24th, 2007. See Alsharq Alawsat Newspaper, ed. 10284, Jan 24, 2007,
http://archive.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=1&issueno=10284&article=403215#.WbwrxMbMyCQ.
More than 20 months later, Almajid questioned why the Law was not officially promulgated, and he
expected to be announced within months. See Almajid, n. 632 at 180. Five years after the long waiting,
the Law finally came into light and was promulgated by Royal Decree No. M/3 on November 9th, 2015,
published in the Saudi Gazette (Um Al-Qura) on December 4th, 2015, and went into effect on May 2nd,
2016.
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corporate public, including shareholders, stakeholders, directors, executive officers, and
academics.
With an optimistic tone, the CL has been regarded as a revolution and one of the most
significant laws the country has legislated recently. As one commentator states, the goals of the
Law are to reinforce the developmental role of corporations to serve the national economy, to
attract foreign capitals, to boost the role of the private sector, and ease the entry of Saudi
entrepreneurs into the market. 137 Moreover, the CL is of paramount importance to carry out the
Saudi 2030Vision as it promotes the bases for an institutional work environment and ensures a
high level of corporate governance practices in the Saudi corporate world, which will foster the
transparency and the protection of shareholder’s rights.138
Speaking of form, the CL, in a nutshell, consists of twelve chapters embracing a total of 227
articles. The first chapter of the Law contains general rules applicable to all forms of enterprises
recognized by the Law, such as the glossary. The other next five chapters are well-organized as
each legally-recognized enterprise form is singled out in a separate chapter. The Law abandons
three types of corporations that were recognized under the old Law, cooperative corporation,
partnership limited by shares and variable capital company. 139 The canonical forms of enterprises
in Saudi Arabia today are the partnership, limited partnership, unincorporated joint venture, jointstock corporation, and limited liability company.

FAISAL M. ALFADEL & SALEH A. ALBALWI,  دراسة لنظام الشركات الجديد:الوسيط في قانون الشركات السعودية
هـ١٤١٢ هـ ونظام الشركات المهنية الصادر عام١٤٣٧  [ الصادر عامTHE ANATOMY OF THE SAUDI COMPANIES
LAW: A STUDY OF THE NEW COMPANIES LAW OF 1437H AND THE PROFESSIONAL
COMPANIES OF 1412H] 7-8 (L. & ECON LIBR. 2017) [hereinafter the Anatomy of Saudi CL].
138
Id.
139
There is no officially announced justification for why these three types were abolished, yet it may be
logically attributed to the rare use of these corporate entity forms during the lifetime of the old Law. Cf.
Francis Patalong, New Saudi Arabia Companies Law: Effective 2016, AL TIMIMI & CO. (Dec. 2016),
http://www.tamimi.com/en/magazine/law-update/section-14/december-january-3/new-saudi-arabiacompanies-law-effective-2016.html (last visited Sep. 16, 2017).
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In terms of substance, the Law has many salient features, as opposed to the superseded one.
One of the most significant features is the official recognition of the one-owner enterprise, in the
form of single-shareholder joint-stock corporation and one-member limited liability company.140
In the past, multiple one-person corporations were incorporated in exception to the Law, namely
stated-owned corporations, where the government was the sole shareholder. 141 Another feature is
the clear-cut definition of the authorities controlling and supervising the enterprises.142 The role
played by the Capital Market Authority following its foundation brought about sort of perplexity
in terms of which controlled which. 143 The old Law assigned the regulating authority to the
Department of Companies at the Ministry of Commerce and Investment, yet the Capital Market
Authority was exerting power over listed joint-stock corporations without regulative frontiers.
Now, the Law commissions the Ministry of Commerce and Investment with the regulatory
authority over all types of enterprises, excluding listed joint-stock corporations, which is statutorily
subject to the control and supervision of the Capital Market Authority. 144 The recognition of the
holding company is also a remarkable feature of the Law. Even though there were a number of
companies that claimed the holding status for their businesses, there were no rules or guiding
principles to govern them. 145 In practice, if the enterprise wanted to operate as a holding one, it
would be formed as a joint-stock corporation or limited liability company, and then the title
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See infra Chapter 3. Part I. E.
E.g., the Saudi Railways Company (SAR), http://www.sar.com.sa/About-SAR/SAR-History.aspx, and
Saudi Arabian Oil Company (ARAMCO), http://www.saudiaramco.com/en/home.html. See also
MOHAMMED H. ALJABER,  [ القانون التجاري السعوديTHE SAUDI COMMERCIAL LAW], 179 ( 4.ed. 1996)
[hereinafter Aljaber].
142
Article 1 defines the Competent Authority in charge of the Law as the Ministry of Commerce and
Investment, and “ . . . as for joint-stock companies listed in the Capital Market, the Competent Authority
shall be CMA.”
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See supra ch.2, I, A, 2&3.
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See supra n. 142.
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E.g., The Kingdom Holding Co.
141
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“holding” would be added to its name without entailing any legal ramifications or being bound by
any governing rules. However, the new Law singles out the seventh chapter for the regulatory
framework for the holding corporations.146 After all, the Law features an enhanced corporate
governance framework that embraces global measures and principles alongside a range of
sanctions, which are explored and analyzed later in the thesis.
It is worth bearing in mind that the fact that much ink has spilled over the distinct aspects of
the Law (with optimism and enthusiasm) should not overlook the challenges and implications the
Law may fetch. Its ink is barely dry. Since its issuance, the implementing regulations have not
been announced yet. Amendments to the Foreign Investment Law in accordance with the new Law
has not been addressed, which should be done in the very soon future, as the custom and practice
take time to adapt. Also, subordinate regulations may be of necessity to provide details about the
Law in a way that renders the Saudi corporate legal framework more responsive to broader global
trends.147

The seventh chapter of the Law contains five articles. Article 182 defines the holding company as “a
joint-stock or a limited liability company that aims at controlling other joint-stock or limited liability
companies, called subsidiaries, by owning more than half of the capital of such companies or by
controlling the formation of their boards of directors . . . .” Article 183 enumerates six legitimate purposes
of holding companies, including managing its subsidiaries or participating in the management of other
companies in which it owns shares and providing support thereto, investing its funds in shares and other
securities, and owning real property and movable assets necessary for its operations. Article 184
emphasizes that “[a] subsidiary may not acquire shares in a holding company. Any action to transfer the
ownership of shares from a holding company to a subsidiary shall be deemed null and void.” Article 185
require holding companies at the end of each year to prepare consolidated financial statements that
include its subsidiaries, in accordance with recognized accounting standards. Article 186 mandates
holding companies to abide by the provisions set forth in this chapter and other provisions of the Law not
conflicting therewith, depending on the type of company adopted.
147
Since the passage of the new Law, several articles and reports have done interesting comparisons
between the two Laws. The authors of these comparisons have utilized a variety of novel formats, such as
matrixes and graphs, to make the comparisons look alluring and easy to grasp. E.g., Alain Sfeir & Nouf
Aljoaid, The New KSA Companies Law in Focus, CLYDE & CO. LLP, CORP. News (Apr. 2016) (on file
with the author), and
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B. Supplementary Rules and Regulations
1. The Regulatory Rules and Procedures Relating to Unlisted Joint-Stock Corporations
(RRPUC)
In acknowledgment of the special nature of close corporations, the Minister of Commerce and
Investment, by the power vested in him,148 announced by a ministerial resolution the Regulatory
Rules and Procedures Relating to Unlisted Joint-stock Corporations (RRPUC).149 In principle,
these rules signify an unprecedented step forward for the world of close corporations in the
region.150
In a few words,151 this resolution includes eleven chapters and forty-eight articles covering a
range of corporate matters that correspond to the unique structure of close corporations. Such
matters are the remunerations of the board of directors, the use of technology to conduct general
shareholder assembly, share buybacks, share sales, mortgaging of shares, issuance of preferred
shares, share conversion, distribution of dividends, issuance and sales of preemption rights.
Furthermore, the resolution includes official four appendixes, three of which are concerning
mortgaging of stocks, and the fourth is an authorization form. 152
Given that most Saudi business establishments are non-listed encourages the Competent
Authority to appreciate these businesses and acknowledge their pressing, structural issues in their
corporate governance. The inconsistency of the corporate governance framework with the social
and economic basis of close corporations gives rise to deficiencies and may not realize the goals

It is prescribed in Article 225 that “ . . . 2- the Minister and CMA’s Board shall, each within their
jurisdiction, issue necessary decisions for the implementation of the provisions of the Law.”
149
See supra Ch.1, IV, A (https://www.uqn.gov.sa/articles/1480082743260579300/).
150
This Ministerial Resolution is written in Arabic and has not been officially translated into other
languages, namely English. Therefore, the author strives to translate these rules in a way that closely
mirrors the exact meanings in Arabic context.
151
An extensive reading and analysis of these rules are situated in the fourth chapter later in this thesis.
152
See supra n. 150.
148
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of the corporate governance, such as the reduction of agency problems and transaction expenses. 153
This calls for effective legal governance mechanisms that offer protection for shareholders from
the misconduct of others. 154 Whether these rules afford an adequate degree of protection for
minority shareholders against the misconduct of controlling shareholder or the opportunism of the
board of directors is of the research questions. The research answers it through an in-depth analysis
of these rules and the rules of the Companies Law to come up with a good understanding of what
would optimize the Saudi legal framework of corporate governance for close corporations. 155
2. The Guide of Corporate Governance of Family Companies and its Directive Charter
The influence of a family over its business in the form of non-listed corporations oftentimes
generates conflicts and tensions among members of the family and its generations or between
minority shareholders and controlling ones (in the long run), which weakens the business or
sometimes leads to bankruptcy or dissolution of the corporation. Therefore, it is highly
recommended that family companies adopt a charter or guidelines that adopts special corporate
governance rules tailored to suit the needs of the family business. Unlike the “thorny governance”
faced by family corporations, 156 family businesses with straightforward corporate governance
rules tend to maintain the sustainability of their corporations, realize their ends, and stay
competitive and efficacious.157
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See JOSEPH A. McCAHERY & ERIK P. M. VERMEULEN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF
NON-LISTED COMPANIES 2,3 (Oxford Univ. Press 2009) [hereinafter McChathery, Corporate
Governance of Non-Listed Companies].
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Id.
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See supra note 151.
156
McChathery, Corporate Governance of Non-Listed Companies, at 4, (criticizing the informal
governance of family-owned corporations as it is the main cause these corporations fail to resist “the
dynamic changes in both the family and business cycle.” Such changes are entry of new generation and
alteration in the business’s strategy, which renders the business prone to failure).
157
Id. (arguing that legislators bear the burden to make family businesses implement a good level of
corporate governance that leads to the success and continuity of the business, and stating an example of
empirical study that concludes poor governance has led to large declines and significant long-term
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In an effort to raise the awareness of family-business owners, the Minister of Commerce and
Investment announced (July 2014) “the Guide of Corporate Governance of Family Companies and
its Directive Charter.” The Guide consists of seven chapters with forty articles. It establishes the
primary foundations for institutional entities and necessitates the significance of adopting
corporate governance, and the separation of management and ownership. In addition, it calls for
the adoption of the efficiency and competency standards in electing the management team along
with finding a precise mechanism for a dispute resolution that protects the business’s reputation.
This guide also advances selective rules and principles that the family charter should contain, and
it draws the systematic framework for family businesses to promote transparency and achieve a
high level of sustainability and stability. 158
As it may be obvious, this ministerial endeavor was before the passage of the CL of 2015. That
reflects on the Competent Authority’s awareness of the fact that the one-size-fits-all corporate law
and governance may lead to unwanted results.159 Also, it may not promote the efficiency and
improve the sustainability and transparency for close corporations—as corporate governance is
supposed to produce. Nonetheless, the guidelines arguably suffer from a structural defect that they
are noncompulsory. The family-business owners have the absolute discretion to opt for these rules.
The good news is that several sophisticated family-owned businesses realized the importance of
adopting these rules and voluntarily turned them into an inseparable part of their articles of

underperformance. Another advantage of strong corporate governance –besides the fact that it promotes
effective tools to deal with and settle familial conflicts- is the correlation between effective corporate
governance of family businesses and the growth in innovations they create because the priority given to
long-term development over short-term profitability). E.g., Gonzalez & Daniel Wolfenzon, Inside the
Family Firm: The Role of Families in Succession Decision and Performance, 122 Q. J. ECON. 647 (2007).
158
These guidelines are in Arabic and have not been officially translated into other languages, namely
English.
159
McChathery, Corporate Governance of Non-Listed Companies, at 3, (claiming that one-size-fits-all
model does not benefit close corporations due to the disproportionate application of the corporate
governance principles. Plus, this model results in high compliance costs borne by close corporations).
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incorporations, after knowing the economic gain and social benefits the adoption of these
guidelines generate.160
3. Templates for the Articles of Incorporation and Articles of Associations
In compliance with the Law, 161 the Minister of Commerce and Investment issued templates for
the articles of incorporation—for each sort of enterprise the Law comprehends. These templates
aim at easing the incorporation of enterprises (as they include the requirements of the Law) as well
as certify the CL implementation. It was the first implementation of the Law as Article 225
instructs the Minister of Commerce and Investment to release these guiding forms within 120 days
from the issuance date of the Law. 162 As far as close corporations concern, they have two templates
representing the constitutional documents of any joint-stock corporation: a template for the articles
of incorporation163 and a template for the articles of association (the establishing contract).164
These embody comprehensive documents for every detail and element of the corporation. In
addition, they seem to be self-explanatory; however, this does not negate the importance that these
documents should be filled out by specialists (e.g., lawyers) who can understand the ramifications
each element produces and inform the owners of the business about them. Another
recommendation is that these templates should be officially translated into other languages (e.g.,
English and Chinese) to facilitate the entry of foreign investors.
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E.g., AlZamil Group Holding Company.
Article 225 reads that “1- [g]uiding forms for the articles of incorporation and articles of association
for each type of company shall be issued pursuant to a decision by the Minister within 120 days from the
issuance date of the Law, and shall be published on the Ministry’s website. Such forms shall be valid
from the effective date of the Law.”
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See supra Ch.2, I, A, 4.
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See template No.3, the Ministry of Commerce and Investment,
https://mci.gov.sa/cl2015/Documents/05.pdf, (last visited: Sep. 18, 2017).
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See template No. 4, The Ministry of Commerce and Investment,
https://mci.gov.sa/cl2015/Documents/06.pdf, (last visited: Sep. 18, 2017).
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4. The Corporate Governance Regulation of Unlisted Corporations (CGUC)
In the fifth of October 2018, the official gazette published the Corporate Governance
Regulations of Unlisted Corporations,165 mirroring the steadfast commitment of the Ministry of
Commerce and Investment to the continuous improvement of the Saudi market. The Regulation
consists of a set of rules and principles that ensure the best practices of corporate governance.
Unlike the Corporate Governance Regulations of listed Corporation, the observance of this
Regulation by close corporations is voluntary. At the onset, Article two makes it crystal-clear that
unless it is obligated by the Companies Law or another legal instrument (e.g., resolution, law or
regulation), the Regulation is mere, non-binding guidance that aims at formulating an effective,
legal framework for the governance of the corporation.
The Regulation underscores the importance of an effective framework of corporate governance
as it reinforces shareholder rights and fosters his role in overseeing the corporation. Furthermore,
effective corporate governance ensures transparency, integrity, and fairness of corporate
transactions as well as it offers effective tools to handle related-party transactions. It also provides
a healthy environment where corporate officers are held accountable for their actions. The
Regulations comes to transform these broad goals into applicable rules the corporation may adopt
to form its governing structure.
As a critical observer of the regulatory framework of close corporations, it appears to be
justifiable not to compel all close corporations to follow the CGUC for two reasons. First, close
corporations vary in their sizes and the number of their shareholders. Therefore, from a cost-benefit
analysis, it may be unwise to subject all corporations to unnecessary rules and other aspects of
governance as they may be costly and may render few or no direct benefits to the corporation. The
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See Um Al-Qura Gazette, https://www.uqn.gov.sa/articles/1538687463811469400/ .
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adoption of best corporate governance practices should be decided by the corporation itself based
on a wide range of variables, including the size of the business and the sophistication of its
shareholders. A corporation with the statutory minimum of share capital and shareholders may
realize no benefits from complying with the CGUC but uncalled-for costs.
Second, as it is exposed later in this research, the Companies Law has already regulated the
governance of close corporations by a host of obligatory rules that, from a comparative point of
view, constitute unprecedented intervention by the legislative body in regulating corporations and
their governance structure. Therefore, mandating more governing rules⎯and thus shrinking the
contractual freedom of shareholders⎯ would be counterproductive as it overregulates the
corporation and thus makes it a less attractive form of business.

Part II. The Ownership Structure of Joint-Stock Corporations in the Saudi
Market
Overview
Most of the comparative and empirical studies of corporate governance establish a solid
connection between the system of corporate governance the country adopts, and the structure of
ownership dominating its corporations. It is regarded as one of the essential elements in shaping
the country’s pattern of corporate governance, bearing in mind the differences among corporate
governance systems.166
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E.g., the German corporate governance requires a representation of the labor in its corporation, while
such a requirement does not exist neither in the United States nor the United Kingdom.
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To elucidate, public corporations in common law countries (e.g., the United States) enjoy
dispersed ownership structure,167 which involves a corporate governance system that addresses the
agency problem between managers and shareholders.168 On the other hand, in Civil law
countries—and arguably developing countries— concentrated ownership is the prevailing
structure of corporations, and hence a different system of corporate governance is undoubtedly
required to handle the agency problem between majority shareholder and minority ones this
time.169
In Saudi Arabia, it is argued that concentrated ownership structure prevails in its corporate
arena.170 Studies attribute the phenomena (the concentrated ownership structure) to a couple of
reasons.171 First, the legally driven reason. The fact that the Saudi Companies Law of 1965 was
vastly affected by the French Companies Code makes it fair to characterize the country as a civil
law country, so a concentrated ownership pattern is expected to dominate.172 Another reason that
justifies the domination of concentrated-ownership structure is a politically driven one. It is
contended that countries with monarchies or a lack of democratic systems tend to have highly
concentrated ownership structure, and thus a fragile protection system for minority shareholders,
resulting in substantial shareholdings in the hand of few moneyed families together with the
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In fact, 94% of listed corporations in the United States do not have a single shareholder with more than
25% ownership of their capitals. See S&P Global Market Intelligence,
https://marketintelligence.spglobal.com.
168
Which is also known as the first agency problem that involves conflicts between the owners of the
corporation (principals) and its managers (agents). The problem resulting out of such a relationship is how
to ensure that managers advance the interests of the corporation’s shareholders and put them ahead of
theirs. See REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 29, 30 (Oxford Univ. Press 3rd. ed. 2017)
169
See supra n. 56, 57.
170
See Almajid, at 207–211.
171
One of the most cited studies that undertakes the analysis of ownership structure is the study conducted
by La Porta and his colleagues. According to their “laws matter” theory, legal institutions widely
influence the structure of ownership in corporations. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes &
Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471,474 (1999).
172
Id.
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government.173 For an observer of the Saudi market, it is evident that both reasons are valid to
explain the presence of concentrated ownership structure in the market.
Another explanation that has debated the validity of the former reasons (legally driven and
politically driven) to substantiate the divergence of the ownership structure and thus the existence
of various corporate governance schemes is a financially motivated reason. Advocates of this
thought suggest that the development of financial markets better expounds differences in corporate
governance systems.174 Financial markets with a strong presence of all internal institutions and
easy access to capital tend to have diffused ownership structure, whereas underdeveloped financial
markets with difficult, if not impossible, and prohibitive access to the capital tend to subsist
concentrated ownership patterns because of the lack of public participation in the market. 175 Such
a reason may be logical and tenable to explain the concentration of ownership in Saudi public
corporations, knowing the slow growth of the Saudi market. 176
As far as close corporations are concerned, it may be misapprehended that there is not much
to say about the ownership structure of close corporations since these enjoy an omnipresent
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See PETER A. GOUREVITCH & JAMES SHINN, POLITICAL POWER AND CORPORATE
CONTROL: THE NEW GLOBAL POLITICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 80,81 (Princeton
Univ. Press 2005); Almajid, at 208, (adding also the political transparency side by side with firm-level
one because of the confidence and trust it brings about for investors).
174
One of these advocates is John Coffee, who contends that neither the politically driven reason nor the
legally driven one suffices to explain the divergence in corporate governance systems and corporate
ownership structure. See John C. Jr. Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the
State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 82 (2001).
175
See Maren Hanson, The Influence of French Law on the Legal Development of Saudi Arabia, 2 ARAB
L.Q. 272, 291 (1987) (claiming that concentrated ownership exists not only in Saudi Arabia but also other
developing countries due to the role played by the governments in managing and supervising business
behaviors).
176
See Almajid, at 209 (asserting the plausibility of such reason given the history of Saudi market
development. Since the establishment of Saudi market in 1948, the Saudi market stayed underdeveloped
until the introduction of technology in stock-trading in the 1990s. Plus, the public, namely small
investors, refrained from trading in the market because of the high cost of share trading at that time. In
addition, the Saudi market suffered from unpopularity at that time because the scarcity of initial public
offerings aimed at the public).
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ownership structure where there are a few shareholders who are quite often family members and
friends. Nevertheless, it is of importance to zoom out for a bit and examine the ownership structure
of the joint-stock corporations, listed and unlisted. This helps to accurately evaluate the corporate
governance principles and its development in the region.
A. Public Corporations
1. State-Controlled Corporations
The existence of the Saudi government in the Saudi market is of a unique nature. Through
three major governmental agencies, the Saudi government exerts a great deal of clout over the
Saudi public corporations. 177 Governmental investments in listed corporations come through the
considerable ownership held by its agencies: The Public Investment Fund, the Public Pension
Fund, and the General Organization for Social Insurance, alongside its direct ownership in some
major corporations in the market.178 Given that the value of Saudi stock market is about 1739.3
billion riyals,179 while the value of government shareholdings is collectively 706 billion riyals

Almajid, at 212, (considering that the Saudi government’s involvement in stock-trading has always
remained paramount since the establishment of the market).
178
However, the government has lately transferred many of its direct shareholdings to the Public
Investment Fund, making the Fund alongside the other two agencies the sole investment vehicles by
which the Saudi government participates in the market. E.g., the Saudi Electricity Company announced
that the three billion government-owned shares representing circa 74% of the total capital of the company
were registered for and transferred to the portfolio of the Public Investment Fund. See Alarabiya.net,
Three Billion Shares: The Government’s Stake in Saudi Arabia Electricity (Sep. 17, 2017)
ALARABIYA.NET, Arabian Markets, https://www.alarabiya.net/ar/aswaq/companies/2017/09/17/-3-تسجيل
للكهرباء-بالسعودية-حكومية-سهما-مليارات.html, (last visited Sep. 22, 2017).
179
As of September 17, 2107, Argaam reported an increase of the market value of shares and enclosed to
the report a detailed table with the shareholdings’ percentages and values of all types of investors,
including government agencies and foreign investors. See Argaam, Saudi Market: The Market Value of
Shares Slightly Higher to 1739.3 Billion [Saudi] Riyals by the End of Las Week and Ownership of
Foreign Investors Constitute 4.62% of them (Sep. 17, 2017), Argaam, Special,
http://www.argaam.com/ar/article/articledetail/id/505129, (last visited: Sep. 22, 2017).
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(161.84 billion U.S. dollar),180 it becomes unmistakable that the government is the largest
shareholder with ownership of circa 40%.181
To perceive the controlling role of the largest shareholder, contemplate that all CEOs and
boards’ members of listed corporations the government invests in are appointed, hired and fired
by the government. This shows the financial and directorial influences of the government over
listed corporations, which leaves no room for other shareholders, irrespective to the size of their
shareholdings, to have a say or active role in the management of a corporation the government
dominates its ownership.182
In a brief assessment of this ownership structure, a set of benefits have flown from this structure
into the region. For example, corporations with substantial government shareholdings tend to be
better managed, financed, and more lucrative than other listed corporations. 183 Shareholders show
a tendency to invest more in corporations with an influential state standing, rather than other
corporations with no such thing. Another advantage is that government-controlled corporations 184
showed earlier strong signs and genuine intention to adopt the best practices of corporate
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Id.
This percentage represents the market value of the shareholdings of government agencies alone, so it
must be higher than 40% if the government investments in other funds are counted, such as the Central
Bank of the Kingdom. See Almajid, n.731.
182
See Almajid, at 213 (adding another layer of complexity as members of the board elected by other
party than the government may not challenge the government representatives’ managerial decisions,
specially decisions involved major consequences for the corporation. Therefore, “politics [Alamjid
thinks] interact with economics in a way which seems to let the former impose its wishes on the latter.”)
183
This may stem from the fact that these corporations enjoy a noncompetitive market in terms of the
services and the nature of their business activities, such as utilities service corporations and corporations
in the petrochemical industry. See Almajid, at 214.
184
Such corporations were Saudi Arabia Basic Industries Corporation (the world largest petrochemicals
manufacturers) and Saudi Telecom Company (STC). It is worth noting that the 70% of SABIC’s shares
are government-owned, and the remaining of 30% are publicly traded on the Saudi market. See SABIC’s
website, https://www.sabic.com/en/about, (last visited: Sep. 22, 2107).
181
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governance, which made them positive models of efficiency other corporations began to copy.185
Another benefit derived from such structure is that investments in state-controlled corporations are
of the lowest risk investments because of the protective role played by the government. Such a
benefit leads to shareholders feeling safe, more reassured when they invest in these corporations,
and fearless of these corporations going bankrupt.186
As this ownership structure has yielded some benefits in the region, it nevertheless suffers
several disadvantages. The major downsides of the structure are the lack of liquidity and diversity
in the market. The government seems to play a passive role in terms of trading volumes. Indeed,
it tends to hold its shareholdings to preserve a long-established position, which has resulted in
insignificant numbers of stocks available for the public and thus has made the market illiquid. The
illiquid market finds it challenging to entice investors, especially foreign ones, which makes the
market less diverse and limited to certain players: government agencies, institutional investors and
affluent families.187
2. Family-Controlled Corporations
One of the main traits of developing markets is considerable familial ownership of its
corporations. Oftentimes government ownership and family ownership are in parallel, so are they
in Saudi Arabia.188 Family-controlled corporations undeniably are of the leading actors in the
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One of these corporation was Savola, a family-controlled corporation. Savola had a head start in
setting up its corporate governance code. See Almajid, n. 736, (talking in detail about the Savola’s
corporate governance experience).
186
Id. at 214.
187
Id. at 216, (arguing that active trading by governmental agencies may result in massive price swings
because of the illiquidity of the market and its incapability to ingest a voluminous bowl of shares). Also,
this serves as evidence for the financially driven reason for the concentration of ownership in the
Kingdom.
188
See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the
World, 54 J. FIN. 471,474 (1999) (stating that family ownership dominates developing countries and
those whose laws flow from the Civil law system, so rich families are eager to hold large shareholdings in
the listed corporations on the market).
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corporate arena in the region,189 given the economic role of these corporations and their substantial
contributions into the national gross demotic product (GDP).190
The foremost aspect of these corporations is that their shares are traded on the market
exchange, while they were originated as family businesses in the form of sole proprietorship until
close corporation, whose owners continue to manage the business and exert control thereupon even
after the business’s going public.191 Surely, such an option (conducting initial public offering)
depends exceedingly upon several factors, and not practically available to all close corporations.192
Such factors are the size of the corporation, its readiness to go public and the sophistication of its
departments to the financial market. These listed corporations ordinarily bear titles of the families
owning controlling shareholdings in the corporations.193 The controlling shareholdings of
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These corporations operate across all sectors, such as cement, transport, agricultural, petrochemicals
and so on.
190
See supra ch.2, I, B, 2. (referring to the guide of corporate governance of family businesses).
191
Almajid, 217, (asserting that positions of wealthy families are further heightened due to their bonds
with members of the royal family). See also Michael Field, The Merchants: The Big Business Families of
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, Woodstock, N.Y.: Overlook Press, (1985).
192
A noteworthy advance—as part of the ongoing development of the Saudi stock market and in an effort
to accomplish the goals of 2030Vision– is the introduction of Souk Nomu in late February 2017. This is a
parallel share market that serves an alternative platform for small-sized and medium-sized corporations
with the intention to go public. This option affords less stringent listing rules, yet trading on this market is
restricted to qualified investors. It is an optimal option for close corporations that are not ready yet to
conduct IPO but desire to finance their businesses through the sales of shares, so Souk Nomu represent a
preparatory stage for these corporations to make them ready to be listed on the main market. To learn
more about Souk Nomu, see generally Tadawul, Nomu - Parallel Market (2017) Tadawul, Knowledge
Center, https://www.tadawul.com.sa/wps/portal/tadawul/knowledge-center/about/parallel-market, (last
visited: Sep. 26, 2017).
193
E.g., AlDrees, AlOthaim, AlZamil, AlRajhi, AlHokair and AlTaiar corporations. The family’s
ownership in each of them exceeds 40% of total capital. For details about capital allocations, see Tadawul
website,
https://www.tadawul.com.sa/wps/portal/tadawul/home/!ut/p/z1/04_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfIjo8zij
YycLQwtTQx83D39zA0cAx09wtzCQowNDEz1w_Wj9KPwKTGBKjDAARwN9AuyswMBEuKIug!!/d
z/d5/L0lDUmlTUSEhL3dHa0FKRnNBLzROV3FpQSEhL2Vu/.

60

corporations held by Saudi families may also result from the direct possession of the corporation’s
shares through the market by a single family. 194
The extreme concentration of corporate ownership in the hand of few families has resulted in
immense fortunes for the latter. In addition, members of the families enjoy a great deal of latitude
over the corporation as they occupy high-ranking positions and senior offices (e.g., corporate
officers and managers). This may produce some concerns and raise questions about the integrity
of their decisions and whether they advance their interests, rather than the interests of the
corporations and all its shareholders as owners of the business. 195
3. Publicly-Owned Corporations
The last category of listed corporations are the ones with fragmented ownership structure,
where neither the government (through its agencies and funds) nor well-heeled families hold a
controlling proportion of the corporation’s capital. 196 This type of corporations includes smallsized and medium-sized businesses and has a little impact on the stock market. 197
The emergence of this sort of corporations and thus the entry of the public into the market are
attributed to the creation of the Capital Market Authority and its following efforts to build the trust
and confidence in the market. 198 Its creation was a milestone in the history of stock-trading in
Saudi Arabia as it was put in charge of regulating and supervising the market. In exercise of its
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Almajid, at 217, (giving examples of AlZamil family [owning circa 10% of stocks in 4 huge
corporations] and AlRajihi family [possessing around 20% of share capital of three quoted corporations]).
195
In principle, capital markets of both developed countries (e.g., Japan, Hong Kong and South Korea)
and developing countries (e.g., markets of GCC countries) are alike in terms of the ownership pattern
though there may vary slightly in the level of concertation. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-deSilanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471,474 (1999).
196
E.g., the IPO of Alinma Bank is a good example of such corporation, when the government offered
around 70% of its common shares to the public on an equal basis, which widened the base for investors.
See Almajid, 221.
197
Id.
198
The number of IPOs following the establishment of the Capital Market Authority is an obvious sign of
the active role played by the Competent Authority.
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power, the Authority, since its establishment, has thrived in facilitating the market and making it
more appealing, not only for local investors but also for foreign ones.199 Furthermore, the lack of
investments channels in the region left the Saudi people with no choice but to invest in the market,
specifically from 2004 to 2005, 200 when the market was a feasible source of income.201 Moreover,
since the oil has always been the rationale behind any economic growth in the region and in an
effort to diversify the national incomes, the government has taken several septs to spur individuals
to invest in the market as part of economic development. 202
C. Close Corporations

1. Stated-Owned Corporations
Corporations are of the foremost inventions of modern history as vehicles to carry out business,
industrial, and infrastructural purposes by not only individuals but also governments. The Saudi
government has incorporated a large number of corporations to embark upon a variety of activities
across the board. 203 For instance, the Saudi Railways Company, and the Saudi Arabian Military
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All fundamental changes by the Capital Market Authority have succeeded in bringing about
development and investments into the market. Such Changes was the issuance of listing rules and the
flow of IPOs afterwards. As evidence, see supra note 179 (reporting an increase in the ownership of
foreign investors to circa 5%).
200
See Almajid, at 219 (during that time, the share index recorded a dramatic jump of 120% of annual
growth).
201
In comparison, people of other countries (e.g., the United Arab Emirates) with similar condition and
economic resources to Saudi Arabia’s had better investment opportunities and alternatives to select
therefrom. However, Saudis did not. Therefore, some argue that the investment compass of Saudis
signaled to the stock market a as a response to the several social and economic changes following the
increase of oil prices and in repatriation of Saudi capitals overseas following September 11 attacks. See
Almajid, at 219 (explaining that the Saudi government immobilism led to the failure to accommodate
Saudi entrepreneurs in the market that suffered shortage of investment opportunities).
202
Another reason worth bearing in mind is that investors themselves have the right to freely trade on the
market., unlike other jurisdictions where trading is confined to licensed investors (brokers and
intermediaries). See also Almajid, at 220 (finding the ability of investors to trade themselves on the
market a major factor for the massive volume of share-trading on the Saudi market in terms of the
transactions by individuals, as opposed to those executed by mutual funds and other financial
institutions).
203
In fact, all state-controlled corporations (e.g., STC and SABIC) were offered to the public and listed on
the market and that all backdated the Vision. However, the Vision makes it clear that it is of its mission to
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Industries Company. 204 Most importantly, state-owned corporations undertake huge projects that
require massive capitals and preexistent infrastructure (e.g., public transportations and airlines), or
projects with high level of sensitivity (e.g., military industries, oil extraction, and petrochemicals),
which makes the state-owned corporations oftentimes are the leading corporations across all
sectors. Private investors may be reluctant to conduct the former category of businesses because
of the less lucrative appearance of these businesses, at least on the short term, or may not obtain
the license to conduct the latter.
Prior to 2015, such corporations would have to be incorporated by a royal decree since they
were established in exception to the Companies Law of 1956,205 and such an exception had to be
obtained from the top of the regulatory pyramid, the King. The Law of 2015 rectified the situation
and filled the gap in the regulatory framework of the corporation as it officially recognizes the
incorporation of one-person enterprises (joint-stock corporation and Limited Liability Company),
and they are incorporated—like other forms of enterprises— by a ministerial resolution. 206
Nowadays, most of the state-owned corporations have been offered to the public, and their
shares are traded on the Saudi stock exchange—even though the government still owns an
overwhelming majority of these corporations’ shares 207— as part of the 2030 Vision to privatize

privatize government services. See 2030 Vision website, http://vision2030.gov.sa/en/node/6, (last visited:
Sep. 26, 2017).
204
This company was incorporated in pursuit of one of the commitments by the 2030 Vision that aims at
localizing defense industries and repatriate more than 50% of military equipment expenses by 2030. See
generally 2030 Vision website, http://vision2030.gov.sa/en/node/6, (last visited: Sep. 26, 2017).
205
The 1965 Companies Law required in Article 52 a royal decree be issued in approval for incorporation
of five kinds of joint corporations: concessionaire corporations, corporations managing a public utility,
corporations receiving governmental subsidy, corporations with the government or a public legal entity as
shareholder, corporations with banking activities.
206
See infra Chapter 3. Part I. E.
207
Supra ch.2. II. A.
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all state-owned corporations. Nevertheless, the privatization and listing of state-owned
corporations took place several times before the announcement of the 2030 Vision.208
This forward movement toward privatizing of government-owned corporations and offering
their shares to the public is expected to contribute around 65% of the general domestic production,
instead of 40%.209 Furthermore, it will improve the quality of services and products these
corporations make, given the entry of new investors into the market and the creation of a
competitive environment.
2. Family-Owned Corporations
Family-owned corporations are the dominant, widespread pattern of ownership in the corporate
arena in almost every country. These corporations are usually the natural development of the sole
proprietorships; the growth and expansion of a business over time necessitate the transformation
of the business into a joint-stock corporation or LLC.
The nature of management of these businesses varies in its levels of sophistication. In general,
most of these corporations are founded out of a purely helpful act by owners of a single family, or
sometimes by owners with personal relationships in common (e.g., friends). Nevertheless, a
growing number of family-owned corporations have realized the inherent issues associated with
family-held corporations in terms of the sustainability of the business and its continuity to the next
generations. Therefore, to tackle such issues at an early phase, these corporations have voluntarily
adopted a wide range of corporate governance principles in running their businesses with the goal
of sustaining their existence, captivating other investors and often taking them public.210
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Supra ch.2. II. A.
See 2030 Vision website, http://vision2030.gov.sa/en/node/6, (last visited: Nov. 08, 2017).
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It is true that shareholdings of family businesses are normally circulated within the family may not be
transferred to outsiders unless proven by other shareholders. However, the investors may be in the form of
another acquirer corporation or franchisor, given adoption of corporate governance principles in the
209
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Furthermore, the importance of regulating Saudi family businesses stems from the fact that
Saudi family businesses constitute circa 90% of the operating establishments in the Saudi market
with an estimated capital investment of 250 billion Saudi Riyals (roughly $67 billion).211 Most of
these entities are LLCs and close corporations. 212 Bearing these numbers in mind, one may imagine
the leading force of family establishments in the region in various sectors of the national
economy.213 The Saudi family businesses, as the heartbeat of the private sector, are the major
employers in the Saudi labor market. Family businesses provide eighty percent of the total
employment in the private sector.214

management of the corporation makes the corporation more attractive to investors and an appealing target
for massive capital.
211
For the sake of academic integrity, these figures have been circulated around for a while and cited in
various journal reports and some papers. However, the author is deeply skeptical about the accuracy of
these numbers and to which extent they reflect the reality of corporations’ contributions due to the
scarcity of statistical or survey data can be relied upon, after examining the methods and variables utilized
resulting in these numbers and making sure there is no selective bias may adversely affect the results. In
addition, these numbers are claimed to represent the contribution of family businesses without
distinguishing between the forms of enterprise (joint-stock corporation or limited liability company) these
families adopt to carry out their businesses. Furthermore, these figures represent the contributions made
by all family enterprises, listed and non-listed, which not correspond with the notion that close
corporations differ from public ones and thus they should be regulated differently. Intuitively, they are the
majority; however, an official figure is of necessity to better evaluate their positions, laws and regulations,
instead of seemingly arbitrary numbers. For this research, all figures are assumed true and reliable unless
proven otherwise.
212
A recent trend in family ownership structure in their business is to incorporate a holding company and
transfer their ownership in the operating business into stocks in the holding company, which becomes the
sole shareholder of the operating business (the subsidiary).
213
To elaborate, approximately 90% of the operating establishments and businesses in Saudi market are
conducted by families. Family-controlled firms collectively contribute 50% of non-oil gross domestic
product. Beyond the scope of the Saudi market, Saudi family businesses represent 48% of all family
businesses in the Middle East. See the National Center for Family Business,
http://www.events.csc.org.sa/Arabic/FamilyBusinessesNationalForum/Pages/Event-Sponsors.aspx, (last
visited: Sep. 18, 2017).
214
See McChathery, Corporate Governance of Non-Listed Companies, at 4, (emphasizing the importance
of family-owned businesses as they promote economic prosperity, on the one hand, and enhance the
social welfare on the other hand as they are viewed as job-creating corporations,); Belen Villalonga &
Raphael Amit, How Do Family Ownership, Control and Management Affect Firm Value? 80 J. FIN.
ECON. 385 (2006).
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All in all, the importance of corporate governance for family corporations escalates because of
their vital roles in the Saudi national economy and the creation of jobs in the region. Therefore,
the CL of 2015 sets forth rules that enhance the corporations’ performance and help them become
institutional entities.
3. Start-Up Corporations
In addition to the traditional form of close corporations (family-owned and small-scale),
startups and high-tech corporations constitute a vital subset of close-corporation form as they have
several traits in common, such as few participants, no public market and overlap between capital
and labor suppliers. 215 Startups and venture-capital-backed businesses may be incorporated in the
form of a joint-stock corporation. Despite the significance of this sort of enterprises as highlighted
above and being a main target of the new Law, no official record has been established yet
concerning the number of these corporations. Nevertheless, this research assumes the protection
of minority shareholders in these corporations as well, whether the position of minority
shareholder is occupied by an entrepreneur or investor (e.g., venture capitalists). Given the
formalities of the joint-stock corporation form, one may wonder—yet such a wonder falls beyond
the scope of this research—whether a startup business should be incorporated in the form of a
joint-stock corporation or limited liability company in terms of which form could offer the best
efficiency, flexibility and ability to meet the business’s needs. 216
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See Edward B. Rock; Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match-Specific Assets and
Minority Oppression in Close Corporations, 24 J. CORP. L. 913, 916 (1999) (concluding that close
corporation forms are best to answer the needs of businesses with “a high density of match-specific assets
because this form with its cardinal principle of no pro rata distributions will guarantee the maximizing of
minority’s interests as majority the majority maximizes its, preventing any opportunistic behaviors).
216
Id.
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Conclusion
Historically, even before the unification of the Kingdom, corporations have received the
attention of the Saudi legislature through various laws and regulations. It began with only seven
articles of the commercial code, whereas nowadays several laws and a wide range of regulations
and circulars regulate the corporate world, alongside multiple authorities dedicated to serve and
supervise this world. Nevertheless, the development of the regulatory framework of corporations
did not correspond to the rapid growth of the economy and the evolution of corporations. Two
significant events throughout the history of corporations are regarded as the cornerstones of
corporate development. The passage of the Capital Market Law and the foundation of its authority
mark a watershed in the history of not only the stock market but also public corporations. The flow
of IPOs and the broad entry made by local investors (following the passage of the law and the
establishment of the competent authority) betoken the significance of that phase of corporate-stock
history. It was the first-ever introduction of corporate governance concept into the region. The
other landmark in the history of the Saudi corporate world is the birth of the Companies Law of
2015 amid an ocean of sweeping reforms, economically, socially and politically. Many hopes and
predictable changes have been pinned on the Law; however, it may be early to assess the outcomes
of the Law and its success in attaining its ends.
Knowing the undisputable prominence of the corporate governance rules in the success of the
corporation and the effect of the concentrated ownership structure on the shape these rules have
led to adopting a couple of corporate governance settings. The dynamic presence of the
government (the largest shareholder) in the stock market along with the dominance of wealthy
family over their listed corporations require a different set of corporate governance rules from the
ones that suit close corporations. They may, however, share the same agency problem where the
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principal is the minority shareholder and the controlling shareholder is the agent, yet the
expectations of the principals are contrasting, and so are the protective rules for minority
shareholders. All in all, the passage of the CL ushers in a new era for the corporations in the region
with the goal of generating an attractive environment for both local and foreign investors. Such a
goal requires the strong presence of corporate governance rules that, inter alia, protect the rights
of the minority shareholders and the newcomers to the market.
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Chapter Three: Joint-Stock Corporations in the Law†
“A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of
law.”
John Marshall

Motivating Hypothetical
Saad thinks about accepting his father offer to join him in the corporation. However, he does not
have the know-how to incorporate the corporation. Furthermore, Saad is also interested in serving
on the board of directors; however, he is unsure whether his shareholding lands him in the
boardroom. If so, he would like to know his responsibilities and duties as a director; otherwise,
Saad wants to know whether he has a voice over the corporate matters if any. In addition, his father
desires to be both the CEO of the corporation and the chairperson of the board, so Saad is
wondering about the legality of this desire, and whether he and his father will suffice to serve on
the board without any outside director. Not to mention the fact that he lacks the knowledge to
review the books and records of the corporation.

The Scope of Chapter Three
This chapter investigates the internal legal framework of joint-stock corporations in Saudi Arabia
according to the CL regulating corporate institutions, corporate operations, and other corporate
affairs. This chapter is intended to dissect the rules through an analytical and critical lens, rather
than descriptive one, yet the description of the rules should be provided to comprehend better the
detailed analysis and constructive criticism of the Law that follows. First, it starts with a straight
procedural section about the incorporation requirements, including the incorporation of the oneperson corporation. Second, it casts light on the role of the shareholder and the shareholder
meetings through which they exercise most of their rights, yet it does not exhaust all shareholder
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matters as most of them are examined in a later chapter in the context of the statutory protection
for minority shareholders. Third, the chapter probes the rules of corporate management, including
the composition of the board of directors, its meetings, and its duties and responsibilities along
with the remuneration-rewards rules. Fourth, it casts light on the role of the external auditor,
including its appointment, powers, and tasks. In the end, the chapter concludes with an in-depth
analysis of the procedural and substantive rules regulating the close corporations.

Part I. Forming a Corporation
The incorporation of the joint-stock corporation requires the incorporators to undergo several
statutory procedures that holistically aim at protecting the interest of not only the owners of the
corporation but also third parties (e.g., creditors of incorporators).217 Therefore, the Law, similar
to its predecessor, sets forth precise, comprehensive rules that lead to the nullity as a punishment
for the failure to obey these rules. Hereunder is a step-by-step explanation of the incorporation
rules.
A. Drafting the Establishing Contract and Corporation’s Articles of Association
The inception of the corporation commences as the founders sign off an establishing contract
detailing major elements existed in every corporation. Such elements include the names of the
incorporators, their addresses, the proposed name of their corporation,218 its headquarter, its

† Hereinafter “the Law” refers to the Companies Law of 2015, unless otherwise noted.
217
The Law defines an incorporator as “any person who signs the company’s articles of incorporation,
applies for a license for incorporation, offers in-kind contribution upon its incorporation or participates in
the incorporation with the intention to become an incorporator . . . .” See Article 56.
218
In regulation of the name of joint-stock corporations, the Law mandates that the name be indicative of
its purposes, and prohibits naming the corporation after a natural person’s name except in three instances:
first, the purpose of the corporation is to utilize a patent registered in the name of such person; second, the
joint-stock corporation decides to adopt the name of its subsidiary whose name permissibly includes a
name of a natural person; or third, the joint-stock corporation is a result of transformation from any
enterprise permissible to carry the name of natural person ( e.g., partnership or limited partnership). See
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purposes,219 its share capital, 220 the composition of the board of directors, its lifespan, its legal
representative, and finally a pledge clause mandating that all signatories commit to undertaking all
necessary strides to incorporate the business, including the advancement of the capital.221
In addition to the written establishing contract, 222 incorporators are to draft the articles of
association (bylaws) elaborating the rules by which the corporation will be running. Moreover, the
bylaws encompass detailed guidelines for several corporate matters. For example, the document
covers distribution of shares, their classes, issuance of shares, trading of shares, increase and
decrease of the capital share, regulation of shareholder assemblies, management of the corporation,
the number of directors, the length of their periods,223 the manner of board membership’s
termination or expiration, 224 distribution of dividends, dispute resolutions, any opt-outs of
corporate default rules, and the liquidation and dissolution of the corporation. 225
In aid to meet these requirements, the Minister of Commerce and Investments issued directive
templates for both documents to help the incorporators fulfill the requirements correctly and avert

Article 53 of the CL of 2015. However, many operating establishments, including joint-stock
corporations, carry the surnames of their owners.
219
Some business activities require special authorization from the competent agencies in charge of
regulating and supervising these activities. See infra note 230.
220
See infra Chapter 3. Part I. C.
221
See supra note 163, 164.
222
The approach adopted by the Saudi legislature to require a contract at the outset and to recognize the
separate personality for the corporation from its owners concurs with the view of corporation as “nexus
for contracts.” According to this view, corporations are parties to contracts with third parties (e.g.,
suppliers, customers and employees) to carry out the main purpose of the business. In addition, the “nexus
for contracts” concept results in the separation of the assets advanced to the corporation from the
ownership of the corporation’s owners. Therefore, the corporation, as the new possessor of these assets, is
solely liable for the debts and liabilities arising from its operations In fact, Article 52 of the Law reads
that “[a] joint-stock company shall be solely liable for debts and liabilities arising from its activities.” See
REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY O F CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH 5 (Oxford Univ. Press 3rd. ed. 2017) (arguing that the economic view of corporation as
“nexus of contracts” fails to distinguish between corporations and “other networks of contractual
relationships”).
223
See infra Chapter 3. Part III. A. 1.
224
Article 68 (3).
225
See supra note 163, 164.
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nullification of or delays in the incorporation process. Also, it sets the minimum information
needed for third parties to assess the corporation accurately.226
After the incorporators draft and execute these documents, they are to file an incorporation
request enclosed with the said incorporating documents to the Ministry of Commerce and
Investments.227 Upon the verification of all documents, a license incorporating a joint-stock
corporation is issued by a ministerial decision (MD No.1).228 Nevertheless, if the business purpose
of the corporation itself requires a special license or official authorization by the competent agency
regulating and supervising such a business,229 incorporators are to obtain such a license or
authorization prior to the submission of the incorporation request. 230
This ministerial license does not guarantee the incorporation but merely permits the
incorporators to move forward with the process of share-capital raising and to hold the
incorporation assembly.231 Finally, after obtaining the MD No.1, the incorporators are to have both

226

See supra note 163, 164.
Article 57.
228
An important difference that is noticed in the Law is that the power to issue a “ministerial decision” is
assigned to two organs: either the Minister or the Ministry. The former himself is solely empowered by
the Law to compose a committee to temporarily supervise corporations with no board of directors (Article
69), to amend the nominal value of shares (Article 105.2), to issue the guiding forms for articles of
incorporation and bylaws for each enterprise recognized by the Law (Article 225.1), and to adopt
whatever necessary for the implementation of the Law (225.2). Any issue falling within the scope of these
articles has to be regulated and decided upon by a ministerial decision signed only be the Minister. On the
other hand, licensing the incorporation of joint-stock corporations (M.D No.1) and announcing the
incorporation of joint-stock corporations (M.D No.2) are of the Ministry’s powers (Articles 62.1 and
65.1). Therefore, a ministerial decision may be issued by the Minister, his deputy, or any delegated
department within the Ministry (e.g., the Companies Department).
229
Article 60 (1,2).
230
For example, if the business purpose of the corporation is to carry out telecom services, a ministerial
decision licensing the incorporating of the business should be issued only after the business has acquired
the required license from the Communications and Information Technology Commission, since it is the
sole competent authority in charge of regulating and supervising the telecom sector in Saudi Arabia.
231
See infra Chapter 3. Part I. B & C.
227
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documents notarized by the competent authority.232 233 Failure to notarize these documents or any
amendments to these documents gives rise to the nullity of the corporation and joint liability
imposed upon the failing incorporators for any damages to the corporation, partners, or third
parties.234
B. Share Capital
1. Share Capital Requirements
In building the corporation’s capital, the Law requires a set of demands to be met.235 First, the
Law presupposes that the capital suffices to embark upon the business purposes,236 yet the
corporation’s capital, in all cases, shall not be less than 500,000 Saudi Riyals ($ 133,333).237 To
ensure the seriousness of the incorporators and their solvency to carry out the business, the Law
demands that at least 25% of the corporation’s capital be advanced and paid up upon the
incorporation.238

232

For a long time, the competent authority was only the Notaries of the Ministry of Justice. Recently, the
Ministry of Justice has licensed a number of lawyers to be also authorized notaries alongside the Public
Notaries across the region.
233
In practice, the notarization requires incorporators to provide three documents: a letter for the Ministry
addressing the Public Notary and authorizing the notarization; incorporation’s resolution; and the bylaws
as approved and stamped by the Ministry.
234
Article 12 (1, 2).
235
Building the corporate capital in close corporations differs from public corporations. In the latter, it is
jointly regulated by the Capital Market Authority and the Ministry of Commerce and Investments because
it involves initial public offerings. Such a difference is the requirement of underwriting. As far as close
corporations are concerned, this thesis assumes only the incorporation process of close corporations. See
Article 58.
236
Article 54.
237
No distinction is drawn between listed corporations and unlisted ones. On the contrary, the predecessor
required that share capital of listed corporations be no less than 10 million Saudi Riyals ($ 2,66 million),
whereas the capital of unlisted corporation would not be less than 2 million Saudi Riyals ($ 533,333). One
may see the huge drop in the share capital as statutory encouragement for businesses to transform to or
form joint-stock corporations. This form of entity is no longer a vehicle deployed for massive business
projects, but it is now available relatively for all business objectives.
238
In the past, the paid-in capital required by the Law was at least 50% of share capital. Evidently, the
lowering of the percentage of paid up share capital and the lowering of the minimum share capital reflect
the leniency of the 2015 Law and the statutory encouragement to carry out business purposes in the form
of joint-stock corporations.
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Second, the corporate capital is to be divided into negotiable, nominal shares of equal value.239
The Law also requires that par value per share be 10 Saudi Riyals ($ 2,66)240 unless otherwise
permitted by the Minister. 241 Furthermore, the share capital (all or portion of it) 242 is to be banked
to a company-under-incorporation account with an accredited bank in the region.243 The access to
this account is reserved for only the board of directors after the declaration of the incorporation.244
Joint-stock corporations’ shares have several statutory features. First, all shares, in general,
have equal value.245 This helps in several ways: it eases the calculating process of voting during
the shareholder assembly and eases the distribution process of dividends. Another feature is that
they are indivisible vis-à-vis the corporation.246 Therefore, if a group of individuals possesses a
share, they must select one of them to exercise the rights attached to this share. By the same token,
all individuals are jointly liable for any obligation arising from the ownership of this share. 247
Inheritance and gifts are a common cause for such devolution.
Last but not least, if some incorporators advance in-kind contributions (e.g., lands, buildings,
cars),248 it is of the incorporators’ responsibilities to ensure accurate evaluation of their shares.249
In addition, the ownership of shares issued against in-kind contributions is transferred only after a

239

Article 52.
It is unclear why the Law has set the par value at ten Saudi Riyals, yet going over past IPOs in the
Saudi market, one may conclude that 10 Saudi Riyals has always fostered small investors and low-income
people to enter the market and make profits out of these IPOs.
241
Article 105 (2).
242
In case the share capital is not paid up in-full, the remaining of share value must be paid within five
years from the date of the issuance of shares. See Article 106 (2).
243
Article 59.
244
Id.
245
Article 52.
246
Article 105 (1).
247
Id.
248
Article 56.
249
In doing so, the Law requires that the incorporation request be accompanied with a report with an
estimate of the fair value of these contributions that is executed by an appraiser or accredited valuator. See
Article 61 for further procedural information.
240
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payment-in-full value is made and full transfer of the ownership of their in-kind contributions to
the corporation is completed.250
2. Share Capital Classes
In principle, the share capital of the corporation consists of “common” shares that entail equal
rights for and obligations upon their holders.251Nonetheless, corporations may decide to issue
another class of shares that entails different rights and obligations, which is known as “preferred”
shares.
Under the Law, the issuance of preferred shares requires the following: first, the corporation’s
bylaws allow the issuance of such a class; second, the extraordinary general assembly of the
corporation votes in favor of the issuance of preferred shares. 252 In all cases, the Law recognizes
preferred shares as non-voting shares, which do not entitle their holders to vote in shareholder
general assemblies.253
Instead, preferred shares grant their holders the right to receive a higher percentage of the
corporation’s earnings, provided that the corporation has set aside its statutory reserve. 254 Holders
of preferred shares are first in line to receive their portions, before any distribution of dividends to
shareholders.255 In addition, since the preferred shares are non-voting shares, which cannot be cast
250

Article 106 (3).
Further details and explanations of these rights and obligations are provided later in the next chapter
under the umbrella of minority shareholder rights.
252
The issuance of preferred shares involves an increase in the share capital of the corporation, which is
one of few exceptional instances the Law sets a higher voting-passage percentage for than the default
percentage stipulated in the Law for decisions by extraordinary assembly. See infra Chapter 3. Part II. A.
2. b.
253
Article 114.
254
The Law obliges joint-stock corporations to build a statutory reserve. In doing so, corporations must
put 10% of its net profits by every year, and they may cease putting aside the 10% portion upon two
conditions: first, the statutory reserve has reached 30% of the corporation’s paid-in share capital; second,
the corporation’s ordinary general assembly votes in favor of discontinuing setting aside 10% of its net
profits for the reserve. In other words, the board of directors may not make such a decision. See Article
129 (1).
255
Article 166 (1).
251
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upon any corporate matter, the Law protects the interests of their holders in a variety of ways. For
instance, besides the fact that they are first in line, the Law prevents the corporation from issuing
any class of shares that would have priority over the existing preferred shares, or to modify their
agreed-upon percentage of the corporation’s net profits unless such issuance is approved by the
holders of existing shares. 256 Another protective aspect of this class of shares is that in the failure
of the corporation to pay— for three consecutive years— the holders of these shares the percentage
to which they are entitled, the Law grants these holders several temporary rights. They have the
right to attend shareholder assemblies and cast their votes, or they may appoint a number of
representatives of them as a class to the board of directors, proportional to their shares in the
corporation’s capital. Such a right continues until their overdue profits are paid in full.257
C. Incorporation Assembly
After notarizing the foundational documents, depositing the share capital into the underincorporation bank account and issuing DM No.1, the incorporators must invite all subscribers to
the incorporation meeting within 45 days from the date of MD No.1 with the proviso that there are
at least three days between the date of the invitation and the date of the meeting. 258 Every
subscriber and incorporator have a statutory right to attend this assembly, irrespective to their
shareholdings.259 For the validity of this assembly, the Law requires a quorum of subscribers

256

Such approval is obtained through a special committee consisting of prejudiced preferred-share
holders, and meetings of this committee is held in compliance with the rules regulating extraordinary
shareholder assemblies. See Article 89.
257
Also, this right is exercised through the special committee of prejudiced preferred-share holders as
class. See Article 166 (2).
258
Article 62 (1).
259
This is a new rule the Law introduces in Article 62 (2). In the past, attending any sort of corporate
assemblies was restricted to only shareholders of at least twenty shares. This reflects statutory recognition
of minority rights and the necessity of raising its voice in shareholder assembly.
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holding at least 50% of the share capital,260 and decisions are passed by an absolute majority of
the shares represented in the meeting.261 In the assembly, subscribers are to elect a chairperson,
secretary and vote counter.
The incorporation assembly is held only once in the lifetime of the corporation. It takes charge
of five statutory tasks.262 First, it ensures that the statutory minimum of share capital, if not paid
in full, has been advanced. Second, it confers the evaluation report of the in-kind contributions, if
any.263 Third, it ratifies the final version of the articles of association (the constitution of the
corporation).264 Fourth, it appoints members of the corporation’s first board of directors and
auditor if they have not been yet specified in the constitutional documents.265 Fifth, it deliberates
and ratifies incorporation report of expenses and activities incurred and carried out by
incorporators.
All in all, the incorporation assembly appears to be the practical kickoff of the business since
it is empowered to finalize the business’s constitution and select the members who will have access
to the banked share capital.266

260

The Law goes farther to regulate cases in which such a quorum is not met. It requires a call for a
second meeting and deems the meeting valid regardless of the how much of the share capital the attendees
represent, provided that the meeting takes place after at least 15 days of the date of first one. To avoid this
protracted procedure, the Law allows for the second meeting to be held after one hour of the period
prescribed for the first meeting (one-hour rule), provided that the call for the first meeting contains what
indicates that a second meeting will be held after one hour if case the first meeting is inquorate.
261
By an exercise of imagination and application of logic, this rule may become problematic for close
corporations in case the majority shareholder possess more than half of the share capital. That shareholder
would unilaterally form and finalize “the constitutional documents” of the corporation.
262
Article 63.
263
See supra Chapter 3. Part I. B.
264
In case there are substantive amendments to the articles of association (e.g., change of business
purpose), the Law requires that it be approved by all subscribers attending the meeting.
265
See supra Chapter 3. Part III. A.
266
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D. Declaration of Incorporation
The last stride in the incorporation process is the announcement of the incorporation. Within
fifteen days of the conclusion of the incorporation assembly, the incorporators must submit a
request for the announcement and enclose to the request three major documents: evidence of
compliance with share capital requirements, the incorporation assembly’s minutes and decisions
along with the approved-by-assembly articles of association.
Upon confirming the completion of the incorporation’s requirements, the Ministry issues a
ministerial decision (MD No. 2) declaring the incorporation of a joint-stock corporation, and such
resolution is to be posted on the Ministry’s website.267 Members of the board of directors are to
register the corporation in the Commercial Registry within a fifteen-day window from the date of
announcing the incorporation of the corporation. 268
MD No.2 breeds essential results. First, the corporation becomes immune against any action
invalidating it for a violation of the Law or the articles of association, and such actions are not
heard, provided that the announcement has been published and the corporation has been
registered.269 Second, all expenses and activities executed by incorporators for the incorporation
purposes are transferred to and become borne by the corporation, only.270
E. The Contractual View of the corporation and One-Person Joint-Stock Corporation
At the onset of the CL of 2105, Article two words the exact definition of the corporation in the
superseded Law. 271 They both define the corporation as “a contract under which two or more
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Article 65.
Failure to comply with the registration requirement, or negligence to announce any amendments to the
articles of association is penalized by the Law with a fine not exceeding 500,000 Saudi Riyals ($
133,333). Article 213 (N).
269
Article 66 (1).
270
Article 66 2).
271
See Article one of the Companies Law of 1965.
268
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persons undertake to participate in an enterprise for profit, by contributing a share in the form of
money, work, or both, and share profit or loss resulting therefrom.”272 However, the Companies
Law of 1965 required a contract between at least five individuals for the incorporation of the jointstock corporation,273 and it disapproved of any form of one-person entity (joint-stock corporation
or limited labiality corporation) because such a concept contradicted the long-standing view of
corporations as contractual relationships between at least two persons.274
The requirement of five individuals to incorporate a joint-stock corporation (or even two
people to incorporate limited liability company) led people to gaming the system and
circumventing the five-incorporator (in case of joint-stock corporations) or two-member (in case
of LLCs) requirement by inclusion of sham shareholders and members to just meet the threshold
requirement. This necessitated the adoption of the one-person enterprise since it was invented in
part of coping with such gaming. In addition, as mentioned earlier the government needed to carry
out several projects through corporate vehicles where it was the only owner. 275 Therefore, the
legislature realized the importance of the one-person entity, the need to depart the longstanding
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Article two of the Companies Law of 2015.
Article 48 of the Companies Law of 1965.
274
A respectable argument against the view of corporation as a contract by the Saudi legislature is
introduced by Aljaber in his book [written in Arabic]. Aljaber argues that even though the contractual
view of corporation might succeed in explaining the complexity of corporation in the past, it has,
however, become incapable of explicating today corporations due to the major gaps between the
corporate rules and the general principles of contract. For example, the contract founding the corporation
not only produces mutual rights and obligations (as all contracts do) but also it creates a new separate
legal person that has the full capacity and is financially independent. Also, the contract features that it can
be modified by consent of the majority of the signatories to the contract, while the general principle of
contract requires consent of all parties to modify it. Contracts in principle are fashioned with the aim to
reconcile between conflicting interests of their parties, whereas all parties to the contract forming
corporations share the same goal of profiting therefrom. Instead, he believes that the corporation should
be regarded as a legal institution of special nature where the role of individuals is limited to accept or
reject the entry to this institution. This gives grounds for the intervention of the legislator by setting forth
mandatory rules to attain a cluster of economic and social goals. For further justification of this argument,
see Aljaber, at 164–165. By the same token, this argument is all-encompassing as it justifies one-person
entities.
275
See supra Chapter 2. Part II. B. 1.
273
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view of the corporation as a contract, and the acceptance of the patrimony of affectation
doctrine.276, 277
In terms of the joint-stock corporations, the Law now requires only two persons, at least to
submit the incorporation request—in principle and according to the contractual view of the
corporation stated in Article two.278 Nevertheless, in exception to the statutory definition of the
corporation, the Law permits the incorporation of the one-person corporation for a few persons.279
The first category to incorporate the one-person corporation—with no minimum share capital
threshold— includes the state, public legal persons alongside state-owned corporations.280 The
second category to incorporate the one-person corporation are corporations whose share capitals
are no less than five million Saudi Riyals ($ 1,33 million). Consequently, the natural person may
not incorporate the one-person joint-stock corporation. 281

276

Similar to the recent acceptance of the Saudi Companies Law of 2015 of one-person entity, the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) just approved and accepted the single-owner entity. See Article 8 (3) of the UAE
Federal Law No.2 of 2015 on Commercial Companies, (“Notwithstanding the provision of Clause 1 of
this Article [“a company is contract under which two or more persons . . .”], a company may be
incorporated or held by a single person in accordance with the provisions of this Law.”)
277
The refusal of one-person entity in favor of the contractual view of corporation according to the
concept of unity of patrimony (a person is answerable for all his debts and obligations with all his present
and future assets, and he or she cannot earmark some of the assets for a specific debt, which is known as
patrimony of affectation) is common in the corporate laws of several Arab countries such as Egypt,
Lebanon, Syria, Kuwait, and Oman. See HIEWA I. ALHAIDARI, ONE PERSON LIMITED LIABLITY
COMPANY: COMPARTIVE STUDY, 121–122, (AL-HALABI LEGAL PUB. 1st. ed. 2010).
278
In case shares of a joint-stock corporation descend to one shareholder that does not satisfy the statutory
exception for one-person joint-stock corporation stated in Article 55(e.g., by involuntary means such as
inheritance or a voluntary one such as a purchase of these shares), the Law grants this corporation a one
year period to rectify its condition in compliance with the Law. Such rectification may be in one of the
following forms: conversion to one-person limited liability, inclusion of at least one shareholder, or
transfer of the shares’ ownership to a legal entity that is allowed by law to incorporate one-person jointstock corporation. Failure to take one of these corrective actions during the statutory one-year window
results in termination of the corporation by the force of law. See Article 149.
279
Article 55.
280
Examples of state, legal persons are the Public Investment Fund and the Public Pension Fund.
Examples of State-owned Corporations are the Saudi Railways Company, and the Saudi Arabian Military
Industries Company
281
However, the Law recognizes the right of natural person to incorporate one-person entity, in exception
to the principle, only in the form of limited liability company. See Article 154 (1).
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F. Incorporation Process Design

Drafting Incorporating
Contract and Articles of
Association
(Constitutional
Documents)

Depositing the share
capital into underincorporation bank
account

Issuing the Incorporating
License (MD No. 1)

Within
45
days

Announcement of
Incorporation (MD No.2)

Within
15
days

Calling for Incorporation
Assembly

Registering the
Corporation in the
Commercial Registry
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Notarizing Incorporating
Contract and Articles of
Association

Within
15 days

Requesting
Announcement of
Incorporation

De Jure Joint-Stock
Corporation in the
Market

Part II. Shareholders
Shareholders are of the foremost bodies (shareholders and board of directors) the Law
recognizes in the regulation of the corporations.282 They are indeed the corporation’s owners who
due to the structure of the joint-stock corporation are divested of their right to operate and run the
business. Nevertheless, they as a class enjoy a supreme power and arguably have the upper hand
over a bundle of corporate matters as explicated hereunder.
The question of which body has the superior power emerges in most corporate governance
studies. Some arguments favor the management organ, 283 while others align with the shareholder
as a class.284 Nonetheless, the advocates of both arguments agree upon the importance of both
institutions, and they would not vest a great deal of power in one body without being checked. 285
Therefore, corporate governance comes to enhance the legal and economic environment of the
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Most of shareholder rights, the statutory protection of them, and other shareholder-related research
questions are explained in a separate part later in this thesis.
283
E.g., Delaware with its pro-management corporate law and judiciary is arguably on the top of the
advocates’ list that favor corporate management and thus entrust them with wider powers over corporate
affairs as a means of maximizing shareholder value. Not to mention the pervasive influence of Delaware
corporate experience over a wide range of jurisdictions. See generally, William L. Cary, Federalism and
Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 663–68 (1974); Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547,
n.61 (2002) (“All state corporate codes provide for a system of nearly absolute delegation of power to the
board of directors, which in turn is authorized to further delegate power to subordinate firm agents.”); Jill
E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637,
674 (2006); William W. Bratton; Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy's Corporatist Origins: Adolf
Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 152 (2008).
284
A prominent proponent of the view of shareholder superiority and power over the management,
Professor Lucian Bebchuk of Harvard Law school, who has written several commonly-cited articles in
support of shareholder superiority and power over the management. E.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth
of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675 (2007); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reply: Letting
Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784 (2006); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for
Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005).
285
See Angualia Daniel, Balance of Power between Shareholders and the Board in Corporate
Governance p.4 (2010) (attributing the collapse of the corporation to “[t]he lake of proper check on such
powers . . . .”) (Available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1612962 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1612962) (last visited Oct. 12,
2017).
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corporations and strike a balance between the two internal organs. Distinctive thoughts of the
separation between ownership and control generate different corporate governance models that
vary in their views and boundaries of the rights and responsibilities of each body.286 Of course, the
variations and differences among these models stem from the fact that each model has been
designed to reflect and suit the corporate environment it develops in.287 Such differences between
these models are the characters in the corporate arena, 288 the ownership patterns,289 the
sophistication of the capital market, 290 the regulatory framework of the country, 291 and the sorts of
corporate powers every organ enjoys. 292
As far as the Saudi corporate governance concerns, one may extrapolate from what has been
explained earlier that the concentrated ownership structure (with the strong presence of the state)
involves corporate governance that leans toward shareholders and empowers them.293 Evidently,
the shareholders capitalize the corporation, incorporate it, decide the remunerations for its board
members, and formulate its policies toward the corporation’s ends.294 The CL of 2015, however,
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The most notable corporate governance models in corporate scholarships are the U.S. model, the
Japanese model, and the German model.
287
See REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH ch. 3 (Oxford Univ. Press 3rd. ed. 2017) (attributing the variation of corporate
governance across the world to ownership structure, coordination and information costs along with
different levels of enforcement of corporate laws).
288
For example, the German model, copied by Brazilian corporate law as well, adopts a two-tier board
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jurisdictions (e.g., France and Italy) grant corporations the option to select either board system. See
REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY O F CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH 50 (Oxford Univ. Press 3rd. ed. 2017)
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See supra Chapter 2. Part II.
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See supra Chapter 2. Part II. A.
291
See supra Chapter 2. Part II. A.
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E.g., REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 49 (Oxford Univ. Press 3rd. ed. 2017) (“In countries where controlling
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See infra Chapter 3. Closing Analysis.
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draws, in a very detailed way, the powers’ limits of each body and the statutory duties assigned to
it. Accordingly, members of the board are agents serving the interests of the shareholders as a
class.
It is worth reminding that close-corporation shareholders oftentimes, if not always, serve as
directors of the corporation,295 so it is rare to trigger the issue of separation and superiority of
power in such situations due to the absence of the agency problem it causes between the
shareholders (principals) and corporate managers (agents). Nevertheless, the issue shifts to bisect
shareholders into minority shareholders (principals) and controlling shareholders (agents). Striking
a statutory balance between the two appears to be critical as to neither over-empower the
controlling shareholders in a way that results in oppression nor to overprotect the minority
shareholders in a way making them the controlling ones.
To balance these powers, the Saudi Law articulates the rights and the duties of both bodies in
terms of substance and form. Moreover, the Law considers that both bodies (the board of directors
and shareholder as a class through their statutory assemblies) compose the management of the
corporation. To elaborate on the management portion of the shareholders as a class, the emphasis
is placed upon the channels through which they perform their statutory roles: shareholder general
assembly and audit committee.
A. Shareholder General Assembly
The Law obligates the joint-stock corporations to have two sorts of general assemblies
(ordinary and extraordinary shareholder assemblies), where shareholders raise their voice and

It is also known as “compliance board”, where the company only has the board to fulfil a legal
requirement, as opposed to “quasi-independent board” consisting of directors with no ties to the
corporation apart from their capacities as directors. See Catherine Bromilow & John Morrow, Family
Business Corporate Governance Series: What is a Board’s Role in Family Business?
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP (June 2014).
295
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exercise their statutory rights. The Law elaborates on shareholder assemblies and the rules
governing them, as these assemblies are regarded as the parliament of the corporation whose
shareholders reserve the right to decide a wide range of corporate affairs the Law assigns to them
as a class. As these assemblies differ from each other in terms of substance, they, however, enjoy
some statutory similarities in terms of the form these meetings take. This research, therefore,
bisects the regulatory framework of the shareholder assemblies into two categories: statutory
similarities and statutory differences.
1. Statutory Similarities
a. Assembly Call
The Law obligates the board of directors to call for all shareholder general assemblies requires
the chairperson of the board to preside these assemblies.296 The invitation to shareholder meetings
may be required by law,297 or based on a request from the corporation’s auditor, 298 the audit
committee,299 or a number of shareholders representing all together no less than 5% of the
corporation’s share capital.300
Another similarity between shareholder assemblies is that the invitation to attend the assembly
is to be published in a daily newspaper circulated in the province where the headquarter domiciles.
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In the absence of the chairperson, the vice-chairperson is to preside the shareholder meeting, or any
member designated by the board of directors in the absence of the two. See Article 86 (1).
297
See infra Chapter 3. Part II. A. 2. a.
298
See infra Chapter 3. Part IV. C.
299
See infra Chapter 3. Part II. B. 2.
300
In addition, the Law specifies several conditions where the call for an ordinary general shareholder
assembly is by not the board of directors but a resolution issued by the Competent Authority, the Ministry
of Commerce and Investment: in case the board’s failure to conduct the statutory meeting according to
Article 87; failure of the board to satisfy the minimum number of members to conduct a valid meeting; in
case of violation of the Law or the corporation’s bylaws; in case of mismanagement of the corporation; in
case of the board’s failure to call for the meeting within fifteen days upon request by the audit committee,
auditor, or shareholders representing at least 5% of the corporation’s share capital. The call is based upon
a request by shareholders representing 2% of the corporation’s share capital, and the Competent Authority
is to send out the call within 30 days from the date of the request. See Article 90 (2,3).
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This invitation must be published ten days prior to the date of the meeting. As an alternative, the
meeting’s invitation may be mailed out by registered mail. A copy of the meeting call and agenda
must be provided to the Competent Authority during the publication period. 301
b. Assembly Minutes
Corporations are to maintain minutes of every shareholder meeting. Such minutes include the
number of shareholders attending the assembly (or their delegates), the shareholdings they
represent personally (or by proxy), decisions made (including the number of assenting votes and
dissenting ones), and a synopsis of the meeting deliberations. The Law requires that the minutes
of every shareholder assembly be recorded and kept following every meeting, and they have to be
signed by the chairperson of the assembly, its secretary and the vote counter.302
c. Voting System and One-Share-One-Vote Rule
Shareholders are empowered to fashion their voting system in terms of the required quorum
for issuing resolutions upon corporate affairs. 303 For example, they may stipulate in the bylaws
that a vote of supermajority is required for deciding directorial remunerations opting out of the
default rule (requiring a simple majority vote at an ordinary general shareholder meeting). Failure
to adopt opt-out provisions in the corporation’s bylaws implies the acceptance and thus adherence
to the Law’s default rules.
The shareholder’s discretion to design the voting manner, nonetheless, is not absolute. The
Law imposes several restrictions on the exercise of this power. For instance, alterations to the
default quorum and voting-passage requirements in shareholder assemblies.304 In addition, the Law
imposes the one-share-one-vote rule as it underscores the equality of shares in terms of the rights
301

Article 91.
Article 97.
303
Article 95 (1).
304
See infra Chapter 3. Part II. A. 2.
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and obligations they produce (except for preferred shares).305 Also, the Law mandates that the
cumulative voting be followed in appointing directors to the corporation’s board. Opt-out
provisions concerning these corporate affairs are null and void. 306
d. Online Assembly and Voting (Virtual Meetings)
The Law has taken an unprecedented step allowing the corporations to conduct shareholder
meetings through cutting-edge technology.307 Evidently, this permission, in theory, encourages
shareholders to play their roles without bearing a high cost of coordination and information. To
utilize this statutory permission, the Ministry of Commerce and Investment sets forth the
implementing rules therefor.308 Such rules are that the shareholder’s participation has to be via
instant visual and audio transmission of the shareholder assembly.309 Also, a shareholder is to be
enabled in the online meeting to effectively participate, express attitude, discuss and cast votes
upon the meeting agenda.310 In addition, close corporations may allow shareholders to cast their
votes online even if they do not attend the assembly, provided that online voting is available before
and during the shareholding meeting (no delegates required). Plus, the online voting period is open
for no less than three days before the date of the meeting, and the online voting upon every item
of the meeting agenda is halted as the discussion and voting on that item conclude.311 Most
importantly, the online voting and online meeting do not subrogate the holding of the in-person
meeting at the venue specified in the invitation, nor do they deprive the shareholder of attending
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An excessive explanation about these rights is provided in the next chapter.
Further analysis of the cumulative Voting approach adopted by the Law is provided later under the
minority shareholder representation in the boardroom as part of the statutory protection of this class.
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Article 86 (3).
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See supra Chapter 2. Part I. B. 1.
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See the Organizing Rules for Unlisted Joint-Stock Corporations, Article 8 (1.A).
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Id. Article 8 (1.B).
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Id. Article 8 (2.A, B, C, D).
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in person.312 In other words, the physical shareholder meeting is always compulsory, and the online
meetings and voting are optional alternatives for the corporation to ease the exercise of the
shareholders’ rights, and they do not substitute for the physical meeting, making it a hybrid
physical/online shareholder meeting.313 The board of directors should adopt whatever necessary
to verify shareholders’ identities,314 and it may also communicate the invitation to the meeting
online in exception to the newspaper publication or registered mail method.315
e. Compliance with Articles of Associations
The possession of the corporation’s shares implies that the shareholder is bound by the
constitutional documents and all decisions made through the shareholder assemblies so long as
they comply with the corporation’s articles of association, regardless of the shareholder’s presence
and absence or his agreement and disagreement to these decisions. However, if the decision is
made to the contrary to the corporation’s articles of associations, such a decision is deemed void
and null.316 For example, if the articles of association or the corporation’s bylaws set a higher
quorum than what is required by the default rule for the validity of general shareholder meeting,
this quorum has to be satisfied. Otherwise, the meeting is invalid, so are its decisions.
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Id. Article 8 (3).
From a shareholder perspective, the requirement of holding in-person meeting offers protection for less
tech-savvy shareholders to raise their concerns and direct questions to the management directly. From the
management’s point of view, however, this requirement appears to be expensive and time-consuming as
hosting physical meetings often involve room-renting and catering costs, which could be avoided by
holding online-only meetings. In addition, shareholders are less likely to confront and investigate
directors in online-only meetings, which relieve the latter from awkward situations. For further
information, see Robert Richardson, Glass, Lewis & Co., Virtual-Only Shareholder Meetings:
Streamlining Costs or Cutting Shareholders Out? Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance
and Financial Regulation (Nov. 30, 2017) (casting light on the trend that a number of public companies in
the U.S. hold virtual-only shareholder meetings with no in-person meetings),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/11/30/virtual-only-shareholder-meetings-streamlining-costs-orcutting-shareholders-out/, (last visited: Dec. 1, 2017).
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Id. Article 9.
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Without prejudice to Article 91 of the 2015 Law (explained earlier in Chapter 3. Part II. A. 1. a). The
Organizing Rules for Unlisted Joint-Stock Corporations, Article 11.
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Article 98, 99.
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2. Statutory Differences
The Law stipulates that every joint-stock corporation have two kinds of general shareholder
assemblies (ordinary and extraordinary ones), each of which is entrusted with a cluster of statutory
obligations and powers. The differences between these assemblies stem not only from the duties
and powers allocated to them but also from the varying statutory quorum prerequisite for the
validity of each assembly as explained hereunder.
a. Ordinary General Shareholder Assembly
The call for ordinary general shareholder assembly may be either statutory or necessary. To
clarify, every joint-stock corporation must hold an ordinary general shareholder meeting at least
once a year.317 This is the statutory meeting required by law (regardless of the urgency to convene
or not), so failure to comply with it is sanctioned with a monetary penalty not exceeding 500,000
Saudi Riyals ($133,333).318 However, sometimes the corporation needs to decide on some
corporate matters on which only the shareholders have the power to decide, such as the
appointment to the board of directors. In this case, the board of directors, as put in charge of calling
for shareholder meetings, 319 invites shareholders to attend an “urgent” shareholder meeting.
The Law sets forth a default quorum for the validity of this assembly. It requires the attendance
of shareholders representing at least 25% of the corporation’s share capital.320 However, the Law
leaves room for shareholders to set a higher percentage for the quorum in the articles of association
on the condition that the quorum does not require more than 50% of the corporation’s share
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To be specific, the statutory meeting must take place within the six months following the end of the
corporation’s fiscal year. See Article 87.
318
Article 213 (H).
319
See supra Chapter 3. Part II. A. 1. A.
320
Article 93 (1).

89

capital.321 On the other hand, the passage of resolutions in ordinary general shareholder assemblies
requires the approval of only an absolute majority (50+1) of the shares representing in the
assembly. Again, shareholders have some discretion to stipulate a higher percentage in the
corporation’s bylaws. 322
In principle, shareholders through the ordinary assembly have powers over all corporate
affairs. Such affairs are, inter alia, the assignment and removal of a member of the board of
director,323 the authorization of related-party or self-conflicted transactions by a member of the
board of directors, 324 the filing of the shareholder derivative suit, 325 the approval of the financial
statements and annual reports,326 the distribution of surpluses,327 the appointment and
remuneration of the auditor,328 the formation of the audit committee,329 and any other corporate
matter that is not part of the corporation’s bylaws. 330
Since the percentage for quorum and passage of the resolutions are not that high along with
the fact that amendments to the corporation’s constitution are critical, the Law—in protection of
the major corporate affairs— excludes the powers to amend the corporate constitution (the articles
of association or bylaws) from the ordinary general shareholder assembly. Instead, the power is
assigned to the second type of assemblies, the extraordinary general shareholder meeting. 331

321

If a shareholder meeting is inquorate, the Law requires calling for a second meeting within a month
from the date of first meeting. The invitation is to follow the rules explained in Chapter 3. Part II. A. 1. a.
The second meeting is deemed valid, irrespective to meeting the required quorum or not. See Article 93
(2).
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Article 93 (2).
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Article 68 (3).
324
Article 71 (1).
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Article 97.
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Article 128.
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See infra Chapter 3. Part II. B.
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b. Extraordinary General Shareholder Assembly
The corporate articles of association symbolize the constitution of the corporation.
Constitutions often characterize as rigid in terms of the statutory procedures followed in amending
or abrogating any of their texts, so supermajorities are of the foremost requirements to make such
constitutional changes due to the significance of constitutions and their roles in the stability and
continuity of the countries they come to organize. By analogy, due to the important details and
organizational frameworks in the bylaws, corporate laws realize this significance and thus require
another sort of shareholder assembly for amendments to these rules. The Law requires an
extraordinary general shareholder assembly to be conducted for any of the corporation’s core
affairs arranged by and stipulated in the corporation’s articles of associations.332 Such corporate
matters are the issuance of new shares, 333 voluntary dissolution, 334 issuance of preferred shares, 335
conversion of common shares to preferred shares or vice-versa,336 issuance of debt instruments or
Sukuk (Islamic bonds) that are convertible into shares,337 decrease of the capital share, 338 increase

However, there are some statutory exceptions to the assembly’s power that cannot be modified. For
example, change of the corporation’ nationality and relocation of the corporation’s headquarter outside
the country are forbidden and shareholders cannot take such decisions. See, e.g., Article 88 (A, B, C, D).
333
See infra note 339.
334
Article 94 (4).
335
Article 114.
336
Article 114.
337
In other words, issuance nonconvertible debt instruments and bonds falls within the powers of the
board of directors, with prejudice to the corporation’s bylaws. See Articles 121–125 for further
knowledge of the regulatory framework of issuance of debt instruments.
338
One way to cope with loses, corporations may decrease their share capitals. Also, a decrease of the
corporate share capital may occur if it is in excess of the corporate needs. Such a decision has to be made
after shareholders being informed about the justifications for such a step by reading the corporate
auditor’s report including the liabilities and effects entailing such a decrease. See Articles 144–174 for
further regulations regarding share capital decrease.
332
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of the capital share, 339 usage of provisional reserve, 340 and repurchase of shares. 341 Also, if the
corporation decides to opt out of the default quorums or the default resolution-passing percentage,
such a decision must be approved by the extraordinary assembly. 342 Above all, it falls within its
powers the right to deliberate and decide on all corporate matters that are delegated to the ordinary
assembly.343
For the validity of extraordinary assemblies, the Law mandates a quorum of shareholders with
no less than 50% of the share capital be satisfied.344 The Law permits the corporation to adopt a
higher quorum, provided that it does not require more than 75% of the share capital.345 Such an
opt-out is to be penned in the corporation’s bylaws. 346 The extraordinary assemblies’ decisions are
issued upon at least a two-thirds of the majority vote of the represented shares.347 Nevertheless,
there are several stances the Law singles out and requires a third-quarter majority vote of the
represented shares for the passage of resolutions related to these cases: the increase or decrease of
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The Law specifies a several methods that may be utilized by joint-stock corporations to increase their
share capital, such as issuance of new shares. In addition, it presupposes for the increase of share capital
that the corporation’s share capital has been completed and paid in full, and grants current shareholders
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the corporation’s share capital, extension of the corporation lifetime, voluntary dissolution of the
corporation prior the expiry date stipulated in its bylaws, or the merger with another corporation. 348
B. Audit Committee
Reviewing and accessing all corporate reports and records are of paramount importance to the
shareholder’s rights in joint-stock corporations. Such a right is indispensable and cannot be
detached from the roles played by shareholders. However, the exercising of this right may require
know-how that some shareholders may lack to deal with corporate affairs, mainly financial ones.
The more the corporation expands its business and becomes sophisticated the more complex
understanding and reading its reports is. For this reason, the Law encourages shareholders to
delegate their supervisory roles to a handful of experts who become the shareholders’ eye inside
the corporation.
1. Formation
It is for the ordinary shareholder general assembly to organize a committee and deputize its
members to monitor the corporation’s affairs and activities. 349 The board is to facilitate its mission
and must not hinder its work. 350 To form the committee, the Law asks not to appoint to it an
executive member of the board for the sake of integrity and independence of the committee. The
shareholder assembly may appoint up to five members to the committee, and it may not have less
than three members. These members may be insiders or outsiders. 351 The resolution of forming the
committee should specify its duties, its manual, and its members’ compensations. 352 The validity
of committee meetings requires the attendance of a majority of its members. The passage of
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resolution involves the approval of the attending majority, and the chairperson has the casting vote
in case of a tie.353
2.

Powers and Responsibilities

This committee has access to all corporate records and documents, and it is entrusted with the
right to demand clarification from the board of directors or the executive branch. It may also
request the board of directors to call for a shareholder assembly. 354
In return, members of audit committees are to probe and scrutinize the corporation’s financial
statements and reports. The audit committee is also supposed to evaluate the internal control in the
corporation and provide its detailed opinion about it. The committee’s opinion and report of its
work is to be deposited in the corporation’s headquarter and copied made available to shareholders
alongside being recited to shareholders at their general assembly. 355

Part III. The Board of Directors
A key feature of the corporation that makes it stands out among other enterprises is the
separation between ownership and control or the so-called “delegated management” feature.
Unlike partnerships (where owners of business actively participate and engage in its management),
the structure and the function of corporations necessitate the separation between ownership and
control rights, given that corporations generally are cut off to undertake massive projects requiring
huge capitals a handful of people cannot build by themselves.356 Therefore, corporate laws
worldwide agree on the importance of corporate governance structure, yet they differ in terms of
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Article 102.
See supra Chapter 3. Part II. A. 1. a.
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Copies of the committee’s report is to be available at the headquarter at least ten days before the
shareholder assembly. See Article 104.
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See REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 11⎯12 (Oxford Univ. Press 3rd. ed. 2017) (adding that majority or unanimity
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the powers vested in the corporation’s institutions (shareholders and board of directors). That
results in two different corporate governance systems, shareholder-centric and director-centric
corporate governance systems.
The Saudi Companies Law elaborates on the governing rules of the board of directors,
setting an unprecedented presence of corporate governance principles, such as trust, integrity,
accountability, openness, commitment to the corporation, disclosure, and transparency. These
principles are decoded into a comprehensive set of rules governing all aspects of the corporate
board. Such aspects are the composition of the board (including appointment, removal, and
qualifications of the board’s member),357 specific duties and responsibilities of the board, board
meetings, and rewards and remuneration of the board’s members. They all together set an
exceptional division of the internal powers among corporate participants in the corporation by
rules, rather leaving these matters to be decided on by contractual arrangements.
A. The Composition of the Board
The Law sets forth stringent rules governing the appointment of directors, their removal, the
number of directors, and the separation of CEO and chairperson.
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The Law does not require a director to have a certain set of qualifications. However, for public
corporations, the Corporate Governance Regulations mandates that a director be professionally capable to
lead, have the necessary knowledge along with skills to perform directorial tasks, and enjoy physical
fitness. See Article 18 of the Corporate Governance Regulations.
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1. Appointment to the Board
The power to appoint a member to the board of directors as shown earlier is vested in the
shareholder general assembly. 358 Shareholders elect their representatives in the corporation’s
management.359 Otherwise, the Law permits shareholders to nominate themselves to the board.360
The appointment resolution to the board should also include the time duration of the member
on the board. Such duration, nevertheless, is not to exceed three years. 361 This stringent rule of the
Law ensures a constant change in corporate management and brings new blood to the boardroom
and the management team. 362 The only exception to this rule is when the appointment of directors
is made by the incorporation assembly. 363 This is the only exception that the Law allows the
incorporation assembly to appoint directors to the board for terms that do not exceed five years
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However, the Law in specific, rare situations (e.g., the death or resignation of a board member) allows
the board to appoint a member to temporarily fill the vacancy on the board. The exercise of this
exceptional right requires the following: the board selects a member based on the number of votes
received by each candidate; the member has adequate competency; the appointment is to be reported to
the Competent Authority within five days of the appointment; the appointment is referred to the ordinary
general assembly in its first meeting following the appointment; and the new member is appointed to
compete the term of the preceded member, and not appointed to a new term. See Article 70 (1).
359
The Law does not specify any qualifications for the board’s membership. However, the Corporate
Governance Regulations of public corporations sets forth several conditions for the membership of the
board. Such conditions are the ability to lead, ability to guide, competency, financial knowledge, and
physical fitness. These conditions are of paramount importance to ensure effective and efficient
management. See Corporate Governance Regulations, Article 18. Furthermore, given the fact that family
corporations, listed or not, in the region represent the major employers in the private sector alongside the
uncertainty and instability of family businesses and thus affecting the Saudi labor market (specially some
of family businesses have thousands of workers), the author tends to the importance to have labor
representation in the board of directors of corporations that unlisted and the number of their workers are
large due to the vital role and positive contribution of these corporations in job security and social welfare
of society. Worker codetermination may be an effective solution to make close corporations adopt the
best practices of corporate governance. However, determining the threshold of employees needs further a
thorough empirical study of these corporations and the size of their labor element in order to set an
optimal threshold that guarantees protection of the vast majority of labor market. See Abdulrahman N.
Alsaleh, Saudi Family Businesses upon their Founders’ Death (2015) (Unpublished L.L.M. Thesis,
University of Southern California) (on file with the author).
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Article 68 (2).
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Article 68 (3).
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Article 63 (D).
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during the lifetime of the corporation. This exception provides the corporation with the stability of
management in its beginnings.
Another statutory constraint on the appointment of directors is that the Law sets forth absolute
minimum and maximum of the number of directors the board may have.364 As the corporation’s
bylaws must indicate, inter alia,365 the number of corporate directors, this number must not be less
than three directors, and not be more than eleven directors. 366 Such a constraint, one may
extrapolate, has a twofold aim: Joint-stock corporations are generally vehicles for mid-sized and
large-scale projects with large capitals, so one or two directors may not be able to monitor the
business efficiently and supervise its executive officers. Also, the prohibition of appointing more
than eleven directors aims at preserving the corporation’s wealth and prevent any exploitation or
exhaustion of its fortune alongside the fact that a bigger board may have more conflicts and clashes
among its members in a way that adversely impacts the operation of the corporation. 367
If the shareholder general assembly fails to compose the board and appoint its members, the
Law requires that the Competent Authority be notified. Upon notification, the Minister can
compose a committee to temporarily run and supervise the corporation and call for an ordinary
general assembly within three months of the formation of the committee to compose a board of
their representatives.368 Such cases may be a result of severe tensions and clashes among
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In the past Law, there was no statutory maximum on the number of directors a corporation would
have, leaving it to be decided by corporate bylaws. An argument was advanced as setting no caps on the
size of the board might be source of abuse by corporate controlling shareholders and senior officers,
which called for statutory reform. See Almajid, footnote 844.
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See supra Chapter 3. Part I. A.
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a mandatory rule in Article 68 (1).
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AHMED ALKHABTI & HISHAM ALSSEBT, [الوجيز في أحكام الشركات في النظام السعودي الجديدTHE COMPENDIUM
OF CORPORATE RULES IN THE NEW SAUDI LAW] p. 186 n. 1 (Dar AlEjadh 2017).
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This rule also applies to cases when all members of the board offer their resignations at the same time.
See Article 69.
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shareholders that bog down the appointment of directors. This rule appears to be protective of the
corporation’s operations and stakeholders (e.g., creditors and workers). 369
2. Removal of Directors
As the shareholder general assembly has the right to appoint members to the board, it is also
empowered with the right to remove any member from the board. The removal may be for cause
or without cause at any time.370 The removal of the directors may include all members or some of
them.371 The right to remove a member from the board is a statutory right that may not be limited
or excluded.372 In other words, if the articles of association stipulate that a certain member may
not be removed or may be removed after serving on the board for a specific duration, such a
stipulation is unlawful and thus void.373 No member of the board is immune from removal. In all
cases, the removed member has the right to seek compensatory damages from the corporation if
the member successfully shows that the removal right is exercised without proper cause or at an
inappropriate time.374
3. Resignation of Directors
On the other side, the Law asserts the right for members of the board to resign from the board
on the condition that such resignation is tendered at an appropriate time. Otherwise, the resigned
member is accountable to the corporation for damages, if any, following the resignation.375 Still,
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In remuneration of the committee, the Law requires that the corporation be responsible to compensate
its chairperson and remembers in proportion to several considerations, such their qualifications, the size
of the corporations, the weight of their duties, and the duration of their appointment. See Article 69.
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(3).
375
Article 68 (3).

98

“an appropriate time” is somewhat ambiguous. Unless it is defined by implementing regulations,
the term is left to the judiciary to construe.376
B. The Chairperson of the Board
The importance of the corporation’s chairperson stems from the fact that chairpersons are the
statutory representatives of the corporations before courts, arbitration tribunals, and other third
parties.377 Therefore, the Law vividly defines some of their roles in the corporations and entrusts
them with a range of duties and responsibilities to supervise the corporations’ operations and sail
their corporations toward their objectives.
To ensure their integrity and to prevent any conflict of interests in playing their supervisory
roles, the Law (and for the first time) mandates the separation between the position of chairperson
and any other executive posts (e.g., CEO, CFO or GM).378 The statutory prohibition of combining
supervisory and executive roles emphasizes the importance to respect the parameters of each
corporate institution, prevents mingling between them, and advances a strong corporate
governance structure. 379
The Law hardly touches upon the powers of the chairperson and rather refers to the
corporation’s articles of association for the powers and responsibilities with which the chairperson
is entrusted. In other words, at their discretion, shareholders set the boundaries of the chairperson’s
powers needed to perform the duties and responsibilities of which the chairperson is in charge.
Such responsibilities are calling for board meetings, ensuring adequate flow of accurate
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insiders and outsiders.)
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information to the board’s members to discharge their duties properly, ensuring the existence of
actual communication channels with shareholders, preparing meetings’ agenda, creating a culture
that encourages constructive criticism, and informing shareholders of any conflict of interest a
member of the board has, directly or indirectly.380
C. Meetings of the Board
To ensure the minimum level of the board’s profession and proper performance of its duties,
the Law obliges the board to convene at very least twice a year. 381 These statutory meetings are
called for by the board’s chairperson.382 In addition, the Law obligates the chairperson to call for
a board meeting whenever it is deemed urgent or upon the request of two of the board’s
members.383
Again, this is the bare minimum set by the Law, which means that shareholders may require
more than two meetings a year. For example, they may stipulate in the corporation’s bylaws that
the board hold quarterly meetings, or specify incidents upon which the chairperson is to call for a
board meeting.384
Moreover, to ensure collaborative work and reject any unilateral one, the Law requires a
quorum of at least half of the board’s members, in all cases not less than three members, for the
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validity of the board meetings. This means that if the board consists of only three members, 385 all
three members must attend the meeting to be deemed valid. 386
Furthermore, given the sensitivity of the board deliberations and confidentiality of some
corporate matters, the Law prohibits members of the board from delegating others to attend board
meetings on their behalf. Instead, they may assign only another board member with the proviso
that the corporation’s bylaws permit such assignment.387
In principle, board decisions are passed by majority vote of the attending members. In case of
ties, the meeting chairperson has the casting vote. However, the Law gives shareholders some
latitude to require a different passage rate or set another rule governing the board’s ties.388
Deliberations of the board meetings and its decisions are required to be maintained and
recorded in minutes. They must be signed by the chairperson,389 attending members, and the
secretary. Also, all board’s minutes must be kept in a special record that is signed by the
chairperson and the secretary of the board.390
D. Powers of the Board
The board of directors well embodies the mind of the corporation. It enjoys a great deal of
latitude and authorities to discharge its duties and responsibilities to manage, supervise, monitor
and protect the corporation and its core business. Therefore, The Law affirms wide-ranging
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authorities to the board in steering the corporation and achieving its ends. Unless the corporate
matter is entrusted to the shareholder general assembly, 391 the corporation’s board has the absolute
power to decide such a matter and skillfully execute all activities within the corporation’s scope.392
An example of the board’s powers is the creation of the executive office to run and monitor
day-to-day operations. The board may assign to this branch one or more of its members or may
hire an outsider.393 In all cases, chairpersons of the boards may not combine between their posts
and any other executive jobs. 394
Another power the Law assigns to the board of directors is the board’s right to enter loan
agreements. This power has no restrictions on the amount of these loan agreements. For example,
the board may make a loan deal exceeding the corporation’s capital. Therefore, the shareholders
should be acutely aware of the ramifications of such a default power and make sure whether they
want to leave it as the Law pronounces it, or place some restrictions on it by means of stipulation
in the articles of association.
By the same token, the Law entrusts the board with the power to sell the corporation’s assets.
However, there are some restrictions the Minister of Commerce and Investment has issued to
regulate this power in joint-stock corporations.395 The ministerial resolution requires the board to
have the ordinary general assembly approve the sale of more than 50% of the corporate assets,

391
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regardless of the sale’s being through one or multiple transactions.396 If the corporation’s bylaws
require that the extraordinary general assembly approves such a sale, then the bylaws prevail, and
such approval must be obtained accordingly.
In addition, the Law asserts for the board the power to remit the debt owed to the corporation.
The board may decide to relieve corporate debtors from any liability vis-à-vis the corporation. This
power is assigned to the board unless the corporation’s bylaws opt out of it or restrict it.397
Above all, the Law empowers the board of directors with whatever is necessary to look after
the corporation’s management and the accomplishment of its aims. The shareholders should decide
in the corporation’s bylaws whether to leave these powers as they are, to restrict them, or to opt
out of them, given that the corporation is always bound by the acts and transactions executed by
the board even if these acts fall beyond the scope of the board’s powers.398
E. Duties of the Board
The duty of care and the duty of loyalty are of the foremost duties owed by directors to the
corporation and its shareholders. These duties set the parameters of the board’s operations and
conduct. According to the American Law Institute, the duty of care entails that directors are
obligated to the corporation to discharge their duties and “act in good faith and in a manner the
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If sales of corporate assets take place through multiple transactions, only the transaction that crosses
the 50% threshold must be approved by the general assembly. This percentage is calculated from the date
of first sale transaction occurred during the last 12 months.
397
Article 75 (2).
398
Holding the corporation accountable for the acts performed by the board in violation of their stipulated
powers may be justified by the protection of a bona fide third part. Otherwise, the corporation is not
responsible for the board’s actions executed with a third party who acts in bad faith or knows that the
board exceeds its powers in executing such actions. See Article 77.

103

directors reasonably believe to be in the best interest of the corporation.” 399 On the other hand, the
loyalty duty requires directors to place the interest of the corporation ahead of their interests. 400
Given the locked-in structure of the close corporations and the popularity of majority
shareholder’s directing the corporation’s affairs, a respectable counterargument, on the other hand,
may doubt the efficacy of imposing the duty of loyalty and duty of care upon controlling
shareholders in their capacity as directors in such a situation. Instead, the advocate of this argument
assumes that holding a controlling shareholding is per se enough to generate “financial incentives”
to render “well-informed decisions.”401
The Saudi Law does not embrace these corporate standards in determining the scope of the
board’s duties. Instead, it sets forth a matrix of obligations and prohibitions that all together convert
these all-encompassing duties of corporate boards into laws and regulations. For example, the Law
explicitly sets forth stringent statutory approaches to handle a wide range of party-related
transactions of which a member of the board may straddle both sides.402 In prevention of the
conflict of interests, the Law requires that the ordinary general assembly must approve potential
transactions and contracts in which a director of the board may have a direct or indirect interest. If
this director happens to be also a shareholder, the Law requires the interested director to refrain
from casting a vote on the transaction under scrutiny. The Law places a duty of disclosure upon
399
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any director with a conflict of interest to disclose to the board any interest, direct or indirect, he or
she has in the corporation’s transactions and contracts. Such disclosure includes a definition of the
interest’s nature and what financial or in-kind benefits if any, he or she may obtain. 403 Also, the
disclosure is to be recorded, and the chairperson has a duty to inform the general assembly when
it convenes to decide whether to approve these transactions and to provide a special report from
the corporation’s external auditor opining the questionable transaction. 404 Failure to comply with
the statutory disclosure provides legal grounds for not only the corporation but also any
stakeholder to judicially request invalidation of the contract or transaction, or request disgorgement
of the profits.405
In addition, a subset of the duty of loyalty the Law recognizes is the non-compete duty. The
Law bans board directors from engaging in any activity that competes against the corporation’s
business or even competes with activity within the line of the corporation’s business. 406 The
prohibition of competing seems to be sensible as directors serving two corporations tend to favor
one over the other in terms of the time and information allocated to the corporations. 407 However,
directors may seek permission from the corporation (general assembly) to engage in any
competitive business. Otherwise, the corporation may petition to the judiciary and seek
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compensatory damages for the harm caused to the corporation in violation of the non-compete
duty.408
Another traditional prohibition on the party-related transaction is the prohibition of loans
between the corporations and their directors. The Law stretches the prohibition to also include all
corporate fiduciaries (directors, shareholders, officers).409 The prohibition of loans to corporate
fiduciaries include also prohibiting the corporation from serving as the guarantor for loan
agreements these fiduciaries have with third parties. 410 A Statutory exception to this prohibition is
that loan and guarantees made by the corporation pursuant to the corporation’s incentive programs
are permissible on the condition that such programs are adopted in the corporation’s bylaws, or by
a resolution issued by the general assembly. 411 Another statutory (and intuitive) exception are loan
and guarantee agreements between banks and credit corporations (in the form of joint-stock
corporation), on the one hand, and its fiduciaries (including shareholders, directors and
executives), on the other, provided that such loans and guarantees fall within the corporations’
purposes and are subject to the same provisions and conditions followed with other clients. 412 Any
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violation of this statutory prohibition or the provisions of its exceptions gives the prejudiced
corporations the right to seek compensations for any damages the corporations sustain judicially.413
Last but not least, the Law emphasizes the duty of the board’s directors not to disclose any
confidential information or corporate secrets they come to know by virtue of their directorships,
except disclosure of information to the general assemblies.414 This duty entails that they also
refrain from misappropriating corporate information to gain personal benefit for themselves, their
relatives or others. This may seem to be a blanket prohibition on all nonpublic corporate
information. If a director gets caught in violation of this confidentiality duty, the Law penalizes
the violated director with immediate removal from the board and accountability for any damages
to the corporation because of such violation. 415
F. The Responsibility of the Board
1. vis-à-vis the corporation
a. Civil Liability
To ensure the board’s performance and discharge of its duties pursuant to the book, the Law
imposes joint liability upon the board of the corporation for damages and loses affecting the
corporation or its shareholders. A range of scenarios give rise to joint liability upon the members
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of the board. Such cases are mismanagement of the corporation and failure to comply with the
Law or the corporation’s bylaws.416 To elaborate, if the wrongdoing giving rise to the board’s joint
liability is a result of a unanimous decision by the board, all board’ members are jointly liable for
such an act. If the decision is by a vote of the board’s majority, joint liability is only imposed upon
members who have voted in favor of the wrongful decision. Dissenting members to the decision,
however, is not liable provided that their candid objections are recorded in the board’s minutes. If
a member of the board is absent from the board meeting at which the decision is made, the absence
in principle does not constitute proper cause for relief from the liability. Instead, the absentee has
to show that she or he has no knowledge of the decision, or that the absentee is unable to object
after becoming aware of the decision.417
b. Criminal Liability
Alongside the civil liability, the directors of the board are also subject to criminal liability for
a cluster of actions that per se constitute crimes (e.g., embezzlement, forgery), or offenses the Law
criminalizes.418 Article 211 and 212 of the Law sets forth a wide range of activities the Law
considers as offenses, and thus puts the Bureau of Investigation and Public Prosecution in charge
of these offenses. Such offenses are manipulation with the corporation’s books and records
(cooking the books), providing misleading information, abuse of powers to gain personal benefits,
and failure to call for an extraordinary general assembly where is mandatory by the Law (e.g.,
losses exceeding 50% of the share capital). Some of these offenses are punished by up to five years
of imprisonment and a monetary fine up to five million Saudi Riyals ($1.3 Million) or either
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penalty.419 Others are penalized by up to one-year imprisonment and a fine up to 1 million Saudi
Riyals ($ 266,666), or either penalty.420 In all cases, these penalties do not negate any other
penalties in other legislation.
2. vis-à-vis Third Parties
As explained earlier,421 the corporation bears the full liability for all acts and deeds of its board
of directors even if these actions are taken in violation of the board’s stipulated powers. 422 The
only exception to relieve the corporation from such liability is that the third party behaves in bad
faith or knows that the board is exceeding its assigned powers. In addition to the accountability of
the corporation over its board actions, third parties or stakeholders (e.g., creditors) have the right
to sue the members of the board under the tort law liability. Directors are agents, so they are liable
for their tortious conduct, irrespective to the corporation’s (the principal) vicarious liability. Also,
the individual, in general, is liable for his wrongdoing. For example, the distribution of sham
dividends.423 In this situation, the third party has the option to sue the corporation based on
vicarious liability or tort law liability.424
G. Rewards and Remunerations of the Board
The boards’ rewards and remunerations are the main tunnels through which some
shareholders/directors in close corporations appropriate a large sum of the corporation’s profits.
Therefore, the Law has adopted strict remuneration policy that takes into consideration, on the one
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hand, safeguarding the interests of the corporation and its shareholders’, and on the other hand the
responsibility and tasks undertaken by the board of directors.
The Law recognizes a cluster of remunerative pay and reward packages 425: fixed salary, inkind benefits (e.g., cars, telephones, housings, newspapers), bonuses, or in the form of meeting
allowance. The Law in principle permits the combination of two or more of these forms, provided
that the total of monetary and in-kind rewards received by each director is no more than the
statutory maximum of 500,000 Saudi Riyals ($ 133,333). In deciding the rewards and
remunerations for the corporation’s directors, the Law stipulates a number of guidelines every
corporation should follow. Such guidelines are the following: the fair proportionality between the
remuneration and the director’s experience, powers, and duties; the size and the industry of the
corporation; the creation of incentives to attract qualified, experienced people and maintain them;
and the proportionality with the corporation’s work and the skills needed to manage it. That implies
that remuneration packages may vary from a director to another accordingly.
Since the ultimate job of the board is to maximize the value of the corporation for its
shareholders, it is of importance to have a performance-based payment to incentivize directors to
discharge their duties optimally. Such an incentive may be created by linking the remuneration of
the director to a stipulated percentage of the corporation’s profits. To do so, the Law requires three
conditions. First, the percentage of profits the director is entitled to receive does not exceed 10%
of the net profits of the corporation after deduction of the reserves stipulated in the corporation’s
bylaws or decided by a general assembly’s resolution. Second, the corporation must distribute to
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its shareholders dividends constituting at least 5% of the corporate paid-in share capital. Third, the
remuneration package of the director is to be proportionate with the number of meetings the
director attended. 426 In all cases, to preserve their independence, independent directors may not be
compensated by a percentage of the corporation’s profits or based directly or indirectly upon the
corporation’s profitability.427
Deciding the board’s remunerations is of the authority of the ordinary shareholder general
assemblies. The assembly decisions on remunerations may be based on recommendations by the
remuneration committee (if the corporation has one similar to the compulsory committee for public
corporations).428 In the assembly, nevertheless, members of the board who are shareholders as well
are forbidden from casting their votes on the item of the board’s remuneration during shareholder
assemblies to prevent any conflict of interest. 429 This being said, directors may obtain, besides
their directorships’ remunerations, additional rewards for any extra work they perform for the
corporations. Such work includes participating in the audit committee, 430 or undertakings of an
executive, managerial, technical, or consultative task.431
In reinforcement of transparency and strong disclosure system, the Law requires the board to
report to the general assembly a detailed statement including all amounts (remuneration, expenses,
and in-kind benefits) received by the board’s directors during the corporation’s fiscal year,
426
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alongside what they received in another capacity (as employees, executives, or members of
corporate committees. This annual report has to include also the number of the meetings the board
held, and the number of meetings each director attended from the date of the last general
assembly.432
If it is proved that directors have been paid erroneously because of the false and misleading
information presented to the general assembly or the inclusion of such information in the board’s
annual report, the corporation may reclaim return of these payments.433 Also, when the board
member is removed because of his absence from three consecutive board meetings without
legitimate excuse, this member is not entitled to any payments starting from the date of the last
meeting he or she attended and has to pay back whatever is received for that period. 434

Part IV. External Auditing
The right to oversee the corporation is of the statutory rights the Law stipulates for
shareholders to keep the corporate management in check regarding its adherence to the corporate
governance of the corporation. Nevertheless, shareholders often lack the necessary knowledge and
capability to supervise and keep an eye on the management’s compliance with the rules. To tackle
such an issue and prevent any self-dealing by the board at the expense of shareholders’ interests,
corporate laws emphasize the significance of the outside auditor as a gatekeeper of the corporation
and protector of its good corporate governance.435
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As the Law has made it of its mission to promote the best corporate practices, the Law
mandates joint-stock corporations (listed and unlisted) to have an external auditor (in addition to
the internal audit committee explained earlier).436 The Law specifies in details the manner of the
auditor’s appointment, its qualifications, powers, tasks, and its liability. The procedural details
ensure the strong application of the corporate governance principles in terms of accountability,
integrity, and independence of the auditor as displayed hereunder.
A. Appointment
Since the right to monitor the corporation is of core shareholder rights, 437 the Law puts the
ordinary shareholder general assemblies in charge of appointing one or more auditor to their
corporations.438 The decision of the appointment also includes their compensations and their
periods.439 The Law specifies some requirements of the appointment of auditors: first, the auditor
must be accredited to operate and render services in the region; second, the total period of the
auditor’s appointment must not exceed five consecutive years.440 In exception to this rule, the

withhold their consent, approval, or rating, the corporation may be unable to effect some transaction or to
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corporation may re-appoint the auditor, who has depleted the five-consecutive-year period, after
the elapse of two years from the expiration date of the five-year period.441
In addition to these restrictions upon the appointment’s duration, the Law outlaws the
appointments of the auditors who have participated in the incorporation process, served on the
board, or executed administrative or technical tasks for the corporation’s sake.442 The Law goes
farther as it also requires that auditors may not be partners with, nor employees or relatives of, one
of the founding shareholders or the board’s members.443 Evidently, the Law aims at ensuring
auditors’ integrity and independence in discharging their duties and avoiding any collision with
the corporation’s internal institutions.
As the shareholder assemblies have the right to appoint the auditor, they also have the right to
replace it at any time,444 with or without cause. However, this does not negate the right of the
auditor to seek judicial compensations for unjustified replacement or inappropriate replacement
timing.445
B. Powers
To properly execute their jobs, the Law assigns several powers to outside auditors that allow
them to access books and records of the corporations at any time. In case of ambiguities in these
books and records, they have a statutory power to demand the board’s clarification of whatever
falls within their scope of work, such as the verification of the corporation’s assets and liabilities. 446
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The Law commissions the chairperson of the board with facilitating the work of the auditor
and paving the way for it to perform its statutory duties. Any obstruction or hindering of the
auditor’s duties, the auditor is to report to the board, and if such obstruction continues or the board
does not react, the auditor is obliged to request an ordinary shareholder general assembly meeting
to discuss such matter. 447
C. Duties
To protect the interests of the shareholders and stakeholders, auditors have a duty to annually
report to shareholders as a class (general assembly). The report includes the corporation’s status,
the board’s position as the auditor is performing its duties (whether the board has been cooperative
or not), and any violation of the Law or the corporation’s bylaws the auditor detects as a result of
auditing.448 The report also includes the auditor’s opinion upon the integrity of the corporation’s
financial statements. The report has to comply with the auditing standards as it reflects the
corporation’s assets and liabilities. In addition, the auditor is required to read the report to the
shareholders at the general assembly to have their approval of the report. Otherwise, the Law
sanctions the approval of the report without reading it with the annulment of the approval, which
stresses out the importance of ensuring the awareness of shareholders of the corporation’s status
on all levels.449
Another duty upon the auditors is the duty of confidentiality. Since corporate auditors are
empowered to access corporate books and records, the Law bars them from disclosing any
information or corporate secrets of which they have become aware as a result of performing their
duties and exercising their powers. The duty even includes the prevention of discourse of
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information to shareholders of the corporation unless disclosure is part of performing auditors’
duties (e.g., reading the report at the general assembly). 450
D. Accountability
To ensure the high-level performance of duties, the Law holds auditors accountable for any
damages the corporation sustains because of a wrongful act committed by the auditors. Their
accountability is not only vis-à-vis the corporation and shareholder but also to third parties.451 In
case there is more than one auditor, the Law imposes joint liability upon all auditors for such
damages. In addition, Failure to comply with their duties may also result in mandatory removal of
the injuring auditor and compensations to the corporation for damages, if any (e.g., disclosure of
a corporate secret). 452
Moreover, to deter auditors from abusing their powers and to prevent them from engaging in
any self-dealing activities, the Law penalizes auditors who violate their duties by, for instance,
reporting misleading information or false statements to shareholders with a fine up to five million
Saudi Riyals and imprisonment up to five years, or either penalties.453 Ensuring proper functioning
of auditors requires strict rules regarding the liability of their work and prevent any action that may
compromise their integrity and independence.

Closing Analysis
Having depicted the regulatory framework of joint-stock corporations and their internal
and external institutions, an observer may affirmatively conclude that the Saudi Companies Law
of 2015 has assumed a very rigorous approach— in dealing with joint-stock corporations— that
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heavily leans toward shareholder-centric corporate governance, alongside the inherent nature of
shareholder supremacy in a close corporation structure. Several grounds may justify the
shareholder-centric tendency in the Law. First, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the
controlling shareholders abound in the region. The government— which is unitary absolute
monarchy— is the largest shareholder in the Saudi market. Therefore, it seems to be logic for the
government, and controlling shareholders dominating the market to retain the powers and
influence over the management. This is candidly found in the Law in its empowering of the
shareholder general assemblies with a wide range of decision and appointment rights, such as the
decision to appoint and remove directors and auditors, the decision to distribute dividends, the
decision to approve of a related-party transaction, and the decision to approve the corporation’s
annual financial reports. This approach may be useful in mitigating the shareholder-manager
agency problem, especially in public corporations. However, one may be skeptical about its
efficacy to offer adequate incentives for the management team to properly run the corporation
without shareholders’ watching over their shoulders.
Moreover, as far as the regulatory framework of close corporations concerns, it is evident the
excessive use of mandatory rules and procedures in regulating corporate affairs. From the
incorporation phase, incorporators find themselves in a pool of rules and procedures that
systemically regulate every aspect of incorporation, deviating the contractual view of the
corporation, albeit the statutory definition of the corporation. For instance, a statutory minimum
of share capital must be met; special qualifications of shareholders have to exist; protracted,
cumbersome filing and notarization procedures must be undergone. 454 This may be justified as it
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protects incorporators themselves and third parties to the corporation, yet it does not mesh with
rationale behind lowering the statutory capital requirement to 500,000 Saudi Riyals($133,333),
which is alleged to serve as an incentive to conduct businesses in the form of close corporations
(the incubators of future public corporations). Such an incentive should be coupled with simple,
inexpensive incorporation procedures. It may be true that the old statutory minimum of capital
share requirement (2 million Saudi Riyals) may have prevented some businesses in be in the form
of joint-stock corporations; however, lowering the share capital requirement should be
accompanied by simplicity of incorporation that would drive more businesses to select this
corporate form, as a practical matter.
In addition, the Law adopts a cluster of mechanisms to alleviate agency problems between
controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders. Such statutory mechanisms come in the
form of disclosure requirements, reporting system, decision rights, and other “legal strategies”455
that all together aim at reducing the costs of information and coordination among corporate
players, namely the majority and the minority shareholders in the context of close corporations.
Otherwise, the high costs of shareholder information and coordination would aggravate the
situation. Therefore, from the very start of the business, the Law sets forth either mandatory rules
or default rules for most of corporate affairs; some of these rules empower shareholders as a class,
while other rules restrict the management, such as mandatory discourse of a “potential” conflict of

by an online system. See The World Bank, Doing Business 2018: Reforming to Create Jobs, Table 3A.1,
(15ed. Oct. 2017).
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A “legal strategy” is a term utilized by the authors of Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative
Functional Approach to indicate “a generic method of deploying the law instrumentally in afunctional
way.” It may come in the form of a default rule, mandatory rule, or a set of different rules. See REINIER
KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH p.39, n.49 (Oxford Univ. Press 3rd. ed. 2017).

118

interest and self-dealing,456 or systemic reporting to shareholders, and mandatory meetings. The
rigid regulations of substantive aspects of the relationship between minority shareholders and the
management (represented by majority shareholders) ex ante afford a great deal of protection for
the minority shareholders as it ensures the flow of information. Also, it affords protection for the
outsiders as they will presume that a set of mandatory rules bind the corporation they are
contracting with, and failure to follow them entails very severe consequences, including nullity of
the action, monetary fines, or imprisonment.
However, by the exercise of imagination and employment of logic, the excess of mandatory
rules and absence of standards, which would provide leeway not only for the relationship between
the minority and the majority shareholders but also for an external authority to intervene, have led
to some loopholes and counterproductive results the regulator may fail to notice. One example is
the regulation of party-related transactions. The Law sets forth a bunch of mandatory rules
(including disclosure and direct reporting to the board and the shareholders as a class), yet it may
be a source of concern that the Law has indirectly empowered the minority with a veto right. The
hypothesis drawn from this criticism is that there is a close corporation with two shareholders, the
minority and the majority. The majority in its management capacity finds that the corporation
needs to transact with another corporation where the same majority has some interest, a crisp
example of a conflict of interest regulated by the Law. According to the Law, the board would
have to report this deal to the general assembly to decide whether to authorize this deal. In this
situation, the minority shareholder solely would have the right to make such a decision since the
majority may not cast any vote. Of course, to decide such an issue, the Law requires the external
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auditor to submit and recite its opinion about this transaction, yet it is not compulsory to comply
with its opinion. Rather, this requirement is to help shareholders to make an informed decision.
This concern is that the minority shareholder arbitrarily declines to approve of such a transaction
despite its fairness to the corporation and the favorable opinion from the external auditor. As a
majority, one may find himself trapped in a corporation where its minority is paradoxically
controlling. Even as an attorney of the majority, it is ambiguous whether such arbitrary refusal
would constitute a cause of action that could be challenged in a court of law, given the absence of
fairness constraint on the exercise of this right and the indeterminacy of the fairness standard. 457
A standard-based regulation of the party-related transactions may be more capable of
preventing such a problem, capturing different self-dealings not recognized by a rule-based
regulation, and affording discretion for the judiciary to decide ex post whether a violation of duties
has occurred. A counter argument may be raised as standard-based regulations require strong,
active judiciary that immerses itself in assessing and shaping corporate affairs. Such a judiciary
has yet to develop. 458 Therefore, as long as the judiciary plays limited roles in shaping the corporate
arena, rule-based regulations will dominate, yet thorough attention should be paid to their drafting
to avert any loophole that cannot be filled, even by contract.
Another point that merits serious attention is the statutory maximum and minimum of the
numbers of directors a corporate board has to embrace. One may argue in favor of the statutory
cap as it, as mentioned earlier, prevents exploitation and misuse of the corporate fortune by overappointing members to the board of directors and thus exhausting its earnings in the form of
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By analogy, the situation may be applicable to the rights of the holders of preferred shares, whom the
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salaries and rewards for the board’s members. This may be true given the unavailability of
standard-based regulation. Nevertheless, the statutory minimum of three directors poses a seeming
paradox in the regulatory framework of close corporations. Imposing this rule upon public
corporations may be justified due to their massive capitals and projects that cannot be managed by
one director. Nevertheless, compliance with this rule from a close corporation’s point of view may
force the corporation to incur additional expenses in the form of remunerations for the board’s
members, which would be distributed to shareholders in the form of dividends or redirected to the
corporation capital for developmental purposes. The Law has lowered the statutory capital share
requirement to make the form of the joint-stock corporation available to startups and small
businesses that may be better off being run by a single director, as a matter of efficiency and
function. As a minority shareholder, one prefers a multiple-member board that ensures— with
cumulative voting— the minority voice in the boardroom, and thus finds this rule to be protective.
However, there are other devices to raise the minority’s voice in the boardroom without having
unnecessary directors and paying for expensive compliance. 459
Speaking of the board of directors under the Law, one may raise some concern about the
mandatory rules for the board rewards and compensations. The Law offers a range of plans from
which corporations select to structure their directorial pay packages— in light of the statutory
proportionality standard.460 Also, the Law gives the right to decide the board’s pay packages to
shareholders only who are not members of the board. From a minority shareholder’s point of view,
this accounts for a great deal of protection as it prevents any opportunism and misappropriation of
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the corporate wealth. To ensure adherence and reduce the cost of supervising and monitoring, the
Law imposes a disclosure requirement, as a valid legal strategy, on the board to submit to the
shareholder body a report containing what members of the board have received. Unlike other
corporate statutes that come to regulate how corporations remunerate their directors, the Saudi
Law, however, goes above and beyond to stipulate—by means of compulsory rules— how much
a corporation can compensate its board of directors. Theoretically, this may be worrisome as it
disheartens the board to properly execute their ultimate duty of maximizing the wealth and
advancing the interests of the corporation, and thus its shareholders —including the minority. The
size of the corporation is different, so it seems absurd to impose a one-rule-fits-all cap on the
boards’ remunerations of titanic corporations with thousands of shareholders (e.g., corporations of
the petroleum and petrochemical industry) and medium or small close corporations with a handful
of shareholders. In both sorts of corporations, boards will be disinclined to thrive in doing their
unless they receive encouraging—or at least adequate— payments proportional to the jobs with
which they are entrusted. Otherwise, the corporation’ performance and prosperity would be
proportional to the compensations offered to the board.461 Another argument about the efficacy of
this statutory cap (as it is allegedly protective of corporation’s wealth by preventing exportation)
is that it does not encompass the remunerative mechanisms for executive officers, whom the board
has the right to appoint, supervise, and compensate. Therefore, a controlling shareholder may
appoint himself to an executive post, and —by a power of the board’s majority— arrange
expensive pay package for his post.

461
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After all, the legislation does recognize the indispensable function of the board as the wheel
of the corporation when it broadens its powers over corporate matters and holds the corporation
liable, in principle, for all board’s actions vis-à-vis third parties. To prevent any abuse of such
power, the Law, on the other hand, reinforces the board’s accountability to shareholders as a class
and holds its members personally responsible for any corporate malfeasance or mismanagement
of the corporation. The principle of accountability is of the foremost corporate governance
principles that have been embedded in the Law in different forms and buttressed by several
shareholder rights and strong external enforcement devices, including the criminalization of some
directorial mismanagement and harsh punishments ex post.462 Broader jurisdiction for the board
over the corporation goes hand in hand with well-defined accountability rules for its actions,
particularly in an environment where the judiciary seems unequipped to evaluate highly corporate
affairs yet.
Another dimension to this analytical discussion of the Law is the maximum and minimum
percentages for shareholder meetings’ quorums and decision-passing. The Law differentiates
between shareholder assemblies as it entrusts them with different tasks based upon their criticality
to the corporation. Of course, the higher the required quorum and decision-making percentages are
the greater the role played by the minority shareholders in shaping and deciding on the
corporation’s affairs, as an exercise of logic. Consequently, the Law requires the approval of 75%
of the share capital represented in a quorate extraordinary shareholder meeting for several

However, some concerns may arise as that “too-zealous imposition of personal liability on managers
might induce them to behave in a risk-averse fashion,” adversely affecting the interests of shareholders on
the long-term. REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 71 (Oxford Univ. Press 3rd. ed. 2017). See also Reinier H.
Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 900 (1984)
(“The legal risks of the firm's individual participants grow more onerous as we expand the scope of
absolute personal liability and the range of participants at risk.”)
462
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instances (e.g., dissolution of the corporation, and increase or decrease of the share capital), which
influences the existence of the corporation and the value of its shares.
As far as the statutory protection for the minority shareholder concerns, it is worth reminding
that the dilemma of minority shareholders is a subset of a greater agency problem.463 To reduce
the cost of the problem, the Law requires mandatory disclosure and makes of it a duty upon various
corporate fiduciaries, including the chairperson, interested director, auditor, and the board as a
whole. Again, the obligations of periodical and ad hoc disclosure foster the corporate transparency
and generate a constant flow of information to not only the shareholders as a class but also to the
third parties, which helps make informed decisions and assess corporate fiduciaries’
performance.464 Another statutory instance with the goal to reduce the cost of information and
coordination is the permission for the corporations to conduct their shareholder meeting via
modern technology, which reduces the costs the shareholder may have to incur to exert his rights
otherwise. The disclosure requirements translate into strong corporate governance of the
corporation, on the one hand, and help outsiders (the market) to become informative of the
corporation and thus to accurately assess the corporation.
So far, this chapter finds that the Law asserts several statutory rights for shareholders, and —
in the protection of these rights— outlaws any alteration or contractual waiver of these rights
whatsoever. At the top of these rights is the non-negotiable right to attend shareholder assemblies,
irrespective to the percentage of shareholding. A shareholder of either one share or thousands of
shares is statutorily entitled to attend shareholder’s meetings and vote on the corporate matters.
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This gives rise to another statutory right of appointing directors to and dismissing them from the
corporate board. That is an influential instrument in the hand of shareholders as a class that
logically meshes with the ownership rights, given that shareholders are the owners of the
corporation and only their interests are at stake. The Law’s recognition of shareholder’s right to
attend and vote in a shareholder assembly coupled with the right to appoint and remove directors
safeguards minority’s rights in close corporations where their voice would be lowered, if not
muted, otherwise.
Because of the unsophistication that dominates most close corporations, the auditing rules
examined in this chapter appear to be a primary source of efficacy for the corporation. The Law
mandates two sources for corporate auditing, internal and external. Both represent the structure of
the shareholder’s monitoring and supervision rights in close corporations. They are of the foremost
tools employed to keep shareholders as a class in the loop about the corporate matters, assist them
to make well-versed decisions, ensure corporate fiduciaries’ compliance with the Law alongside
corporate bylaws, and detect corporate malfeasance if any. For the monitoring and supervising
structure to fructify, the Law sets forth rigorous rules governing the powers and tasks of both the
audit committee and external auditor and holding them to a high standard of accountability for
their wrongdoing if any.
All in all, one may conclude that the Law has translated a range of corporate governance
principles into straightforward rules and procedures that encompass most of the corporate affairs,
including a vivid governance structure, the board structure (appointment, removal, duties, powers,
and remunerations), and auditing rules. On the book, those jointly accumulate for the advancement
of corporate transparency, disclosure, openness, and accountability. However, whether these rules
could attain these goals with efficiency and smoothness—not with unduly burden and high costs—
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is an empirical question that may remain unanswered for a while due to the newness of the Law,
and such spotted loopholes have not scratched the surface yet.
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Chapter Four: The Statutory Protection of Minority Shareholder in the Law †
“The law is the only sure protection of the weak, and the only efficient restraint upon the strong.”
Millard Fillmore

Motivating Hypothetical
Now the business is incorporated in the form of a close corporation. Saad and his brother, Khalid,
possess 25% each of the corporate capital. Their father owns 50% of the corporate capital. The
three of them are deeply involved in the corporation’s day-to-day operations. They are also
members of the board of directors. Saad reads the news that Saudi Arabia has introduced radical
reforms that improve the protection of minority investors. Saad is wondering how the Law protects
his interests, and whether he has a say in the management of the corporation.

The Scope of Chapter Four
This Chapter represents a case study of the minority shareholder protection in Saudi Arabia. It is
divided into five sections. The first part introduces the reader to the minority shareholders’ issues
in Saudi Arabia, and the factors affected the change in the policy of protecting their interests,
leading to an indispensable role of law in the region. The second part offers an analysis of statutory
shareholder rights. The third part demonstrates⎯through analytical reading⎯how the Law is an
effective device to curtail oppressive conduct, and how it handles minority shareholders’ issues,
including the minority’s directorial representation, the dilution of interests, and the unmarketability
of shares. The fourth part underscores the role of formalism in the Law in one section, and it
highlights some issues and limitations associated with this statutory approach in the other section.
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Part I. Introduction
A. Overview
Due to the universal structure of the corporation, minority shareholders in Saudi Arabia,
presumably like their counterparts in other parts of the world, suffer from inherent issues to which
the close corporation structure gives rise.465 In short, the minority shareholders often have
expectations while they are making investments, but these expectations are not necessarily met.
That makes these disappointed shareholders want to exit the entity, yet the fact that disposing of
their shareholdings for fair value ⎯with no escape through the market⎯is relatively problematic
and makes them stuck in an awkward position, as displayed earlier in chapter one.
Saudi Arabia has recently carried out a range of significant reforms to enhance business
environments and captivate foreign investments. That requires the modernization of the regulatory
framework governing the business domain, and the reinforcement and the protection of
businesspeople and entrepreneurs’ rights. To this end, one of the primary steps the country has
taken is the enactment of the Saudi Companies Law of 2015. 466
To this point, the Law has earned an excellent reputation for its strong protection for investors.
According to the World Bank Group Report of 2017, the region ranks the 10th globally in
protecting minority investors, whereas it was reported 36th in the 2016 Report.467 Moreover, the
Report highlights the existence of a strong conflict of interest regulation, which exceeds the
regional average. 468 All together symbolizes the governmental determination to move forward and

† Hereinafter “the Law” refers to the Saudi Companies Law of 2015, unless otherwise noted.
465
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See The World Bank, Doing Business 2018: Reforming to Create Jobs, Country Tables, p. 190 (15ed.
Oct. 2017).
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Id.
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ensure a business climate for entities of all sizes. Nevertheless, a question arises, how has Saudi
Arabia set this unprecedented record in such a short period? And why?
To begin with, unlike the orthodox method utilized in protecting minority shareholders and
curbing opportunistic and oppressive conduct of majority, the Saudi legislature has taken an
unconventional approach in addressing the issues of minority shareholders and protecting their
interests. In the United States, for instance, oppression of minority shareholders in close
corporations are squarely handled by the judicial intervention ex post, which has created judicially
established principles (e.g., heightened duty on controlling shareholders, partner-like duty,
mandatory buyouts, and the judicial consideration of the minority’s reasonable expectations) in
deciding oppression claims brought by minority shareholders. 469 The judicial protection comes as
a result of the minority shareholders’ failure to contract against oppression and opportunism by
the controlling shareholders. In this sense, corporate laws play a gap-filling role, leaving the
governance rules of the corporation to shareholders to decide how they want to manage and run
their businesses (contractarian view).470
A number of writings on the minority’s issues in the United States advocate for, and rely on
heavily, the judicial intervention to curb opportunism and oppression by controlling shareholders.
This appears to mesh well with the contractarian view of the corporations besides an effective
judicial system that is sophisticated to execute its functions of applying fairness and resolving
shareholder squabbles. The same can be said about minority shareholder dilemma in Saudi Arabia
except for the part of the effective judiciary that would rectify the situation ex post.
The commonplace failure of shareholders to bargain for their protection alongside the limited
role of the Saudi judiciary led Saudi lawmakers to intervene and take a different route in protecting
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minority investors, including close corporations’ shareholders. The newness of the Saudi approach
is represented by an assortment of prescriptive rules that shareholders must adhere to in governing
their business, setting a benchmark for effective corporate governance for the corporations in the
region. The general theme of these rules is centered around empowering shareholders as a class
with agenda-setting supremacy.471
This core chapter seeks to convince the reader that the statutory protection for minority
shareholders⎯through a set of compulsory corporate governance rules⎯is an effective approach
to blocking the way ahead of controlling shareholders from engaging in any abusive or
opportunistic conduct toward the minority at the first place. The unsophistication of both the
judiciary and shareholders of close corporations in the region necessitates the governmental
intervention to eliminate, or at least minimize, the issues generated by the locked-in structure of
the close corporations, such as illiquidity of shares, selective repurchase of shares, dilution of
interests, and management expectations.
Another dimension of this chapter is to contribute to the ongoing debate over the minority
shareholder of close corporations by putting forward a proposal for a statutory approach in
protecting minority shareholders that may be followed by countries with similar circumstances as
Saudi Arabia’s. The prevalence of family businesses that are run by blinded trust among their
members makes it difficult for these members, in reality, to bargain for themselves or at least
expect conflicts and tensions in the future when it looks rosy at the outset. Furthermore, the
developing corporate judiciary poses a threat that its rulings may not be anticipated ahead of time,
and thus foreign investors appear to be reluctant to rely on such an approach in facilitating
shareholders’ private ordering, or in construing their agreed-on provisions. Because of these
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circumstances, a corporate law with governance rules⎯that protect minority shareholders, balance
the power, and ensure the exercise of rights 472⎯is of necessity as explained hereunder in
reinforcing investor’s trust and offering a healthier business environment.
B. The Role of Law in the Region
The importance of corporate law’s role in the Saudi business environment stems from four
overlapping factors. First of all, Saudi Arabia is an Islamic state that is mostly influenced by the
civil law system. 473 Hence, Laws and regulations are the primary sources for the legislation,
especially for the business sector.474 Therefore, the necessity of the new law is unquestionable to
chase the rapid changes the country has been pursuing.
Second, in developed countries (e.g., the U.S. and the U.K.), corporate laws are not only
statutes that legislatures promulgate. Instead, they also include other players of social, judicial, and
legal aspects.475 In fact, some scholars claim that corporate laws themselves perform a “trivial”
role.476 On the other hand, corporate laws in emerging markets and economies are the linchpin of
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the business and the only wheel that rotates the market. Their contribution to the businesses in
these countries outweighs the value added by corporate statutes in developed countries clearly
because of the weak role played by other institutions 477 that shape the corporate behaviors in the
developed ones.478
Third, corporate laws in developed countries coexist with other supporting legal institutions.
As stated above, the U.S. state courts represent the cornerstone in the protection for minority
shareholders by for instance defining oppression and imposing a partner-like duty on dominant
shareholders.479 However, this is not always the case in Saudi Arabia or other developing countries,
where the judiciary works and develops sluggishly. 480
Not only do rules and regulations aim at protecting the interests of minority
shareholders⎯when they neglect or fail to bargain for their protection⎯, but also they serve an
essential role in protecting the interests of outsiders.481 Outsiders include creditors of the
corporation, its workforce, and its bondholders. An example of such an immutable rule is that
corporations must maintain a statutory reserve of 30% of the advanced corporate capital.482

Id. at 1913, (defining “the term "institution" in a broad sense to include private organizational
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Another example is the approval requirement of a special assembly consisting of bondholders
concerning any change in their entitlements in addition to the approval of the shareholder general
assembly.483 Such mandatory rules reinforce the third party’s confidence in dealing with
corporations in the region, which accumulate for the public good of the market as a whole.484
These four points heighten the significance to put together, inter alia, a corporate act that fulfills
the needs of the country, especially with the declaration of the Kingdom’s 2030 Vision. In short,
the 2030 Vision reflects, inter alia, a steadfast commitment to end the era of oil dependency.
Instead, it aims at rehabilitating the business ambiance to attract foreign investments, and empower
small and medium-sized enterprises. 485 Such a goal requires the existence of strong corporate
governance embedded in an effective corporate law. 486 All in all, knowing that Saudi Arabia is one
of the emerging markets, it is of prominence to comprehend the role played by laws in such a
country that lacks sophisticated institutions that would otherwise contribute to shaping the
protective system of minority shareholders.

Part II. Statutory Shareholder Rights
The Law incorporates a set of statutory rights that shareholders enjoy so long as they hold to
their shares. These rights differ in their importance, yet they all together, the research argues,
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profits for the reserve. See Article 129 (1).
483
Article 166 (2).
484
As mentioned earlier, close corporations have a vital role not only in the Saudi economy⎯due massive
size of their capitals,⎯ but also in the labor market as they are the employers of circa 80% of workforce
in the private sector. See supra Chapter 2. Part II. B (2).
485
For an in-depth look at the Saudi 2030 Vision, including its themes, goals, and challenges, see
http://vision2030.gov.sa/en
486
See Bernard S. Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law,109 HARV. L.
REV. 1914 (1996) (claiming that even if the issues that a corporate law endeavors to redress are
worldwide, it is of importance for the corporate law to be context-specific).
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establish strong protection for and a great deal of deference to the minority shareholders. This
result flows from⎯and is premised upon⎯the statutory view of the shareholder. In principle,
shareholders in close corporations are co-owners who enjoy equal rights and impartial treatment
under the Law. There may be, nevertheless, some exceptions to the general rule, such as preferred
shares, yet the Law sets forth a number of rights to ensure that the minimum impartiality is upheld.
To begin with, a “statutory” right under the Law implicates two significant results: First, the
right may not be eliminated or limited by any means of a contract, agreement, or an opt-out
provision, and such an arrangement is deemed void and null under the Law. 487 Second, the
shareholder enjoys the right by force of law, without the need to be stipulated in any of the
corporation’s constitutional documents (i.e., articles of associations and corporate bylaws) and
irrespective to the size of his shareholding (one share or million shares). 488 These results are of
paramount importance for shareholders, mainly minority ones, as they prevent the controlling
shareholders from, by means of bargaining power, denying the minority of any rights explained
hereunder. In addition, it reduces the cost of contracting the minority shareholder may incur as
these rights are guaranteed by law, and thus even if the minority shareholder is an unsophisticated
businessperson, he has these rights in any case.
The shareholder’s statutory rights can be categorized by subject into two collections: economic
rights (e.g., right to receive dividends, right to sell shares, and right to residual claim upon
liquidation) and control rights (e.g., right to vote, right to elect directors, right to supervise the
corporation, right to inspect the corporation, and right to call for a shareholder meeting).

See Article 110, which read that “[s]hares shall entail equal rights and obligations. Shareholders shall
have all rights associated with shares, particularly the rights to dividends. . . .” and Article 88, which
constrains the powers of the extraordinary shareholder assembly as it may not deprive a shareholder of his
fundamental rights, including “obtaining a share of distributed dividends. . . .”
488
Id.
487
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Shareholders advance capitals with the expectation that they in return obtain some financial
benefits and run the corporation⎯or at least have a say in the corporate management. Therefore,
the Law embraces a set of fundamental rights that assert the shareholder supremacy in the
corporation.
Note that, for the sake of clarity and given the importance of several rights, the research
examines these rights under different rubrics as they are useful tools to eliminate and minimize the
minority shareholder’s issues. These rights include the right to elect directors and the right to file
derivative or direct action.
A. Economic Rights
1. The Right to Receive Dividends
One of the fundamental rights the share confers on its holder is the right to receive dividends.
As a matter of law, it is one of the main elements of the statutory definition of the corporation, the
share of profits and losses.489 No shareholder shall be denied receiving returns on his investment.490
Returns may be in pecuniary form, in the form of bonus shares, or both. Moreover, an important
aspect of this right is that only shareholders⎯through their assemblies⎯ have the power to declare
dividends.491 The board of directors may make some suggestion or propose a distribution plan, 492
but the shareholder assembly always retains the ultimate say by means of a shareholder resolution.

489

Article two.
Article 88, 1 (a).
491
By comparison, the board of directors in the United States reserves the right to declare dividends or
not, yet such a power is limited by judicial review, or so-called the business judgment rule. See 11
WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 5320, at 562⎯63 & nn.7-8 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2003), and Julian Velasco, The
Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 414 (2006).
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Article 175, (“The company’s directors shall prepare . . . proposals on distribution of dividends within
three months from the end of the fiscal year.”)
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Therefore, given the limitation placed on the board’s remunerations,493 the controlling
shareholder has a strong incentive not to vote against the declaration of dividends, and thus all
shareholders receive some of the corporation’s net profits after it satisfies its statutory obligations,
such setting aside the statutory reserve. 494 Unless the shareholder possesses preferred
shares⎯which may not have a voting right495⎯, all shares yield the same percentage of returns
regardless of the position of their holders, controlling or minority shareholders. 496 Nevertheless,
the Law does not obligate the corporation to distribute dividends in a timely manner, yearly or
quarterly.497 Instead, shareholders may stipulate it in the corporation’s bylaws, or leave it to the
shareholder assembly to decide. 498 Placing the discretion to declare dividends within the
shareholder assembly makes this right of paramount importance in protecting minority
shareholders, rather than it is being so “illusory” and of little significance had it been within the
will of the board of directors.499
Another constraint⎯that ensures the distribution of dividends and not to be obstructed by
controlling shareholders⎯is tying the directorial remuneration in the form of profits to the
declaration of dividends to shareholders.500 To illustrate, the Law grants the corporation freedom
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See supra Chapter 3. Part III. G.
Article 131.
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Article 114.
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Article 110.
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See Article 37 of the RRP (listing a number of requirements with which corporations have to comply
whenever they consider a distribution of dividends, including regular positive profitability, reasonable
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board of directors has the right to declare dividends, which renders shareholders’ right illusory and trivial.
See Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. D AVIS L. REV. 407, 424 (2006)
(prioritizing shareholder rights in the United States and dividing them into illusory or ancillary rights, on
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to select how it compensates its directors. 501 Nevertheless, if the corporation wants to tie its
directors’ compensation to their performance and thus to the corporation’s profitability, the Law
requires, inter alia, that the corporation distribute dividends⎯representing at least 5% of the
corporation’s paid-in capital⎯to shareholders.502 Evidently, such a requirement deprives the
controlling shareholder of appropriating the corporation’s profits to themselves only. In sum, if
the controlling director/shareholder wants a slice of the pie, so do other shareholders. Thus, he has
to share the pie with them.
2. The Right of Residual Claim on the corporation’s Assets upon Liquidation
Another basic, yet significant right to which the shareholder is entitled is the right to claim his
share in the remaining of the corporation’s assets after liquidation. Only after the corporation enters
into liquidation and all of its creditors are paid, shareholders can have a claim against the
outstanding assets if any. 503 As in the right to receive dividends, this right is protected in multiple
positions within the Law as it cannot be contracted out or denied, for it is of the statutory,
inseparable rights the share accords to its holder. 504
B. Control Rights
1. The Right to Vote
Voting right is the shareholder’s mechanism to exert power over the corporation’s
management, given the separation between ownership and management in today corporation.
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Article 76 (1).
Article 76 (2).
503
Article 110 reads that “[s]hares shall entail equal rights and obligations. Shareholders shall have all
rights associated with shares, particularly the rights to dividends, the company’s assets upon liquidation . .
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Therefore, the Law, similar to other corporate laws, confirms the voting right for shareholders to
decide corporate matters.505 However, the extent of this right over corporate affairs differs from
law to another based on whom the law empowers the most: shareholders or directors.
The CL vests a great deal of power in shareholders as a whole by requiring their votes to
approve a broad range of corporate affairs. Such affairs are the director’s compensation, 506
mergers,507 increase or decrease in the corporate capital, 508 bylaws amendments, issuance of
shares,509 and appointment and removal of directors.510 Such a right exemplifies the shareholder’s
control over not only shareholder affairs (e.g., restrictions on share sale) but also managerial affairs
(e.g., issuance of share and approval of related-party transactions).
2. The Right to Attend the Shareholder Assembly
It may seem to be intuitive that the right to vote implies the right to attend; otherwise, where
else would shareholders cast their votes? However, the access to shareholder meetings was denied
to shareholders with tiny shareholdings⎯less than 20 shares under the superseded law.511
As it is demonstrated in the previous chapter, the shareholder assembly as a powerful organ is
the mainstay of a number of rights the Law asserts for shareholders. It is the regulatory instrument
by which shareholders, for instance, elect (or oust) directors, 512 declare dividends,513 amend

Article 110 reads that “[s]hares shall entail equal rights and obligations. Shareholders shall have all
rights associated with shares, particularly . . . voting on resolutions . . . .”
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See supra Chapter 3. Part III. G.
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corporate bylaws,514 approve of a related-party transaction, 515 decide managerial remunerations,516
and so on. To ensure that shareholders exert their statutory powers, the Law guarantees the right
to attend for all shareholders⎯irrespective to the size of their shareholdings. 517 A change signifies
the legislature’s intention to reinforce the minority shareholder’s participation in corporate matters,
and also it signals the impartiality of the Law toward all shareholders.
To make the shareholder’s attendance effective (rather than illusory) and substantive (rather
than procedural), this right entails a couple of ancillary rights that enhance the role of the
shareholder during corporate assemblies. Any shareholder⎯or his representative518⎯has the right
to discuss any corporate matters listed in the meeting agenda and also has the right to direct
questions (about these matters) to directors of the board or the external auditor. 519 Both of which
are of great importance in reducing information and coordination costs for shareholders to be wellinformed and thus efficiently exercise their rights.
The Law penalizes the violation of these rights in two ways. First, the Law imposes a monetary
fine up to 500 thousand Saudi Riyals ($133,333) on anyone who intentionally denies or deprives
a shareholder of his right to attend a shareholder assembly or cast his vote.520 Second, the harmed
shareholder is entitled to submit an order to the assembly to nullify any resolution issued in
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See supra Chapter 3. Part III. E.
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See supra Chapter 3. Part III. G.
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violation of his rights⎯ even if in his absence due to an acceptable excuse. 521 Although it is unclear
what constitutes an “acceptable excuse”, it indicates that the shareholder’s presence is encouraged,
protected, and treated with great deference, however.
3. The Right to Request Shareholder Meeting
Knowing that a number of shareholder’s rights are exercised through only the shareholder
assembly, the Law has asserted that shareholders (as well as members of the board and auditors)
have the right to request the board to call for a shareholder assembly. Such a request has to be
submitted by a shareholder or a number of them in possession of at least 5% of the corporate
capital.522 The board of directors has no discretion but to carry out the request. 523
The board’s failure to respond to shareholder’s request permits shareholders with only 2% of
the corporation’s shares to submit the request to the Ministry of Commerce and Investment to hold
a shareholder meeting within 30 days from the request date. 524 Such a procedure emboldens the
minority shareholders to raise their voice about any corporate matter that would not be enclosed
in a prepared-by-board agenda.
4. The Right to Monitor and Supervise the Corporation
This informational right allows any shareholder to access and observe corporate books and
records.525 Unlike other laws, 526 this right is of great significance as it is absolute. To clarify, the
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Article 178 (1). However, the Law stipulates statute of limitation of one year from the date of the
prejudiced decision. See Article 178 (2).
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Article 90 (1) stipulates that “[t]he board of directors shall call for an ordinary general assembly
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Article 90 (3).
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books and documents.
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For example, Shareholders in some U.S. states bear the burden that they have a proper purpose to
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to access corporate information. See, e.g., Security First Corp. v. U.S. Die Casting & Dev. Co., 687 A.2d
563, 568 (Del.1997).
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Law does not mandate shareholders to prove a legitimate purpose to exercise this right. The board
has no statutory ground to refuse the shareholder’s access to look at the board’s minutes, the
corporation’s financial records, or other documents. Such a denier (e.g., the controlling shareholder
or a member of the board of directors) is subject to a monetary penalty. 527 In addition, the judiciary
has ruled in multiple cases in favor of letting shareholders access and review not only primary
documents (e.g., bylaws and board’s minutes) but also financial records and assessment. 528
There may be, nevertheless, some concern about the minority shareholder’s abusing this right
to harm the corporation, or expose it to potential damage, yet the Law stays silent about any
restrictions imposed on this right. By employment of logic and exercise of imagination, it may be
proposed that this right be subject to the same limitations imposed on the director’s answering
shareholder’s questions. In principle, the Law obligates directors to answer the shareholder’s
question to the extent that the answer does not sabotage the corporation’s interests. 529 In case the
shareholder is dissatisfied with the director’s response, the Law sets a mechanism to settle such a
conflict. The displeased shareholder may then petition to the assembly, which adjudicates whether
the answer at dispute is inadequate.530
5. The Right to Judicial Inspection
The right to judicial inspection offers minority shareholders the chance to have an outside
player reviewing and assessing some corporate matters. For example, shareholders may have their
suspicion about some directorial misbehavior taking placing within the corporation or that the
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See infra Chapter Five, Part II.
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auditor has engaged in malpractice. For this reason, the Law grants the shareholders⎯who hold at
least 5% of the corporation’s outstanding shares⎯the right to request the judiciary to order
inspection of the corporation. 531
In terms of procedures, the inspection shall be approved only after the court has heard the
defendant’s response.532 In addition, to ensure that inspection requests are justified and with some
merit, such inspection is entirely at the expense of the complaining shareholders so that
shareholders will not submit a groundless, or abusive request. 533 If the request turns out to be valid,
the court has a basket of options it may select from: it may call for a shareholder meeting, and it
may remove the directors of the board or the corporate auditor and appoint temporary directors
whose powers and terms are also defined by the court.534

Part III. Minority Shareholder’s Issues in Light of the Law
This part explores how some prescriptive rules of the Law address the major issues confronted
by minority shareholders in close corporations. It also argues that strengthening corporate laws
can eliminate⎯or mitigate⎯ the issues associated with minority status in close corporations. A
strong corporate law can enhance the minority shareholder’s role in management, form a
framework of continuous, compulsory disclosure about the business’s affairs, and ensure the
integrity and professional judgment through the strict conflict of interest laws that uphold fairness
and profitability for all shareholders.
This part continues to examine the Law’s response to the issue of shareholder’s expectation to
run and manage the business through representation in the boardroom. It also casts light on the
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statutory treatment for the dilution of share value. Another issue this part addresses is the exit issue
and how the Law protects the tradability of shares. In addition, it shows the Law’s approach to
curbing opportunistic conduct and conflict of interest transactions.
It is important to keep in mind that these rules are neither fully comprehensive nor perfect.
They only empower minority shareholders with the necessary instruments to play their roles
without fearing the cost of information and coordination and ensure them strong standing armed
with a group of economic and control rights. If the shareholders seek more rights and powers, they
should optimally bargain and contract for them. The following analyses of the Law are intended
to be critical, rather than descriptive, and encapsulate the relevant rules and regulations that may
be potent weapons in the hand of minority shareholders in their confrontation with close
corporation’s issues.
A. Enhancing Minority Shareholder’s Representation on Corporate Board
Shareholders in close corporations oftentimes are a small number with interpersonal
relationships and with expectations to manage the business. 535 However, the expectations of
minority shareholders may not be met unless they are secured by a provision in the corporate
documents or by a long-term employment contract. 536 Regardless of the rationale behind
shareholders’ failure to protect their expectations, the Law delivers reliable backup for these
shareholders to play their statutory roles effectively and efficiently.
As the Law protects minority shareholders as the ultimate owners of the business through a set
of economic and control rights, it also ensures that their stakes are represented (and not overlooked)
in corporate boardrooms⎯proportionately to their interests’ size. This lays in the shareholders’
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See supra Chapter 1. Part II. C.
See supra Chapter 1. Part III. C.
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ability to nominate one of them (or an outsider) to represent their interests on the board. To this
end, the Law sets forth a couple of fundamental tools that ensure the representation of the
minority’s interests: the election of directors is a statutory right, and the cumulative voting is
mandatory.
1. The Right to Elect Directors
One of the core rights of the shareholders is the right to elect their representatives to the
board.537 This is a statutory right that may not be contracted out, waived, or denied.538 Moreover,
it is argued that the shareholder’s right to elect directors is of the foremost rights, and superior to
other economic and control rights discussed earlier because of the powers this right confers on
directors.539
In close corporations, however, shareholders oftentimes wear the hats of directors and
managers; they elect themselves to the board of directors. 540 Not all shareholders can wear such a
hat, which makes the decision-making power resides in an individual or a small group of
shareholders who possess a majority of the voting shares that suffice to elect the entire board. 541
Therefore, in solidification of the statutory right to elect directors and to ensure a greater chance
of representation for the minority shareholders’ interests on the board, the Law enjoins the

Article 68 (2) affirms that “[e]ach shareholder shall be entitled to nominate himself or one or more
other persons for board membership, based on his share in the capital.”
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observance of the cumulative voting in electing the board’s members, thus eliminating the
corporation’s discretion to adopt such a rule. 542
2. Cumulative Voting
The general principle is that shareholders have the discretion to design their voting system.543
In principle, shareholders vote on corporate matters⎯including the election of directors⎯by
plurality voting. This voting system in the context of the director’s election involves that every
voting share is cast for each post on the board. 544 Under such a system, the shareholder with a
majority of the voting shares may select the entire board’s members,545 which leaves the minority
shareholders destitute of any chance to have their representatives on the board unless they have
secured a voting agreement ax ante, or they voluntarily adopt the cumulative voting system. 546
An exception to the general rule and in determination to reinforcing the minority shareholders’
rights and raising their voice in the boardroom, the Law obligates joint-stock corporations⎯public
and close⎯to adopting the cumulative voting in electing directors.547 The cumulative voting
entails that the shareholder’s voting shares are multiplied by the number of for-election posts on
542

In the United States, for instance, cumulative voting is optional. Corporations have to stipulate such a
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the board, and the result is the product the shareholder may cast for a single candidate or divide
among two or more candidates. 548 Obligating corporations to assume the cumulative voting in
electing directors accentuates the statutory role in promoting the minority’s rights and its role in
the governance of the corporation.
A significant effect the cumulative voting yields is that it enhances the chance of minority
shareholders with considerable shareholdings (e.g., 10% or 20%) to have their interests represented
and their voice heard as the board is vested with a great cluster of powers in formulating corporate
policies and deciding corporate matters. It is worth bearing in mind that, however, the cumulative
voting does not guarantee the minority’s representation on the board, but rather it increases its
opportunity to secure the board’s representation depending on the size of the board. If the size of
the board is large, the minority shareholders have a greater chance to elect one or more members
to the board, and vice-versa.549 This meshes well with the statutory minimum of directors the
corporation must have, preventing controlling shareholders from making the board small so that
they would appoint all of the directors.
From a critical point of view, the Law mandates the cumulative voting in the appointment of
directors, yet it stays silent whether the system must be followed in their removal. Assuming that
this is a statutory loophole, directors will be therefore susceptible to removal by a plurality of
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To clarify the difference between plurality voting and cumulative voting in the election of directors,
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shares, eroding the usefulness of the cumulative voting for minority shareholders. To fill this gap,
it may be suggested that the Law protects its cumulative voting and the appointment of minority
shareholder’s representative through a special requirement similar to the one stipulated in the
MBCA. According to section 8.08, a resolution to remove the director may not be passed if a
number of shares⎯enough to elect him by means of cumulative voting⎯are voted against such a
resolution.550 By doing so, the Law would ensure that the controlling shareholder could not
circumvent the minority shareholder’s director of choice.
In sum, the shareholder’s right to elect directors espoused by the mandatory cumulative voting
manner in the appointment allows the minority shareholders to have access to the management of
the corporation, represent their interests, stay informed about the corporate matters, engage in the
formulation of corporate policy, and affect the governance of the corporation. It is an effective
device to augment the minority’s chance to participate in corporate management.
B. Protecting Share Value
The dilution of share value is another issue faced by minority shareholders. 551 During the
lifespan of the corporation, the corporation may need to issue more shares for various reasons,
such as raising capital in pursuit of a new business opportunity and conducting the first public
offering. The issuance of new shares dilutes the voting power⎯and thus the value⎯of the
shareholdings of the minority shareholders.
The prescriptive rules may serve as a protective device to ensure that the dilution of the
minority’s shareholdings is not driven by opportunistic nor oppressive motives, but rather it is the

See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.08 (c) (2016) (“If cumulative voting is authorized, a director may
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result of a purely business decision. The statutory protection for the minority shareholder’s share
value flows from two main rubrics fished out from the Law: the approval requirements for share
issuance, and the preemptive rights. Note that the following subsections do not divulge all of their
procedural details, but rather they single out the significant rules that, I argue, constitute the
statutory protection from the minority shareholder’s standpoint.
1. Approval Requirement for Share Issuance
With respect to the shareholder primacy and the shareholder equality themes throughout the
Law, the Law stipulates procedural mixture of protective rules that must be followed in case the
corporation desires to increase its capital through the issuance of new shares. 552
The first and foremost rule is that the decision to issue new shares is within the extraordinary
shareholder assembly. 553 Because the issuance of new shares entails an increase in the corporate
capital and consequently a change in the corporation’s articles of association, only the shareholders
(via extraordinary assembly) may decide such a matter.554 Furthermore, the Law requires a higher
resolution-passing percentage for the decision to, inter alia, issue new shares. 555 In principle,
resolutions pertaining one of the matters that fall within the jurisdiction of the extraordinary
shareholder assembly (e.g., changing the corporation’s name or engaging in a new business
purpose) require the approval of at least a two-thirds of the voting shares represented in the
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Article 138 considers the issuance of new shares as the primary vehicle to increase the corporation
capital, and it lists a number of options against which shares may be issued (e.g., cash, in-kind
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the issuance of new shares with the proviso that the corporate capital has been paid in-full, except if
shares are issued as a result of bondholders’ right to convert their debt instruments into shares.
554
See supra Chapter 3. Part II. A. 2 (b).
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percentage for the following corporate matters: increase or decrease of capital, extension of the
corporation’s lifespan, voluntary dissolution, and merger with another entity).
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assembly.556 Nevertheless, a three-quarter majority of the voting shares represented in the
assembly must approve of the decision to increase its capital⎯through the issuance of shares.557
By employment of logic and given that the validity of the assembly requires at least representation
of 50% of the corporation capital,558 this resolution-passing percentage empowers the minority
shareholders to have their say on such a decision, and prevent the controlling shareholders from
exploiting the tool (issuance of share) to dilute their share value.
2. Preemptive Rights
Another protective aspect of the minority shareholders by the Law is the statutory recognition
of the preemptive right for the existing shareholders.559 As a result of increasing corporate capital,
shareholders enjoy the right to purchase new shares in proportional to their shareholdings.560 This
right enables “registered” shareholders 561⎯including minority ones⎯to avert the dilution of their
shares’ value and voting power in case the corporation increases its capital through the issuance
of shares.562
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See supra Chapter 3. Part II. A. 2 (b).
Id.
558
Id.
559
Preemptive rights may be, however, granted to non-shareholders provided that the extraordinary
shareholder approves of such an arrangement. See Article 140.
560
Article 139 stipulates that “[a] shareholder shall . . . have a preemptive right to subscribe to new shares
issued against cash contributions.”
561
According to the RRP, registered shareholders are the ones who are registered in the shareholder
registry at the end of the day on which the extraordinary shareholder assembly approves of a share capital
increase, or at the end of the day specified by the ordinary shareholder assembly (or the board) on which
shareholders become entitled to dividends. Moreover, the importance of knowing the status of registered
shareholder intensifies as the Law mandates that changes to share’s ownership or its entitlements be
marked in the shareholder registry. Otherwise, such a change (e.g., transfer of share’s ownership to
another person) does not produce effect vis-à-vis the corporation. Article 162.
562
See generally JAMES D. Cox ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 16.14, at 475 (1997) (claiming that
preemptive rights are an effective tool to prevent manipulation of voting control and dilution of share
value); Julian Javier Garza, Rethinking Corporate Governance: The Role of Minority Shareholders - A
Comparative Study, 31 ST. MARY'S L.J. 613, 620 (2000) (“This right is essential for minority
shareholders, because without it, the majority could dilute both the holdings and the voting power of the
minority.”); Lorenzo Segato, A Comparative Analysis of Shareholder Protections in Italy and the United
States: Parmalat as a Case Study, 26 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 373, 408 (2006) (suggesting that
557
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Comparatively speaking, the Law’s treatment of this right, I believe, is unique. Unlike the
United States where this right is purely contractual, 563 the Law recognizes this right as a “quasistatutory” right. Describing this right as a quasi-statutory right stems from the fact that it is a
shareholder’s right by default, meaning that shareholders do not need to include an opt-in provision
in the corporate documents to enjoy the right.564 On the other hand, this right may be subject in
special circumstances to some limitations that preclude the shareholders from exercising the
right.565 The statutory recognition of the preemptive rights weighs substantially in favor of
protecting the minority shareholders, who (due to their fragile contractual position) may fail to
bargain for and include the right in their corporate bylaws or the articles of association. 566
Preemptive rights under the Law are not wholly statutory.567 The Law sets forth some
circumstances under which this right may be suspended. For instance, the extraordinary
shareholder assembly may suspend shareholders’ preemptive rights only if such suspension
“deems beneficial for the company”. 568 While it is ambiguous what constitutes a beneficial
suspension, the statutory designation of this power to the extraordinary shareholder assembly
represents protection that likely⎯ by means of its representative quorum⎯ brings about an
informed and justified decision.

“[e]liminating preemptive rights significantly impairs the rights of minority shareholders [in close
corporations] because it leaves them without economic protection and active participation in the
business”).
563
See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.30(a) (2016) (“The shareholders of a corporation do not have a
preemptive right to acquire the corporation’s unissued shares except to the extent the articles of
incorporation so provide.”); JAMES D. Cox ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 16.14, at 475⎯76 (1997)
(asserting that preemptive rights are not mandatory but permissive).
564
See supra note 560 and accompanying text.
565
See infra notes 568 & 569.
566
See supra Chapter 1. Part III. C.
567
See supra Chapter 4. Part II. for the definition of “statutory right”.
568
Article 140 states that “[t]he extraordinary general assembly shall . . . have the right to suspend
shareholders’ preemptive rights to subscribe to the capital increase against cash contributions . . . in cases
it deems beneficial for the company.”

150

Another limitation upon the exercise of the preemptive right is when the purpose of the share
issuance is to distribute these shares to the workers of the corporation (or its subsidiaries).569 This
constraint may apparently pose a threat that controlling shareholders issue new shares to
themselves as employees of the corporation and thus deprive minority shareholders of their
preemptive rights. Nevertheless, it worth reminding that the power to issue new shares as a matter
of law is within the extraordinary shareholder assembly, 570 and the share issuance requires a high
resolution-passing percentage, 571 which enhances the minority shareholder’s chance to have a say
in the matter.
Decisions in violation of the shareholder’s preemptive rights are null and void. 572 For example,
the issuance of shares without complying with the notification rule. 573 Not to mention that the
shareholders who prevent others from exercising their preemptive rights may be subject to
monetary penalties, or even face criminal charges. 574 In a word, the preemptive right is a powerful
tool for the minority shareholders to maintain their power, preserve their share value, and probably
prevent controlling shareholders from diminishing them.
C. Transferability of Share and Exit Option
A major issue inherited from the close corporation structure is the absence of a ready market.575
The frustrated or oppressed minority shareholders have no public market through which they may

569

Article 137 (2) confers the power to issue new shares to employees on the extraordinary shareholder
assembly, yet shareholders’ exercising preemptive rights is impermissible if such issuance of shares is
allocated for the corporation’s employees.
570
See supra Chapter 4. Part III. B (1).
571
Id.
572
Article 88, 1, a (vi).
573
Article 139 requires that shareholders be notified of such a right, and of the decision of capital increase
along with the conditions and the period of subscription as well as beginning and ending dates, via
publication in a daily newspaper, or transmission by registered mail.
574
See generally Articles 211⎯213.
575
See supra Chapter 1. Part II. A.
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exit the corporation for fair value. Although the unmarketability of close-corporation shares is an
integral part of the close corporation structure, several statutory steps help escape the adverse,
likely consequences (e.g., freeze-outs). The steps include the statutory recognition of the share
transferability (including the right to sell and the right to mortgage shares), the statutory limitations
on the contractual restrictions of such a principle, and recently the mandatory offering rule.
1. The Statutory Principle of Share Transferability
One of the distinctive features of the joint-stock corporation the Law asserts is the tradability
and transferability of its shares. 576 This feature flows from the fact⎯and is premised upon the
principle⎯that shareholders have property rights over their shares.577 Adjacent to the right to
receive returns on their investments ( as one of the property rights),578 shareholders are entitled to
the statutorily-protected right to transfer their interests, which encompass both economic and
control interests.579
a. The Right to Sell
The transferability of shares involves the shareholder’s economic right to sell all or part of
their shares or interests. 580 Evidently, it is of the most important rights as it permits shareholders
to liquidate their shares and consequently exit the corporation as well as making profits from

Article 88, 1, a (iv) (confirming that a shareholder’s right to dispose of his shares is of the fundamental
rights that shareholder assemblies have no power to exclude). Article 110, (“Shareholders shall have all
rights associated with shares, particularly . . . disposal of shares . . . .”)
577
Cf. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 1.40 (22) (2016) (defining shares as “units into which the
proprietary interests in a corporation are divided”); Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the
Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 414⎯15 (2006) ([S]hares are a form of personal property.”)
578
See supra Chapter 4. Part II. A (1).
579
See supra Chapter 4. Part II. A & B.
580
See Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 414⎯15
(2006) (arguing that shareholder’ right to sell is one of the most two significant rights shareholders enjoy,
above other rights); Troy A. Paredes, The Firm and the Nature of Control: Toward a Theory of Takeover
Law, 29 J. CORP. L. 103 (2003) (spotlighting the role of shareholder with the right to sell in the
governance of the corporation).
576
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selling parts of their interests,581 such as selling their preemptive rights. 582 In principle,
shareholders may dispose of their shares at will. It is the result of the separation between ownership
and management in joint-stock corporations. 583 However, this right⎯in the close corporation’s
context⎯is oftentimes subject to a range of contractual restrictions discussed hereunder. 584
b. The right to Mortgage
Another right that stems from the transferability feature and the conceptualization of share
ownership as personal property585 is shareholders’ right to mortgage their shares. Again, the shares
are part of the shareholder’s personal property, and thus the shareholder may pledge their shares,586
which lets creditors step into the shareholders’ shoes and exercise share-related rights⎯including
the right to receive dividends.587 Nevertheless, such creditors may neither attend shareholder

581

Cf. Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 425
(2006) (“This right of alienation [the right to sell] is of the utmost importance to shareholders both
because it is a means of obtaining economic benefit from their investment in the corporation and because
it is their means of exit should they become dissatisfied with management.”
582
Accord Article 141, (permitting shareholders to sell or reassign their own preemptive rights in the
newly issued shares to others during the subscription period).
583
But see WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND
FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 132 (9th ed. 2004) (arguing that the feature of
separation between ownership and management in close corporation’s context appears to be more
theoretical than actual).
584
Id. at 109, (considering the absence of potential buyers as an implicit restriction upon transferability of
shares in close corporations).
585
See supra note 577 and accompanying text.
586
Article 112 (2) (“Shares may be pledged in accordance with rules set by the Competent Authority.”)
The Regulatory Rules and Procedures issued pursuant to the Companies Law relating to Unlisted Joint
Stock Companies sets forth, in Part five, the governing rules of pledge of shares by shareholders, which is
different from the rules stipulated in Part 4, Chapter 3 regulating the pledge of shares by the corporation.
The most important rule, besides executing a mortgage contract, is that in order for share mortgage goes
into effect vis-à-vis the corporation and third parties, share pledge has to be submitted to the board of
directors and recorded in the shareholder registry in the corporation, which every corporation has to
maintain and which includes names of shareholders, their nationality, place of residence, and shares’
numbers. See generally articles 24⎯30 for further details about the information that has to be in a
mortgage contract.
587
Id. (“The pledge creditor shall receive profits and use share-related rights, unless the pledge contract
stipulates otherwise.”)
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assemblies nor cast the votes of mortgaged shares since these rights are only exercised by the
registered owner of the shares (or his delegate).588 589
2. Restrictions on Share Transfer
In spite of the fact that the share transferability is of the core features of joint-stock
corporations, the Law subjects this feature to a temporarily statutory constraint, and it also allows
the corporations to restrict this right. Nevertheless, these both restrictions do not negate the
statutory protection of the right as explained hereunder. As a matter of fact, they, I believe, should
be perceived as protection for the shareholders rather than external constraints upon the
shareholder’s rights.
a. Statutory Restriction
In exception to the principle of free transferability of shares, the Law precludes the
incorporating shareholders from disposing of their shareholdings during the following years of the
incorporation. Only after the publication of the corporation’s financial records and statements of
two fiscal years may shareholders sell their shares.590 Through an analytical lens, such a restriction,
one may deduce, accords twofold protection.
First, it protects the third parties (e.g., potential buyers) from being deceived or lured into a
fraudulent business. At the oust of the business, it is unlikely to accurately evaluate the business’s
success and thus pay the fair value for its shares.591 After two years, nonetheless, the potential
buyer is in a better position to assess the business and estimate how much the corporation’s shares

588

See supra note 518 and accompanying text.
Article 112 forbids “pledge creditors” from attending and voting in shareholder assemblies.
590
Article 107 (1) (“Shares subscribed by incorporators may not be tradable except upon publication of
the financial statements for two fiscal years, each is not less than twelve months, as from the date of the
company’s incorporation.”
591
To ensure such protection is provided for third parties and communicated to the outside world, the
Law requires the certificates of shares be marked with the date of the incorporation of the corporation and
the restriction period for trading. Article 107 (1).
589
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deserve, given its financial records and statements of its two fiscal years, which should reflect the
corporation’s performance and lucrativeness.592
Second, which is more relevant to the present discussion of this chapter, this statutory
restriction ties the interests of the minority shareholders with the interests of the controlling ones,
who have the upper hand in managing and operating the business. By the exercise of imagination,
if the business were falling apart or seemed fruitless, the controlling shareholders⎯by virtue of
the superior and managerial status⎯ might exit the corporation by selling their controlling
shareholdings and leaving the minority shareholders stuck in the failing business. The beginnings
of businesses are of the most challenging time a business may undergo, so the minority
shareholders are better off with this statutory restriction because of the sense of reassurance it
produces that they are sailing through the whirlwind with other controlling shareholders on the
same boat.
Most importantly, during the two-year trading ban, the Law exempts some forms of
transferability.593 Allowable trading includes the transfer of shares among existing shareholders, 594
and the transfer of shares to the heirs of a deceased shareholder. 595 In addition, the Law permits
the transfer of shares that transpires as a result of enforcement against the insolvent shareholder’s
shares,596 yet the other shareholders enjoy the right of first refusal in such cases. 597 After all, both
of the exceptions prove the rule.

592

Note that, not only does the Law require the elapse of two-year period in order for shareholders to sell
their shares, but also it requires that such passage is to be accompanied with publication of the financial
records and statements of the corporation, which underscores the message underlying such requirements
for third parties.
593
Article 107 (2).
594
Id.
595
Id.
596
Id.
597
Id.
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b. Corporate Restrictions
Worldwide, the tradability of close corporations’ shares oftentimes undergoes some
restrictions imposed by the shareholders themselves for a variety of reasons, such as to prevent the
shares from being sold to outsiders with no personal or familial relationships to the rest of
shareholders. The small number of shareholders in close corporations and the interpersonal
relationships among shareholders make it sensible for the shareholders to restrict the free
tradability feature of shares. The most prevalent form of share resections is the right of first refusal.
This restriction is widely recognized by corporate law,598 including the Saudi Companies Law of
2015.599
Nevertheless, to ensure that the shareholder’s discretion is neither abused nor exploited in a
way that contradicts the general principle (free transferability), the Law prohibits the corporations
from imposing restrictions that implicitly render shares untradeable. 600 An example of an outlawed
restrictions is that requiring shares be sold exclusively to shareholders while no one wants to buy.
Even if the shareholders agree to the provision, this provision violates a statutory right, and thus it
is void and null under the Law.601 The essence of the contractual restrictions on share tradability
should design a mechanism by which shareholders sell their shares, not create a blanket ban that
eliminates the shareholder’s right to transfer shares.

598

See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8. § 202 (2006); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.27 (2016) (authorizing
contractual restrictions on the transfer of shares).
599
As matter of fact, the Law recognizes the right of first refusal for shareholders of close corporations in
a couple of instances in the Law. Both instances asserts shareholders’ right of first refusal if a
shareholder’s shares are subject to enforcement due to shareholder’s insolvency or bankruptcy. As a side
note, there is a major difference between the two terms: insolvency and bankruptcy, and thus the laws and
regulations concerning them.
600
Article 108, (“The company's articles of association may provide for restrictions related to trading of
shares, provided that such restrictions do not lead to permanent ban of trading of such shares.”)
601
See supra note 576.
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3. Mandatory Offering
A unique rule that has been introduced by the Competent Authority and appears to account for
the protection for the minority shareholders is the mandatory offering.602 The uniqueness of this
rule finds its roots in the fact that it is commonly imposed on shareholders of public corporations,
not close ones.603 According to the ministerial resolution, if the ownership of the shareholder in
the corporation exceeds 50% of the corporation’s capital by means of share purchase (in one or
multiple transactions), that shareholder has to offer the remaining shareholders (the minority) to
buy their shares for the best of the prices and terms the acquiring shareholder paid for the shares
during the last 12 months prior to the offer date.604 From the perspective of an advocate for the
minority shareholders rights, this rule represents protection for minority shareholders’ interests
against the unexpected rise of the controlling shareholder or a sudden change of
control⎯especially if the corporation has no controlling shareholder⎯and thus the dilution of
share value and power.605

602

Ministerial Resolution, No. 32565, Fifth.
See generally Zohar Goshen; Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE
L. J. 560, 617 (2016); Stephanie Luiz; Kathleen Van der Linde, The Mandatory Offer Obligation and
Intermediaries, 2011 J. S. AFR. L. 113, 126 (2011); S. M. Luiz, Protection of Holders of Securities in the
Offeree Regulated Company during Affected Transactions: General Offers and Schemes of
Arrangements, 26 S. AFR. MERCANTILE L.J. 560, 586 (2014).
604
In addition, the acquiring shareholder has to make the offer to other shareholders during the following
60 days after his shareholding crosses the 50% threshold. See Ministerial Resolution, No. 32565, Fifth.
605
Notwithstanding the protection mandatory offering provides, this rule is surrounded by grave concern.
By thorough reading and analyzing of the Law, I think that the Competent Authority crossed the
boundaries the legislative branch drew in the Law. According to the Law, the Competent Authority is
empowered to issue whatever necessary for the implementation of the Law (Article 225,2). However, this
rule, I think, is beyond its statutory power because it effects a new substantive obligation the Law has
neither mentioned nor implicated. Unless this rule becomes part of the Law through the right channel, I
am skeptical about its legality and enforcement in a court of law. As far as I know, this rule is under
reconsideration by the Competent Authority as of March 2018.
603
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D. Corporate Share Repurchase
Repurchases of shares is a tool that alters the structure of the corporation’s share capital.606 As
a matter of fact, it is a form of distribution by the corporation. 607 During its lifetime, the corporation
may decide to buy back its shares for an assortment of operational and financial causes. Such
causes (stipulated in the Law) include decreasing the corporation’s share capital to tackle losses,
or awarding shares to its employees. 608 Unlike these reasons, which seem to be legitimate and for
good cause, the repurchase of shares may be driven by corrupt intents, such as the oppressive
elimination of a dissenting shareholder or by opportunistic appropriation of a larger portion of
corporate profits, 609 which has generated the abusive practice of what is so-called “selective
repurchase”.610
The selective repurchase denotes that the corporation buys back some of its shares⎯that are
in the hand of selected shareholder(s)⎯upon favorable conditions and prices to the latter,
depriving other shareholders (the minority) of benefiting from the repurchase.611 Because share

606

Cf. Victor Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and Reorganizations,
71 CAL. L. REV. 1072, 1072 (1983).
607
E.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 1.40 (2016) (The definition of “a distribution includes the payment
of a dividend, a purchase by a corporation of its own shares [emphasis added], a distribution of evidences
of indebtedness or promissory notes of the corporation, and a distribution in voluntary or involuntary
liquidation.”)
608
See Kathleen van der Linde, Share Repurchases and the Protection of Shareholders, 2010 J. S. AFR. L.
288, 288⎯289 (2010) (citing other reasons behind corporate repurchases, such as are reduction of
administrative costs, perseverance of control in case of repurchasing the shares of perished or retiring
employee).
609
Id. (“ Getting rid of a troublesome shareholder is another motivation.”); Languta A. Manganye,
Selective repurchases of Shares and Protection of Shareholders in terms of the Companies Act 71 of 2008
(2016) (published L.L.M. Thesis, University of Johannesburg) (on file with the author).
610
The term “ selective repurchase”, however, is coined in the Saudi Law; unlike some other jurisdictions
(e.g., South Africa and New Zealand), the Law regulates repurchases in a broader scope in a way that
bans selective share buybacks, completely. See Languta A. Manganye, Selective repurchases of Shares
and Protection of Shareholders in terms of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (2016) (published L.L.M.
Thesis, University of Johannesburg) (on file with the author) (comparing between South Africa and New
Zealand’s regulations of repurchases).
611
In addition to selective repurchases, another abusive form of repurchase is the proportional repurchase
provided that such a repurchase occurs with the knowledge that shareholders are unable to accept the
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buybacks may give rise to oppression against the minority shareholders (e.g., freeze-outs),612 the
Law prescribes some mandatory rules that ensure the application of the equity doctrine in such
circumstances, deterring the controlling shareholders from misusing corporate repurchases for
vicious drives.613
Based on the Law,614 the corporation may buy back its shares only in three events: to decrease
the share capital,615 to retain treasury shares, 616 or to redeem shares.617 The discussion hereunder
is narrowed to crystallize the protection for the minority shareholders underlying the procedural
requirements the Law stipulates to guarantee that all shareholders have the chance to render their
shares in lieu of discriminatory repurchases of selected shareholders’ shares.
1. Share Repurchase for Capital Decrease
The protection of minority shareholders against abusive repurchases is signified in a number
of procedural rules that together establish a mechanism of fairness and equity among all

offer. For further information, see Kathleen van der Linde, Share Repurchases and the Protection of
Shareholders, 2010 J. S. AFR. L. 288, 289 (2010).
612
See supra Chapter 1. Part II. D. (explaining what freeze-outs mean and how they occur).
613
Note that not only are procedural rules the statutory approach to protect shareholders from abusive
repurchase, but also they may be protected through fiduciary duties and the principle of fairness. In the
United States, for example, repurchase decisions in principle are regulated of the board’s duty of utmost
good faith and equal opportunity rule for all shareholder, in many states. Accordingly, shareholders have
the right to have their shares repurchased or redeemed; otherwise, non-selling shareholders have to
approve of selective repurchases. See Kathleen van der Linde, Share Repurchases and the Protection of
Shareholders, 2010 J. S. AFR. L. 288, 297⎯298 (2010).
614
Article 112 (1) permits corporations to repurchase its shares in accordance with the rules set by the
competent authority, the Ministry of Commerce and Investment in case of close corporations.
615
Article 144 stipulates that corporations may decrease their share capitals under one of two conditions:
First, the share capital is in excess of the need of the corporation. Second, the corporation incurs losses.
616
See infra note 625.
617
The Law allows corporations to issue callable or redeemable shares. See generally Article 111
(regulating the issuance and redemption of callable shares). Repurchases due to the corporation right to
redeem its shares is excluded as it falls beyond the concern of this research, and since such shares are
presumably owned or purchased with the knowledge that these shares are callable, which differs from
share repurchase due to decreasing share capital or retaining treasury shares as repurchases for such
causes are aimed at non-callable shares and with no prior shareholder’s expectations of such repurchase.
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shareholders.618 First of all, as seen earlier, the decision to decrease the corporation’s capital is of
the exceptional corporate matters that require a higher quorum and higher decision-passing
percentage to approve of it, 619 which ensures a greater role played by the minority shareholders in
the decisions. Furthermore, it is not a mere decision to decrease the corporation’s share capital,
but rather it includes (in case of approval) specifications such as the number of shares to be
repurchased, the price, and the terms for the repurchase offer.620
Moreover, the Law mandates that the corporation notify all shareholders of its resolution to
buy back a certain amount of their shares. 621 This ensures that all shareholders are acutely aware
of all the necessary information about the repurchase transaction and gives them equal
opportunities to sell their share back to the corporation.
Most importantly, the repurchase price is to be “fair”.622 Despite the fact that there are an array
of determinants affecting the fair value of close corporation’s shares along with the fact that there
is no clear-cut definition of what constitutes “fair value”,623 the shareholders are not coerced to
sell their shares at the end. Instead, they have the ultimate freedom to accept or reject the offer if
they think that their shares are underpriced. The absence of the ready market poses a heavy burden

618

As a sideline, the Law extends its protection to encompass creditors of the corporation as well. In case
the repurchase of shares is for the purpose of decreasing share capital due to its excess of the
corporation’s needs, the repurchase decision is to be communicated to the creditors who have 60 days to
raise their objection to the decease of the corporation’s share capital. If such an objection is raised during
the statutory 60-day period, the corporation has to either pay the debt if it is due, or provide the creditor
with a sufficient guarantee if the debt is not due. Article 145.
619
See supra Chapter 3. Part II. A. 2 (b); Article 12 (H) of the RRP.
620
Article 12 (H) of the RRP.
621
Article 148 (1) (“The call shall be made by notifying shareholders of the company’s wish to
repurchase shares by registered mail or by publication in a daily newspaper distributed in the area where
the company’s head office is located.”)
622
Article 148 (3).
623
On the other hand, public corporations may rely of the market to determine the fair value of shares. As
a matter of law, public corporations my fix the repurchase price not exceeding 5% of the closing price on
the day preceding the day the repurchase transaction is finalized. See Article 12 (6) of the RRP of Listed
Companies.
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upon the close corporations to fashion an attractive deal in a way that incentivizes shareholders to
vend their shares, avoiding overpricing and underpricing. 624
2. Share Repurchase for Retaining Treasury Shares
At times, the corporation may seek to repurchase its shares to retain them as treasury shares. 625
Treasury shares may be piled up only for a collection of statutory purposes.626 The purposes are
awarding the corporation’s employees as part of employee share ownership plan,627 share swap,628
or fulfilling the right of the holders of convertible bonds to convert their debt instruments into
shares.629
A number of procedural requirements are prescribed by the Law to achieve adequate protection
for the interests of the minority shareholders. Once again, the repurchase of shares for the treasuryshare purposes has to be approved by a resolution of the extraordinary shareholder assembly, 630
yet this resolution does not require the same stringent resolution-passing percentage required to
repurchase shares for the capital decrease.631 In addition, the fraction of shares the corporation may

624

See Marvin A. Chirelstein, Optional Redemptions and Optional Dividends: Taxing the Repurchase of
Common Shares, 78 YALE L.J. 739, 743⎯744 (1969); Kathleen van der Linde, Share Repurchases and
the Protection of Shareholders, 2010 J. S. AFR. L. 288, 289 (2010).
625
Treasury shares are repurchased shares the corporation retains for different future purposes, such as
employee share ownership plan. Most importantly, repurchase of shares for purposes other than deceasing
the share capital due to losses are to be stipulated in the corporate charter and bylaws. Article 1 (C) of the
RRP.
626
Article 13 of the RRP.
627
The employee share ownership plan is a program that is adopted voluntarily by the corporation in its
corporate charter or bylaws, which allow it to confer some of its treasury shares on its workforce. See
Article 137 (2) (empowering the extraordinary shareholder assembly to decide on granting its employees
some shares in the corporation as part of incentives).
628
A share swap is a transaction via which exchanges of shares of different corporations take place in
various forms. In the context of mergers and acquisitions, for instance, a target corporation’s shares are
exchanged for the shares of acquiring corporation. See Article of 13 (B) of the RRP (limiting the retaining
of treasury shares for, inter alia, [s]hare swap transactions for the acquisition of shares or limited liability
company’s interests or an asset purchase”).
629
Article of 13 (A) of the RRP.
630
See supra Chapter 3. Part II. A. 2. (b).
631
Remember, a share capital decrease is one of the corporate matters for which the Law requires the
approval of three-quarter of the shares attending the extraordinary shareholder assembly, while
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retain as treasury shares are limited. According to the Law, the treasury shares of the close
corporation may not exceed 10% of the corporation’s aggregate shares, at all times. 632 Otherwise,
the corporation, namely the controlling shareholders, would abuse the option to exhaust the
corporate cash to make the corporation repurchase their shares, and thus channel corporate profits
to the vending shareholders.
3. Repurchase as Part of Employee share ownership Plan
The Controlling shareholders may exploit treasury shares in a way that puts these shares in
their possession⎯as employees of the corporation. To curb such a theoretical⎯but practically
possible⎯assumption, the Law goes above and beyond to set forth a number of rules that promote
protection in the face of the potential abuse of the employee share plan by the controlling
shareholders. First of all, the extraordinary shareholder assembly has to approve of the plan as well
as the permission of the corporation’s bylaws to adopt such a plan.633 Second of all, non-executive
directors of the board may not benefit from the plan, 634 and most importantly the executive
directors may not cast their votes on any employee-share-related matter that is the subject of the
board’s deliberating and voting.635
As an observer may find in these rules rigorous requirements, they, from the viewpoint of
minority shareholders, constitute a protective shield against opportunism and oppression. They
ensure that the shares are repurchased and re-issued for the sake of the corporation’s employees,
rather than a way to augment their shareholdings. Evidently, these requirements safeguard the

repurchases for share-treasury purposes requires the default percentage approval of two-thirds of the
shares attending the extraordinary shareholder assembly. See supra Chapter 3. Part II. A. 2. (b).
632
Article 12 (C) of the RRP.
633
Article 21 (A) & (B) of the RRP (The extraordinary shareholder assembly may designate to the board
the power to determine the plan’s details, including the price if it is offered for consideration.)
634
Article 21 (C) of the RRP.
635
Article 21 (D) of the RRP.
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integrity of the decision related to such a repurchase, and they make sure that the decision is not
tainted or driven by personal benefits of the controlling shareholders, who presumably control the
board and manage the day-to-day operations. 636
E. Regulation of Related-Party Transactions
In a number of instances, the controlling shareholders may engage in self-dealing transactions,
or they may benefit directly or indirectly from some of the transactions they execute while wearing
the hats of directors or officers. These transactions raise concern about their fairness to the
corporation, and whether they are detrimental to the interests of other shareholders. In response,
most jurisdictions, if not all, impose a set of regulatory rules to uphold the equality doctrine among
shareholders, and deter or eliminate transactions that may harm the minority shareholders’
interests. Nevertheless, the legal devices adopted to tackle related-party transactions vary from
county to the other.637
As far as the statutory protection for the minority shareholders within Saudi Arabia is
concerned, the Law has approached the related party transactions with a set of legal rules that
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To illustrate how these rules prevent an abusive repurchase in a real life example, let us assume that X
is a controlling shareholder of Y corporation, whose board is presided by X, who appointed his son, Z, to
the corporation’s CEO post as well as to a seat of the board. The Y corporation decides to launch an
employee share ownership program, which is permissible by Y’s bylaws. The board has been designated
the power to start the program. For the sake of the presented argument, X’s intent to launch the plan
appears to be for the corporation’s employees’ interests, yet the ulterior motive is to enlarge his and his
son’s shareholdings. With these rules in play, however, X may not benefit from this plan at all because he
does not fit the definition of employee for the sake of the plan. Plus, Z, the CEO and director of the
corporation, may not cast his vote to approve of such a plan due to a conflict of interests because he fits
the definition of corporate employee and thus benefits from the plan.
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See REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 145 (Oxford Univ. Press 3rd. ed. 2017) (defining party-related transactions as
“these include both transactions in which related parties such as directors and controlling shareholders
deal with the corporation—traditional self-dealing and managerial compensation—and transactions in
which related parties may appropriate value belonging to the corporation—the taking of corporate
opportunities and trading in the company’s shares”). Party-related transactions fall within a wider scope
known as “tunneling”. This term is first used by Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-deSilanes & Andrei Shleifer, Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 22 (2000), to characterize the expropriation
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mandate disclosure and shareholder approval on the one hand, and prohibit sort of conflicted
transactions on the other hand. They collectively forestall the related-party transactions, including
self-dealing and the misappropriation of corporate opportunity, at least in theory. 638 The discussion
hereunder may be found repetitive of what is stated in the earlier chapter under the subsection of
the Duties of the Board; however, this subsection differs as it embraces the role of the minority
shareholders and review these rules in light of their standpoint.
1. Mandatory Disclosure
One of the devices the Law adopts to curtail suspicious transactions involving conflicts of
interests and probable misappropriation of wealth that belongs to the corporation is the obligation
to disclose. Mandatory disclosure is one of the effective legal mechanisms that has been decoded
in the corporate literature as a tool that, inter alia,639 warns the shareholders of questionable
conduct by the controlling shareholders and the management team.
According to the Law, transactions and contracts that involve direct or indirect benefits to a
member of the board may be executed only after the board obtains the permission of the general
shareholder assembly. 640 The chairperson has to report to the assembly about the suspicious
transaction and request its authorization from the shareholder assembly.641 To ensure that the
shareholder assembly is fully informed, it is of the external auditor’s duty to review the
questionable transaction and submit a report about its fairness to the shareholder assembly. 642
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Note that whether the regulatory apparatus succeeds in deterring controlling shareholders and directors
from engaging in such transactions is an empirical question that falls beyond the scope of this study.
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See REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 147 (Oxford Univ. Press 3rd. ed. 2017) (asserting that mandatory disclosure also
supports the “internal decision-makers’ independence and ensures compliance with the Law and the
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Article 71 (1).
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Although this requirement yields advantages, some concerns are surrounding the statutory
prescription of this requirement. First, the Law fails to define what constitutes a direct or indirect
benefit, making it ambiguous for the obligees to comply with this requirement. The ambiguity
includes, for example, whether the benefit has to be pecuniary, to what extent an indirect benefit
may stretch, and whether the size of the benefit matters. Another concern is that compliance with
this rule as described in the Law is seemingly prohibitive and does not mesh with the doctrine of
delegated management. The corporation engages in many transactions, so seeking the approval of
shareholders as a whole every time a potential conflict of interest transaction pops up is inefficient,
economically and intuitively. The board may forgo good deals just to avoid the lengthy⎯and
costly⎯requirement to call for an assembly and seek its approval.643
Furthermore, the Law imposes an obligation to disclose and report the remuneration packages
of the board’s directors to the shareholders. 644 The compensations of directors oftentimes give rise
to conflicting interests. Therefore, this obligation⎯along with other constraints imposed by the
Law⎯constitutes an effective mechanism as the board has to report to the shareholder organ
compensation-related details, including their monetary and in-kind benefits, other amounts
received by the member of the board under another capacity (e.g., CEO), and the number of
meetings attended by the member.645
In sum, the mandatory disclosure is a vital apparatus to keep the management of the corporation
in check, to prevent any expropriation of the corporation’s wealth, and to alert the minority
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Although the Law provides for an exception that the general assembly may allow the board to decide
on related-party transactions, this rule still makes legitimate related-party transactions subject to scrutiny
and require approval. In addition, the permission for the board to decide conflicted transactions is
temporary; it may be granted for only one year, subject to renewal. Article 71 (1).
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Article 76 (4).
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See supra Chapter 3. Part III. G. for a comprehensive explanation of the governing rule of directorial
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shareholders of any red-flag-raising transaction. Nonetheless, the status quo of the mandatory
disclosure may be baffling and overregulating as the definition of direct and indirect benefit is still
undetermined, and as the reporting system poses cumbersome procedures that do not match with
the rapidity involving the business sector. After all, this does not negate the significance of the
informative role played by the mandatory discourse in protecting the minority shareholders.
2. Shareholder Approval
Another effective device to eliminate related party transactions is the statutory requirement of
shareholder approval. The Saudi Law, unlike other jurisdictions,646 imposes a blanket approval
requirement for every conflicting-interest transaction.647 Moreover, the Law mandates the
transaction-related party abstain from voting on the matter in question.648 The abstention
empowers the minority shareholders in cases where the party is the controlling shareholder. In
such cases, the transaction is approved by a majority of the minority of shareholders.
3. Prohibition of Conflicted Transactions
To curb opportunistic and self-dealing transactions, the Law bans some types of transactions
where directors’ interests⎯or the controlling shareholders’⎯ are present at both ends of the
transactions. For instance, corporations may not grant any forms of a loan to its directors or
shareholders alongside the prohibition that the corporations may not serve as guarantors of the
shareholders and directors’ loans.649
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E.g., the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, and Brazil.
But cf. REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
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cumbersome. . .”).
648
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resolution to be issued on this matter by the board of directors and the assembly of shareholders.”)
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See supra Chapter 3. Part III. E. for elaborate illustration of this statutory prohibition as a matter of
director’s duties.
647

166

Another prohibition that signifies the statutory protection of shareholders’ interests is barring
the board’s directors from competing against the business they are supposed to advance its
interest.650 This prohibition may be waived only if the shareholder general assembly authorizes the
competition in question. Otherwise, competing against the business without obtaining proper
authorization makes the violating director subject to the removal, litigations, and the damages.
Note that this prohibition stretches over business activities within the corporate line of the
business.651
In the same fashion, insider trading is a ubiquitous example of a conflict of interest that is
forbidden in most jurisdictions, if not all. Insider trading includes the disclosure of secret
information they obtain by virtue of their directorships to unauthorized persons, and the trading on
such information to gain or direct to someone else personal benefits. 652 Albeit an old argument in
the literature that insider trading may yield some benefits, 653 violators under the Law are subject
to removal from the board as well as to civil liabilities.654
Despite the obscurity of some rules regulating the related-party transactions, these rules
provide an acceptable level of statutory protection for minority shareholders. The flow of
information into shareholders and the shareholder-approval rule go hand in hand to thwart dubious
practices and contracts executed by interested parties, as well as the ban on the competition and
the personal loans to the management and the directors of the board. The prohibition of insider
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Such benefits include that it constitutes a type of incentive remuneration and it provides a “superior
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trading as part of the Law is logically necessary, yet its importance in the context of close
corporations may be marginalized as the insider trading is an issue that is associated with the listed
corporations.
F. Shareholder Derivative Actions
The right to bring lawsuits against the corporation and its management is of paramount
importance to the protection of the minority shareholders.655 It represents a statutory tool available
to the shareholders to hold the management of the corporation liable for its wrongdoing and seek
a judicial remedy based on the oppression of the controlling shareholder or based on a violation of
the governing law and documents (e.g., corporate charter and bylaws). Note that the protection of
the minority shareholders through shareholder actions is not a mere matter of recognizing the right,
but rather it is a matter of the procedural rules that regulate shareholder actions. In the United
States, for instance, the board has a great deal of discretion to whether allow shareholders to bring
a derivative against the management.
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This rule makes the shareholder right to sue the

corporation more tentative than protective as it poses a limitation on the right.

Accord Julian Javier Garza, Rethinking Corporate Governance: The Role of Minority Shareholders – A
Comparative Study, 31 ST. MARY'S L.J. 613, 636 (2000) (“Minority shareholders may not control the
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of Minority Shareholders: Protecting Minority Rights, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 121, 139-40 (1987)
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the hats of directors or officers).
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In Saudi Arabia, nevertheless, the Law recognizes the shareholder’s right to sue the corporation
and takes arguably a lenient approach in setting the governing rules of shareholder actions. 657 For
example, the Law does not require the shareholders to obtain the approval of the board to file an
action. Instead, it sets forth a cluster of statutory requirements that once are met, the shareholder
has the right to file the case against the corporation. As demystified hereunder, the statutory
requirements are more procedural than substantive, yet they make shareholder actions powerful
instruments in the hand of the minority shareholders, conceptually.
Derivative Action Requirements
One of the statutory rights shareholders enjoy is the right to bring a suit on the corporation’s
behalf.658 These lawsuits claim that harm has disturbed and hurt the welfare of the corporation,
and the shareholders (as the ultimate owners of the corporation).659 Therefore, the relief sought in
derivative actions belongs to the corporation, not to the shareholders filing the action. In short,
derivative actions stem from the wrongdoing done to the corporation.
The Law establishes two ways to bring actions vis-à-vis the corporation. The first sort of
derivative actions is an action that brought pursuant to a resolution by the shareholder general
assembly. According to the Law, the shareholder general assembly has the power to sue the
directors of the board because of their wrongdoing or mismanagement that results in harm to the
corporation, and thus shareholders⎯as a whole.660 Needless to say that the resolution to sue the
management is subject to the regulating rules of the shareholder general assembly (e.g., quorum

Article 110 (“Shareholders shall have all rights associated with shares, particularly the rights to. . .
[initiate] a liability suit against Board members and appealing resolutions issued by shareholder
assemblies.”)
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Article 88 (a.v.) forbids the elimination or deprivation of shareholder’s right to sue the board of
directors, declaring this right as a statutory right that may not be altered or modified.
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Cf. MICHAEL A. CHASALOW, EXPERIENCING BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 549 (WEST ACAD. PUB.
2014).
660
Article 79.
657

169

and resolution-passing requirements).661 In practice, it may be difficult, if not impossible, for the
minority shareholders to bring a derivative action by means of the assembly resolution, mainly if
the controlling shareholder also serves on the board as a chairperson or director. Logically, no
shareholder votes to bring a suit against themselves. For this reason, the Law advances another
way to file the derivative action.
Alternatively, the derivative action may be brought by the shareholder⎯as an individual. The
individual shareholder may seek judicial intervention to redress the violation of the corporation’s
right on behalf of the latter. Based on the Law, if the shareholder general assembly fails to act or
decide not to sue the corporation’s board of directors, the shareholder may file the action instead
provided that the statutory requirements for the derivative action by the shareholder are met. The
first requirement is that the suing shareholder establish the harm to his interest due to the board’s
wrongdoing,662 which is unusual since derivative suits are brought on behalf of the corporation
and for damages sustained by the shareholders as a whole.
One may interpret that the Law fails to distinguish between derivative and direct action.
However, the second requirement requires the validity of the corporation’s right to bring the
lawsuit. The Law mandates that the corporation’s right to sue the board exists and has not yet
expired.663 The Law sets a statute of limitations of three years from the date of discovering the
wrongful deed.664 If the affected shareholder fails to act during this time, he loses his right to bring
the derivative action.
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The third requirement is that the prejudiced shareholder alert the board of the intention to file
a derivative action.665 Note that it is merely a notification; no approval from the board is required.
The fourth requirement, which also seems unconventional to the concept of the derivative suit, is
that the judicial remedy be limited to the damages sustained by the suing shareholder,666 while the
traditional understanding is that remedies based on derivative suits belong to the corporation.
Admittedly, there is perplexity in the differences between the two ways to bring a derivative
action. One may think of the second way as a substitute for the direct action since the affected
shareholder has to establish personal harm along with the fact that the remedy is limited to that
sustained harm. On the other hand, the confusing requirement of the existence of the corporation’s
right and the description of this suit as a derivative suit in the Law may lead others to consider it
as a derivative suit of special nature. Otherwise, what would be the kind of actions the shareholder
might bring if the corporation sustained no harm, but the shareholder did? Furthermore, the
requirement that the shareholder prove that the harm to the corporation results in personal harm to
his interest makes it impractical as the harm is presumably impossible to prove; otherwise, the
shareholder would bring a direct action if the harm were demonstrable. 667
One idea to address the confusion of the current procedural requirements for derivative actions
in a way that will strengthen the protection for the minority shareholders is the adoption of
abstention rule. Under this rule, I propose, the shareholder⎯especially controlling one⎯who is
also a director of the board would not cast his vote in deciding whether to bring a derivative suit
against the board due to an existing conflict of interest. A rational shareholder would never vote
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in favor of a lawsuit against him. In support of this idea, the Law has recognized this use of rule
when it comes to deciding the remunerations of the board’s directors,668 so it is not a novel device
deployed by the Law. If adopted, this rule would empower the minority shareholders who had no
representation on the board (even with the use of cumulative voting in the appointment of
directors) to challenge the board’s decisions and hold its members accountable for their negligence
and misconduct by means of a derivative suit brought by a majority vote of the minority
shareholders.

Part IV. Evaluation of the Statutory Protection of Minority Shareholders
This Part bisects into two sections. The first section sheds light upon the role of formalism
throughout the Law to establish a primary source of the statutory protection for minority
shareholders. My analysis’s goal is to accentuate the positive of the Saudi approach in addressing
minority shareholder’s issues in close corporations by form, rather than substance. The second
section voices some concern surrounding the statutory protection of minority shareholders as it
emboldens them to oppress majority shareholders or frustrate corporate management.
A. The Formalities of the Law
Having investigated a variety of prescriptive rules of the Law consisting the statutory
protection for the minority shareholders, it is evident that the Law, similar to most corporate laws,
abounds with formalism.669 Unlike other areas of the law where substance prevails, corporate laws
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See supra Chapter 3. Part III. G.
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Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 427–37 (2006)
(arguing that corporate laws are characterized by a high level of formalism).
669

172

have always preferred form and process. While formalism may involve different meanings,670 the
term hereunder donates the regulatory apparatus utilized throughout the Law to assert the
shareholder supremacy, regard the shareholder rights, and protect the interests of the minority
shareholders.
In principle, comparatively reading of the Law leads to the argument that formalism in the Law
tends to favor the shareholder over the management, in a rare exception to the general premise.671
While the Law defines the roles of both shareholders and directors, it entitles the shareholders to
an array of powers to decide not only the shareholder affairs but also the management affairs. 672
An outstanding example, as seen above, is the requirement of the shareholder approval in different
instances (e.g., the board’s remunerations and issuance of shares).673 The exceptional expansion
of the shareholder intervention in corporate matters by the Law signifies the inclination of the
formalism toward shareholders. Another example of the formalism⎯that provides great deference
to the fundamental rights of the shareholder⎯is the statutory inviolability for some of the
shareholder’s rights (e.g., election right, voting right, liquidity right, and the right to receive
dividends).674 Most of these rights, if not all, are surrounded by procedural details to ensure the
shareholder’s exercise of his statutory rights.
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A positive view of the formalism is the reduction of the costs associated with bargaining for
these rights along with the costs of coordination of information. A framework that ensures
systematic inflow of information into the shareholders with a group of rights to act on such
information is a reliable tool rest in the shareholders’ hands. As a matter of policy, nevertheless, it
may be argued that it is unwise to vest a great deal of power in the shareholder organ in lieu of the
management, such an argument defends the standpoint of directors, and therefore falls beyond the
scope of the research subject.
B. The Controlling Minority Shareholder
Notwithstanding the foregoing concerns and loopholes raised about some rules of the statutory
approach, as a defender of the minority shareholder’s protection on the one hand, and a critic of
the Law on the other, I extrapolate that the Law might have led to an unsolicited consequence that
makes the minority shareholders controlling ones in the corporation. Note that the controlling
minority shareholder status in this research’s context does not betoken the status resulting from
prior arrangements (e.g., pyramids and dual-class shares),675 but rather it means the excessive
power the minority shareholder may wield as a side effect of some of the regulatory rules that are
intended to protect the minority shareholders against opportunism and oppression. However, they
may be utilized in bad faith to frustrate the corporate management or annoy the majority
shareholders, particularly at times of shareholder tensions and clashes.
In a handful of instances, I visualize, the minority shareholders are emboldened to take
advantage of and abuse the legal apparatus for vicious purposes. For example, the Law precludes
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the shareholders on the board to cast their vote on the approval of a suspicious, related-party
transaction. Legally speaking, the voting minority shareholders may refuse to approve of the
transaction, albeit its fairness to the corporation, for arbitrary reasons or no reason at all. Another
example is the decision of capital increase. Because the Law requires an exceptional resolutionpassing vote (i.e., three-quarter of attending shares in the extraordinary assembly), one may
imagine a situation where the minority shareholders indiscriminately vote against the resolution,
despite the fact that an increase is sought to embark upon a sound investment.
In both examples, the minority shareholders exercise their legal rights, which means that no
one may challenge or stop them, irrespective to the concealed or conspicuous drives behind their
manners, and to whether they are voting rationally or irrationally. The Law does not provide a
judicial ground for other shareholders (i.e., majority shareholders) or the corporation’s
management to challenge the abusive or oppressive exercise of rights, which may leave the
controlling shareholders with no choice but to wheedle votes out of these minority shareholders
every time their votes matter. Otherwise, the resolution will never be passed, regardless.
An effective option to rectify the controlling-minority-shareholder dilemma, I propose, is to
establish a judicial ground in the Law to keep the minority shareholder’s exercising his rights in
check on the one hand, and to provide the affected shareholders with an option to sue these the
minority shareholders on the ground of abusing their rights. This may be done by inserting into
the Law a fairness standard that may be adjudicated in a court of law or conditioning the
shareholders to exercise their statutory rights with good faith and fair dealing. The fairness
standard or good faith and fair dealing is a term that paves the way for the judiciary to intervene
ex post and adjudge whether the disputed exercise of the right is oppressive, case by case.
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Closing Analysis
The use of the prescriptive rules⎯in lieu of default rules⎯ to arrange a crowd of shareholder
affairs widens the role of the shareholder in corporate governance. The stipulation of a host of
statutory rights replaces the traditional “passive shareholder” with a more “functional shareholder”
the Law (through its rules) invites to take an effective role in overseeing the corporation and
deciding on its shareholder matters.676 From the minority shareholder’s viewpoint, the
functionality of shareholder, which is expected in close corporations,677 also is espoused by virtue
of statutory rules that may not be contracted out. Therefore, the merits of this approach should
account into statutory protection that mitigates, if not eliminates, the minority shareholder issues
as extrapolated above. 678
In the popular imagination, this Saudi approach⎯to asserting the shareholder supremacy and
the minority shareholder protection⎯ is not immune from criticism. The proponents of the
director-centric corporations raise several objections against the empowerment of shareholders.679
Although some of their arguments merit attention, they fail to recognize the upsides of the
functional shareholder, which outweighs the benefits realized from the passivity of shareholders,
specifically in the context of close corporations.
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A prevalent objection to the strong shareholder rights⎯as opposed to the current state of
director-centric corporate laws⎯ is the shareholder indifference. 680 Because shareholders
commonly have little interests in the corporation, they appear to be apathetic about corporate
matters. Furthermore, the expenses the shareholder may incur in an exercise of his rights
oftentimes outnumber the benefits he may obtain, 681 so no rational shareholder would care to
exercise his rights or endeavor to effect change. 682 In addition to the counterarguments to these
claims,683 one may add that these arguments would not exist had been there a regulatory framework
that would ensure the flow of information into shareholders and thus make them informed of the
corporate matters without bearing excessive costs. 684 In addition, this argument may fit in the
context of public corporations where there are countless shareholders. In close corporations’
context, one shareholder has a greater chance to affect, given the small number of the shareholders
of the close corporations.685
Another objection lodged to empowering shareholders is that shareholders are inadequate to
make sound business decisions.686 This allegation stems from the notion that directors are superior
to shareholders and more informed than the latter.687 This may be true, yet it should not
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underestimate the power to supervise the corporation and access its books and records in informing
shareholders better. The oversight role coupled with external auditing reports and advice⎯and
sometimes a director at the boardroom⎯ renders the shareholders competent enough to make
business decisions. As a matter of risk-bearing, the shareholders ought to partake in the process of
decision making because they ultimately will bear the risks of these decisions.688
An unavoidable yet significant line of objection is that the Law excessively regulates the
corporate matters that go against the contractual nature of the close corporations. Knowing the fact
that the Saudi market is a developing one, and the fact that social and economic transformations
flow only from laws and regulations, one may find it justifying to utilize this approach for the
higher public welfare. Evidently, laws have profound effects on reshaping individuals’ behaviors
and protect their interests and rights. Without them, the shareholder looks vulnerable and is left
with no option but to depend upon the partial contracts.689 Furthermore, this claim subscribes to
the venerable theory advanced by sociopolitical thinkers, notably Gerald Rosenberg, that refutes
the overrating view of the judicial bench to effect change or spark progress in a society, solo.690
Social change is a process that involves a mountain of political, legal, and social mobilization.
Social reforms that are thought to be produced by courts have been already preceded by a great
deal of change through executive and legislative branches alongside the civil rights movement. 691
If laws have the power to bring about social change, then why would they not effect change in the
business society?
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For further rebuttal of this argument, see Julian Velasco, Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously , 41
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 605, 625–27 (2007).
689
See supra Chapter One, Part III, A & C.
690
For further insights into this debate, see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (Univ. of Chicago Press 2d. ed. 2008).
691
Id. at 35, (“While the conditions suggest that courts can be effective producers of significant
social reform, . . . they also suggest that this occurs only when a great deal of change has already been
made.”)
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All in all, the minority shareholder armed with a host of statutory rights should be powerful
enough to deter the oppressive conduct and assert a voice in the management of the corporation.
As demonstrated above, the shareholder right to cumulatively elect the members of the board
enhances that shareholder’s chance to engage in the management. The shareholder right to sell his
interests freely is another principle establishing a fundamental right for shareholders in close
corporations to exist without the fear of being stuck therein. Plus, the right to request a meeting or
to inspect the corporation and access its books and records confidently avails the minority
shareholders to keep the management’s discretion (i.e., dominant shareholder’s discretion) in
check and to stay informed about corporate operations.
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Chapter Five: Enforcement of the Statutory Protection of Minority
Shareholders
“To know the law is not merely to understand the words, but as well their force and effect.”
Justinian, Digest, Book 1, Title 3, 17

Motivating Hypothetical
Although their business is flourishing, Saad has expressed some frustration and been dissatisfied
with the management of his father and brother because of his constant disagreement over the
preferred direction of the business. He has been removed from the board and replaced by an outside
director, and the corporation has not distributed dividends for the past three years despite its
prosperity. His brother has prevented him from accessing the books and records of the corporation,
and Saad thinks about requesting the court dissolve the corporation, for the book value of his shares
is far less than his pro-rata would the corporation be liquidated. However, Saad is confused about
in which Saudi courts he should file the lawsuit, and he is uncertain about his odds of prevailing
though he is acutely aware that it is of his statutory rights to receive dividends, to access the
corporation’s books and records, and to request a court-ordered dissolution of the corporation.

The Scope of Chapter Five
This chapter scrutinizes the second component of the research theory, the enforcement of the Law
in Saudi Arabia as it is a major player in protecting minority-shareholder interests. Laws and rules
alone do not suffice to protect minority shareholders. Instead, they are to exist interdependently.
For this reason, this chapter expounds the role of the judiciary ex post, as it is the sanctuary for all
disgruntled and oppressed shareholders on the one hand, and the principal enforcer of the law on
the other. To do so, the chapter first provides a foundational stone of the historical development
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of the corporate judiciary in Saudi Arabia. Second, the chapter differentiates between the role of
the judiciary in enforcement into two subsections: public enforcement and private enforcement.
Under each category, the chapter examines the nature of the judicial intervention ex post and
accentuates the protective aspects of these interventions.

Part I. The Development of the Corporate Judiciary in Saudi Arabia
Overview
The Saudi judiciary is a dual judicial system and thus divided into two kinds of courts,692 Sharia
courts (akin to civil courts) and administrative courts, each of which has its judicial hierarchy,
including, subject-specific courts,693 multiple appellate courts, and a supreme court resting at the
top. The term “corporate judiciary” is coined here to embody every competent court that has
jurisdiction to adjudicate corporation-related and shareholder-related disputes. While there are no
corporation-specific courts, throughout the history disputes arising out of the corporations have
been ruled on in specialized tribunals, including the so-called commercial circuits and some quasijudicial committees.694
After the issuance of the Saudi Companies Law of 2015 alongside massive changes dictated
by the Vision 2030,695 the Saudi corporate judiciary underwent a transformational change aiming
at high efficiency and rapidity. Although a comprehensive discussion of the Saudi framework of
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The duality of the Saudi judiciary was copied from the Egyptian system, which was inherited at first
place from France, the origin of dual legal system. See generally Almajid, at 177; and Maren Hanson, The
Influence of French Law on the Legal Development of Saudi Arabia, 2 ARAB L.Q. 272, 291(1987) (
explaining how the French legal system found its way into the Middle East and thus the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia).
693
See Article 9 (3) of the Judicature Law of 2007.
694
An Example of quasi-judicial committees is the Committee for Resolution of Securities’ Disputes,
which adjudicates security-related conflicts and violations, including shares of joint-stock corporation.
For further information, see Bandar O. Alrasheed, Corporate Governance of The Saudi Arabian Publicly
Traded Companies: an Appraisal and Proposals for Improvement, 196–199 (2014).
695
See supra Chapter Two, Part I, A (4).
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the judiciary falls beyond the scope of the research, to understand the development of the Saudi
corporate judiciary and its complexity, a brief show of the history of its development is of
necessity. Therefore, a distinction is made here between the development of corporate judiciary
before 2015 and after 2015.
A. The Corporate Judiciary before 2015
After the promulgation of the first Companies Law in 1965, the Law, similar to previouslyenacted laws,696 faced fierce oppositions from Sharia-court judges and religious jurists at that
time.697 In other words, the courts declined to apply and implement any of these “positive laws”,
for the implementations of these laws would run afoul of Sharia, the opponents alleged.698 One
example of their rejections was the refusal of the limited liability feature of some enterprises,
including the joint-stock corporations and the limited liability companies. 699

696

E.g., The Law of Commercial Court.
This comes as a natural result of the different Islamic schools of thought and how a jurist interprets
Sharia texts. See, e.g., H. S. Shaaban, Commercial Transactions in the Middle East: What Law Governs,
31 LAW & POL’Y INT'L BUS. 157, 172 (1999).
698
E.g., Hossein Esmaeili, On a Slow Boat towards the Rule of Law: The Nature of Law in the Saudi
Arabia Legal System, 26 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 48 (2009) (highlighting the effects of religious
leaders on the progress and reform in the country alongside social factors).
699
Cf. CHIBLI MALLAT , INTRODUCTION TO MIDDLE EASTERN LAW 329 (Oxford Univ. Press
2009) (documenting the refusal of limited liability feature:
697

“Yet neither law nor the business world has fully digested the separation, and some
courts are reluctant to stop at the company’s assets in case of unpaid debt. This
phenomenon is difficult to document in the absence of systematic law reporting,
particularly in the Gulf states, where the size and importance of the companies in the
era of oil is evident. Legal practice, as far as can be ascertained from lawyers and
businessmen, confirms the difficulty, in countries where the persona of the directors
and major shareholders of the companies is paramount, in limiting liability to the
capital and assets of the company, without touching upon the personal property of the
decisive actors in such business ventures.”)
However, see Bandar O. Alrasheed, Corporate Governance of The Saudi Arabian Publicly Traded
Companies: an Appraisal and Proposals for Improvement, 73 (2014) (Unpublished SJD dissertation,
University of Pittsburgh) (on file with the author) (“[R]ecent developments in Islamic jurisprudence
approve compatibility of limited liability with Sharia.”
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The rejection of implementing positive laws (including the Companies Law) resulted in the
creation of another judicial body consisting of several quasi-judicial committees and circuits, to
each of which the judicial power was delegated by law to adjudicate disputes pertaining to positive
laws.700 Therefore, this approach to overcome such a rebuff led to the formation of commercial
circuits within the hierarchy of the administrative judiciary.701 The commercial circuits would
review and rule on disputes pertaining to the Law of Commercial Court and Companies Law.
These disputes included corporation-related lawsuits, shareholder-related conflicts, brokeragerelated claims, commercial transport complaints, bankruptcy cases, and other commerce-related
disputes.
The commercial circuits showed great deference to the Companies Law of 1965. They would
rely on its articles in solving lawsuits and exercise their gap-filling power in the absence of a
written rule according to the common law (principles and rules derived from Sharia). 702

700

Nowadays, there are circa 75 quasi-judicial committees ruling on different sorts of disputes. Each
enjoys judicial jurisdiction that helps it to perform its duties in resolving and ruling on disputes of certain
types. Some of these committees’ power even include the power to impose monetary penalties or
imprison violators.
701
Cf. Ayoub M. Al-Jarbou, Judicial Independence: Case Study of Saudi Arabia, 19 ARAB L.Q. 5, 27
(2004)(“ The Board has been authorized since 1987 to decide most of the commercial disputes which
used to be under the authority of what was the Commercial Dispute Committees. It has been granted this
authority by Royal Decree number m/63 on 26/11/1407AH (1987).”); Abdullah F. Ansary, A Brief
Overview of the Saudi Arabian Legal System, GLOBALEX (2008)
[http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Saudi_Arabia.html] (“Although Article 1 [of the Law of the
Board of Greivance of 1982] states that the Board is an independent administrative judicial board, it has
been authorized to decide cases and disputes to which the administration is not a party. It is authorized to
temporarily adjudicate criminal, and commercial disputes . . .”)
702
See generally George Sayen, Arbitration, Conciliation, and the Islamic Legal Tradition in Saudi
Arabia, 9 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 211, 213 (1987) (“The statutes are intended to supplement rather than
modify the Sharia, and are at least theoretically subordinate to it in cases of conflict.”); Ahmed A. AlGhadyan, The Judiciary in Saudi Arabia, 13 ARAB L.Q. 235, 235 (1998) (“Islamic Sharia is the law
applicable to all judicial matters. It should be applied according to the Hanbali school of jurisprudence.”);
Faisal M. Al-Fadhel, Legislative Drafting and Law-Making Practices and Procedures under Saudi
Arabian Law: A Brief Overview, 1 I.J.L.D.L.R. 95, 98 (2012) (“The primary sources of Sharia are the
Quran [the holy book of Islam] and the Sunnah [a collection of the sayings of Prophet Muhammad and
examples of his behavior] and there exist [sis] a closed number of other secondary sources of Sharia or
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In 2007, a new judicature act was enacted,703 launching a new era for the Saudi judiciary. One
of the prominent aspects of this law was the adoption of subject-matter jurisdiction. It establishes
that Sharia first instances are to be restructured into subject-matter jurisdiction of five courts:
family courts, commercial courts, labor courts, criminal courts, and general courts that hear all
complaints that do not fall within any of the subject-matter jurisdictions.704 This should have ended
the longstanding divorce between the commercial circuits and the Sharia courts. However, the
status of these circuits continued as it had been until 2015. One of the most side effects of this
messy divorce was the confusion about which court would have jurisdiction over a complaint. That
resulted in lengthy trials and countless cases dismissed due to the lack of jurisdiction by both
courts.
B. The Corporate Judiciary after 2015
Enacting the Companies Law of 2015 alongside far-reaching changes brought by the
successive government called for the transformation of the existing commercial circuits into
commercial courts as the Judicature Law stipulates.705 Two years later (September 2017), the
Ministry of Justice inaugurated its commercial lower courts. It was the end of an era of confusion
for the public and of withholding of the Judicature Law.
This turning point in the commercial judiciary is believed to effect changes on various levels.
Having specialized courts for only commercial disputes implies a greater capacity of specialized

methods for adducing appropriate normative behaviour in response to new incidents and unregulated
circumstances.”)
703
This Law was enacted by a royal decree No. M/78, in 2007. It was part of a bigger project aiming at
comprehensive reforming of the judiciary (both Sharia and administrative courts) in Saudi Arabia by the
former king, King Abdullah AlSaud, who allocated nearly 2 billion U.S. dollar for this shake-up project.
704
See Article 9 (3) of the Judicature Law of 2007.
705
See Article 9 (3) of the Judicature Law of 2007.
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judges designated to these disputes, which result in shortening the span of litigations.706 Another
ramification that has been already observed is the periodical publication of the courts’ rulings.
Since the inception of the commercial courts, the rulings have been published on the Ministry’s
website on a monthly basis. 707 Needless to say that such publications make these courts more
predictable and thus reliable,708 which positively contributes to the confidence of litigants,
especially foreign ones. 709

Part II. Public Enforcement
Public enforcement connotes state authorities that are vested with powers to uphold the
Companies Law of 2015 and prosecute the lawbreakers. In the Saudi close corporation’s context,
public enforcers include the Public Prosecution and the Ministry of Commerce and Investment.710
This part explores the role of the corporate judiciary in lawsuits brought by public enforcers, the
Public Prosecution alongside the Ministry of Commerce and Investment. To that end, the
parameters of powers of each authority are of significance to determine within which authority an
illegal activity falls, and what forms of intervention each authority may seek.
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Contra Youseif A. Alzahrani, Rights of Shareholders under Saudi Company Law 1965, 21–22 (2013)
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Brunel University) (on file with the author) (arguing that the judicial
system is still suffering from shortage of judges in courts in comparison with the number of lawsuits filed
each year in Saudi courts).
707
See the Ministry of Justice website at https://www.moj.gov.sa/en/Pages/default.aspx.
708
Note that these rulings do not constitute precedents, but rather they provide common understanding of
how a judge may rule in similar circumstances. See generally David J. Karl, Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia:
What Foreign Attorney's Should Know, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 131, 149–150 (1991) (“[J]ust
because a judge, qadi, issued a particular ruling in the past does not mean that he or any other judge will
rule the same way in the future, even if presented with an identical set of facts.”)
709
E.g., David J. Karl, Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia: What Foreign Attorney's Should Know, 25 GEO.
WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 131, 169 (1991) (there are indications that Saudi Arabia’s legal system may
become increasingly hospitable toward international commerce, and increasingly aligned with Western
doctrines.”).
710
In the context of public corporations, the squad of public enforcers includes (alongside the Public
Prosecution and the Ministry of Commerce and Investment) the Capital Market Authority and the
Committee For Resolution of Securities Disputes.
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A. The Public Prosecution
1. Powers
The Law delegates to the Public Prosecution the power to investigate and press charges against
offenders committing any of the illegal activities itemized in Articles 211 and 212.711 These powers
constitute ex post intervention that may take different forms, including pecuniary interventions
(e.g., fines), non-pecuniary intervention (e.g., incarceration), or both.712 These interventions,
nevertheless, are subject to the judicial review that must find the defendant to be guilty of violating
the Law and thus deserving of the punishment.713
Furthermore, the Law goes above and beyond by allowing the Public Prosecution to prosecute
the corporation itself in case the prosecution of the real offender is unavailable for any reason.714
For example, if the perpetrator perishes, the Public Prosecution may seek imposition of monetary
fines upon the corporation instead.
2. Scope of Powers
The Law restricts the investigative and prosecutorial powers of the Public Prosecution to the
offenses enumerated in Articles 211 and 212. These articles are crafted in a way to be allencompassing, leaving no room for maneuver. Such offenses include providing misleading
information,715 willful omission of material facts, 716 misuse of voting right to the detriment of the

711

Article 215.
Articles 211 & 212.
713
On the other hand, the Ministry of Commerce and Investment may impose monetary penalties for
violations stipulated in Article 213 without a judgment, as explained in the subsequent subsection.
714
Article 217.
715
Article 211 (a)
716
Id.
712
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corporation or gaining personal benefits,717 failure to call for a shareholder meeting (where a duty
to call exists),718 divulgence of corporate secrets,719 and the mishandling of corporate funds. 720
Theoretically, the language of both Articles grants the Public Prosecution broad discretion over
the interpretation of what actions constitute an offense by law. For example, the Law criminalizes
the use of power by directors and officers in a way detrimental to the corporation’s interests, either
by realizing personal benefits or extracting direct or indirect gains from deals the corporation
executes by virtue of that power. 721 This text provides the authority with a great deal of latitude to
make sure that such the offender may not escape justice, while it also acts as a deterrence that the
prejudiced people may favor avoiding a suspicious business activity instead of being criminally
accountable for it.722
3. Penalties
The intervention by the public Prosecution may take different forms, including pecuniary
interventions (e.g., fines), and non-pecuniary interventions (e.g., incarceration). Either of these
forms of intervention, the Public Prosecution is to obtain a judgment finding the defendant guilty
of violating the Law and thus deserving of the punishment. The Law empowers the authority to
seek two kinds of punishment premised on how drastic an illegal activity is. For instance, the Law
enables the Public Prosecution to seek (for acts stipulated in Article 211) imposition of monetary
fines not exceeding 5 million Saudi riyals (1,33 million U.S. dollars), or imprisonment of the
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Article 211 (c)
Article 211 (d)
719
Article 212 (b)
720
Article 211 (b)
721
Article 211 (c)
722
Practically, I was not able to locate a case brought by the Public Prosecution against a close
corporation or a shareholder thereof. In the context of public corporations, nevertheless, the Public
Prosecution regularly brings lawsuits against offenders of the Companies Law or capital-market
regulations based on referral by the Capital Market Authority as the Competent Authority of regulating
and supervising public corporations.
718
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offender not exceeding five years, or both. These acts include the mistreatment of corporate funds,
the manipulation of corporate books and financial statements, and the engagement in self-interest
dealings.723 For less drastic misconduct (Article 212), the Public Prosecution may seek imposition
of fines not exceeding 1 million Saudi riyals (266,666 U.S. dollars) or a maximum of one-year
imprisonment, or both. 724 To add a layer of deterrence, the Law doubles the punishment in both
Articles in case of recidivism. Repeat and persistent offenders committing the exact violation may
be subject to a doubled punishment.725
That being said, the corporate judiciary’s role is of paramount importance as it assesses the
charges and ensures that whatever the form of intervention the authority is seeking is proportional
to the alleged violation or misconduct, subjecting the enforcement by state authority to the judicial
review of its statutory discretion. 726
B. The Ministry of Commerce and Investment 727
1. Powers
The Ministry assumes a leading role in the enforcement of the Law. As the Law assigns an
array of powers to the competent authority of close corporations, these powers can divide the role
of the Ministry into supervisory, regulatory, and disciplinary roles. These roles jointly strengthen

723

Article 211.
In both circumstances, punishment in accordance with the Companies Law does not negate other
punishment in any law. For instance, if a director utilizes his voting power to the detriment of the
corporation as a result of a bribe he receives, that director may be prosecuted for misuse of her voting
power according to Article 211 (c) of the Companies Law, and she may be prosecuted for bribery
according to the Law of Anti-Bribery, if applicable.
725
To recognize an offender as a recidivist, three conditions are to be met. First, the offender commits the
same violation, for which, second, a final judgment is made against her. Third, the second violation
transpires within three years from the date of the sentence. See Article 214.
726
Article 223 stipulates that “[t]he competent judicial authority [commercial courts] shall decide all civil
and penal lawsuits and disputes arising from the implementation of the provisions of the Law, and shall
impose prescribed penalties.”
727
Hereinafter “the Ministry”.
724
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the enforcement of Law by the non-judicial authority since most of the actions the Ministry may
take do not involve the review of the judiciary or its approval, making the Ministry a more
responsive enforcer to the needs of the corporations (and shareholders) and the to the violations of
the Law.728
2. Scope of Powers
According to the Law, the Ministry assumes various tasks. First, it is incumbent upon the
Ministry to watch and superintend the operating business enterprises⎯including the close
corporations. To that end, the Ministry enjoys the right to inspect the corporations, review their
books, and request their records (supervisory role). 729 This includes the chairperson’s duties to
notify the Ministry about any changes or updates in the corporation’s constitutional documents
(e.g., change in the bylaws or shareholders), and to submit the financial statements and the
resolutions decided by the shareholder assembly. 730 The role goes farther to permit the Ministry to
deputize some of its personnel to inspect the corporation and its accounts alongside attending its
shareholder assembly, if necessary. 731 On the other hand, the officers and directors of the
corporation are to allow the Ministry’s officials to access the corporation’s books and records and
provide them with all documents they demand.732 This role lets the Ministry ensure the conformity
of the corporations with all applicable laws and regulations by keeping an eye on them.
Second, the Law empowers the Ministry to take whatever deemed necessary for the
implementation of and compliance with the Law (regulatory role). 733 Examples of the Ministry’s
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Infra Chapter 5, Part II, B (3).
Article 220.
730
Supra Chapter Three, Part III, E.
731
Article 220.
732
Article 221.
733
Article 225 (2).
729
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exercising this power include the regulation of online voting,734 and the issuance of the guiding
templates and forms for the incorporation of each enterprise.735 In an evaluation of this role,
nevertheless, it may seem to be a double-edged weapon. It is true that such a role allows the
Ministry to respond more effectively to rapid changes, while it may adversely affect the stability
and predictability of the market, and it becomes a source of demagnetizing the market and turns
off foreign investors.
As the Ministry polices the corporate arena in Saudi Arabia, it also enjoys the power to
penalizes wrongdoers within its jurisdiction (disciplinary role). Article 213 stipulates various
violations that fall within the Ministry’s jurisdiction. Such violations include depriving the
shareholder of the right to attend shareholder assembly and vote, 736 distributing dividends in
violation with the corporation’s constitutional documents or shareholder-assembly resolutions, 737
obtaining a loan from the corporation in violation of the Law, 738 obtaining benefits to vote in a
certain way,739 and blocking a shareholder from accessing the books and the records of the
corporation.740
3. Penalties
The statutory jurisdiction of the Ministry to penalize wrongdoers brings a further dimension to
the discussion of protecting the minority shareholders. Unlike penalties imposed by the Public
Prosecution (where the judiciary has to approve these penalties),741 the Law allows the Ministry to
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Supra Chapter Three, Part II, A, 1(d).
Supra Chapter Two, Part I, B (4).
736
Article 213 (f).
737
Article 213 (a).
738
Supra Chapter Three, Part III, E.
739
Article 213 (g).
740
Article (j).
741
Supra Chapter Five, Part II, A (3).
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impose monetary fines on lawbreakers without the need to a court judgment.742 As soon as the
Ministry comes across an offense stipulated in Article 213, or is notified about it by other
shareholders, the Ministry may impose a fine⎯up to 500,000 Saudi riyals ($133,333).743 As a
matter of justice, the Law allows fined individuals to appeal before the commercial court.744
The nature of the violations prescribed in Article 213 underscores the importance of this role
in protecting the minority shareholders. Most of these violations constitute oppressive conduct and
opportunistic behaviors committed by dominant shareholders that need immediate attention in
order for the harmed party to exercise their statutory rights. Therefore, asserting this role to the
Ministry to intervene and immediately penalize wrongdoers ensures the protection for the minority
shareholders the Law promotes. It allows the oppressed shareholders to seek an immediate
intervention by the Ministry to retrieve their statutory rights, without bearing the cost of lengthy
lawsuits.745
C. Overall Assessment
Given the crisp description above, it is critical to point out to a number of conclusions
stemming from a comparative view of both laws. First of all, the Law comes to reset the corporate
arena in terms of the authorities in charge of regulating its actors. The ambiguity of authorities no
longer exists, but rather it is replaced with a comprehensive framework that specifies every
enforcer, and the powers to which each enforcer is entitled. The claim is that the introduction of
the Public Prosecution as a competent authority of violations the Law comes to criminalize⎯for
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Article 216.
Article 213. In case of recidivism, see supra note 725.
744
Article 216.
745
Whether the disciplinary role of the Ministry is effective on the ground is an interesting yet empirical
question. Given the newness of the Law and the absence of published data about such fines, it is unlikely
to reach reflective assessment of the Law in this regard. Nevertheless, the employment of logic and
imagination suggests that knowing the Ministry’s power of immediate disciplining should suffice to act as
a deterrence to would-be wrongdoers unless otherwise proven.
743
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the first time746⎯ and the roles of the Ministry craft an institutionalized environment where the
shareholder’s rights matter. Moreover, the enlargement of the Ministry’s role is of paramount
importance as it oversees the corporate actors in on hand and punishes the violating ones on the
other. These inspective and disciplinary powers granted to a responsive institution ensure the
growth of a rights-respectful business environment.
Most importantly, the judicial jurisdiction over the prosecutorial and ministerial authorities is
an integral part of a well-institutionalized market where the courts keep other institutions in check.
The nature of the court’s intervention aims at the fairness of the machinery of public enforcement.
The accused lawbreakers and fined violators have the right to make their cases and defend
themselves before an impartial institution that guarantees the just exercise of power by the
governmental and prosecutorial institutions.747 The judiciary has to decide whether the accused is
criminal (in case of the cases brought by the Public Prosecution) or to hear the appeal of a fined
person (in case of the pecuniary penalties imposed by the Ministry).
Finally, the absence of data and the recency of the Law make it difficult to gauge the efficacy
of public enforcement and the protection with which it may provide the minority shareholders.
Nevertheless, the existing structure of the public enforcement should theoretically reinforce “legal
mobilization”748 enabling the affected shareholders to have faith in the competency of these
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Although no lawsuit has been spotted in regard with close corporations, the Public Prosecution⎯in
cooperation with the Public Market Authority⎯ has an indispensable role in regard with publiccorporation-related crimes. Evidently, the Public Market Authority’s website includes a range of criminal
cases brought by the Public Prosecution and adjudicated by the Committee for the Resolution of
Securities Disputes.
747
Accord Ayoub M. Al-Jarbou, Judicial Independence: Case Study of Saudi Arabia, 19 ARAB L.Q. 5, 6
(2004) (claiming that in sheltering the rule of law, “judges become powerful players in maintaining the
submission of the government to the law: they prevent potentially arbitrary acts of the government and its
instrumentalities”).
748
Notwithstanding the difference between subject matters, the term legal mobilization is used by Charles
Epp to refer to all resources available for individuals to realize the effects a bill of rights brings about.
Such resources include governmental financing, rights-advocacy organizations, and the access to lawyers
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institutions to redress violations of the Law, and thus seek their interventions to rectify oppression
and retrieve their statutory rights. Reliable courts alongside well-established institutions (i.e., the
Public Prosecution and the Ministry of Commerce and Investment) with well-fashioned roles
ought to mobilize support for the protection of minority shareholders.

Part III. Private Enforcement
Private enforcement refers to litigations triggered by an individual shareholder. Under certain
circumstances, violations of the Law do not cause harm to the corporation (and thus shareholders
as a whole), but rather they harm a particular shareholder, who then seeks the judicial intervention
to retrieve a statutory right, to rectify harm or oppression, to be remedied or both. That being said,
this Part excludes the private enforcement of the Law brought on the corporation’s behalf by means
of derivative actions;749 instead, it focuses on the direct action as a corrective instrument that
responds to the close corporation’s issues.750 This Part investigates the status quo of the direct
action, and it scrutinizes what remedies the shareholder may demand under this action. Finally, it
casts the light on the stance of the Saudi judiciary in regard to other remedies and actions the Law
does not stipulate, and on the availability of these remedies.
A. Direct Action
1. The Nature of Shareholder Direct Action
The close corporation’s issues are frequently associated with direct personal harm to certain
shareholders (i.e., minority shareholders). Therefore, the shareholder may bring a direct action

and the structure of legal profession. For in-depth look into this argument, see Charles R. Epp, Do Bills of
Rights Matter? The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 90(4) AM. POT. SCT. REV. 765, 765
(1996).
749
See supra Chapter 4, Part III, F.
750
Supra Chapter 1, Part II.
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against the corporation, its directors, officers, or a dominant shareholder to redress the harm.751
However, it is paramount to differentiate between two causes for personal harm. First, the
shareholder may incur harm as a result of the corporation’s violating the Law or obstructing his
statutory right. Second, the shareholder may be affected as a result of a legitimate corporate action
(e.g., refusal to pay dividends); the recognition of the latter harm may be traced to the judicial
understanding of the special nature of the close corporation and its inherent problems, as it is the
case in several U.S. states.
In Saudi Arabia, however, the Saudi courts have not yet considered the special characteristics
of the close corporations, which meshes with the legislative approach that also does not distinguish
between close and public corporations. Nonetheless, this may not negate the existence of direct
action on such harm. In fact, one of the judicially-implemented maxim rooted in Sharia (common
law) is that Al Darār Yuzal (injury must be removed).752 While there is no ruling about the issues
at hand, one may imagine the shareholder bringing a direct action predicated upon this tort doctrine
as it is a core maxim upon which rulings in different subject matters have been established.
That being said and given the Islamic theme of the country, this maxim should be the
underpinnings for the statutory cause of action for shareholders in close corporations. The failure
to recognize such an action raises grave concern about the shareholder’s standing to fight against
oppressive, opportunistic yet legitimate conduct. Such failure stems from the absence of both
statutory and judicial division between close and public corporations. 753 A discontented

Accord Wade H. III Watson; J. Bertram Levy, The Development of the Shareholder’s Direct Action
Damage Remedy, 28 GA. ST. B. J. 195, 195–96 (1992) (tracing the origin of the shareholder’s direct action
to the unique nature of close corporations).
752
Al Darar means harm, while Yuzal means removed. It is of the comprehensive Islamic maxims. See
generally Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Legal Maxims and Other Genres of Literature in Islamic
Jurisprudence, 20 ARAB L.Q. 77, 85–87 (2006) (elaborating on the concept of Darar (harm) in Islam and
what other maxims raising out of this concept).
751

753
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shareholder of the public corporation has the right to exit the corporation at any time for fair value,
while a frustrated shareholder in the close corporation (like Saad) finds it difficult to liquidate his
interests without the minority discount. Therefore, the statutory cause of action for the shareholders
in close corporations should be an indispensable aspect of every statutory corporate governance
for non-listed corporations.
2. Infringement of the Law as Cause of Action
Returning to the motivating hypothetical, Saad has been, inter alia, deprived of a fundamental
right enshrined in the Law, the right to access the corporation’s books and records. As demystified
in the preceding chapter, the Law entitles the shareholders to a number of sacred rights to ensure
that the shareholders play their roles without the burden to contract for these rights.754 If these
rights are violated, it is incumbent upon the corporate judiciary to remedy the complaining
shareholder.
Furthermore, the judicial remedy may vary based on the nature of the violation, so the courts
have wide discretion to select what remedy is best to apply as a matter of fact. In Saad’s situation,
for instance, the commercial court may order the corporation to allow the complaining shareholder
to access its books and records. It may go farther to nullify the corporate decision if the
complaining shareholder establishes that the corporation’s denying him access led to a
misinformed vote.755 Evidently, the corporate judiciary has always shown willingness to uphold
the statutory shareholder rights earnestly.756
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See supra Chapter 4, Part II.
Article 110 establishes, inter alia, the shareholder’s right to request nullification of violating corporate
decisions.
756
E.g., Case No. 597/ 2/ Q [ق/٢/٥٩٧], Jeddah Commercial Court, Second Circuit (H 1438 [corresponding
to 2017]). [on file with the author].
755
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Similar to the right to access the corporate books and records, the corporate judiciary may order
the corporation to enable shareholders to exercise other statuary rights, such the right to attend and
vote in shareholder meetings. 757 The obstruction of these rights permits the corporate judiciary not
only to invalidate whatever decisions resulted from those meetings but also to penalize the
obstructing individual. All in all, the shareholder’s action to request the judicial enforcement of
the statutory rights when infringed ensures the implementation of the shareholder’s roles according
to the Law on the one hand and fosters the business environment abiding by laws and regulations
on the other.
3. Oppression as Cause of Action
The oppression concept as defined by several U.S. states is absent from the Saudi corporate
laws. As explained earlier, the oppression is oftentimes a result of either a squeeze-out action
forcing the minority shareholders to exit the corporation for unfair value or a freeze-out technique
employed to deprive the minority shareholders of returns (salaries or dividends) on their
investments (as in the case of Saad). The enfeebled shareholders seek out equitable reliefs for the
oppressive conduct. Nevertheless, in the absence of the statutory and judicial definition for
oppression, there is much ambiguity in terms of when legitimate actions taken by the controlling
shareholders would constitute a form of oppression in Saudi courts. In the hypothetical, Saad is
deprived of all financial returns on his investments. Whether such denial is by the book, the nature
of the close corporation involves the judicial lens to look holistically at such issues in their context.
Notwithstanding the dire need for the statutory recognition of the special nature of the close
corporations, the corporate judiciary should develop the concept of the oppression as a judiciallycreated doctrine to protect the minority shareholders. One solid foundation upon which this
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See supra Chapter 4, Part II, 1 & 2.
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doctrine should be tailored is the theory of right abuse alongside the corresponding Islamic maxim
of Al Darār Yuzal (harm must be removed).758
Another robust basis for oppression as a cause of action is the statutory principle of shareholder
equality. The appropriation of corporate profits by some shareholders in the form of salaries and
rewards runs afoul of the fundamental equality doctrine the Law underscores in multiple stances.759
Furthermore, the equality premise finds its strength in the fact that it is a peremptory law that may
not be contracted out or derogated by any means of agreement. Therefore, it is true that the majority
rules the corporation, yet such control has to be consistent with the equality and fairness principles
among shareholders. 760 Otherwise, biased decisions favoring a group of shareholders over others
will be challenged in a court of law and violating officers may face harsh penalties. 761
B. Judicial Remedies
Asserting the shareholder’s right to bring a direct or derivative action against the corporation
or its management is a significant step to effectuate the judicial intervention ex post, to remedy
injured shareholders, and upholding the Law. In Saudi Arabia, the judicial intervention in
oppression-related claims may be in the form of invalidation of the corporate resolution that results
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For further information on the theory of right abuse, see Michael Byers, Abuse of Rights: An Old
Principle, A New Age, 47 MCGILL L.J. 389, 434 (2002); Joseph M. Perillo, Abuse of Rights: A Pervasive
Legal Concept, 27 PAC. L. J. 37, 98 (1995).
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See, e.g., article 110 asserts the equality of rights and obligations rendered by shares. Article 111
requires that⎯in case of the redemption of share⎯ redemption be made by drawing or another way that
guarantees fairness among all shareholders.
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It is important to note that there are two sorts of equality, equality of shares and equality of
shareholders. What the Law mandates is the equality of shares, which can been accentuated by one-shareone-vote rule. This principle of equality differs from the equal treatment of shareholders. which would be,
if applied, inconsistent with principles and view of western economy of corporations (e.g., majority
rules). See Nicola De Luca, Unequal Treatment and Shareholders’ Welfare Growth: Fairness v. Precise
Equality, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 853, 894–895 (2009).
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Contra Nicola De Luca, Unequal Treatment and Shareholders’ Welfare Growth: Fairness v. Precise
Equality, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 853, 919–920 (2009) (advocating for the permission of unequal treatment
so long as it accomplishes economic results and claiming that “strong equal treatment rule does not avoid
all oppression of minorities).
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in oppressive conduct, court-ordered payment of dividends, or⎯in rare circumstances⎯ the
dissolution of the corporation. That being said, a court-ordered buy-out remedy, which is prevalent
in some jurisdictions, is unavailable in Saudi courts due to its incompatibility with Sharia. In
principle, the shareholder may not be forced to sell her shares or obligated to purchase another’s
shares.762
1. Judicial Dissolution
Unlike voluntary dissolution by a vote of shareholders, the Law grant courts the power to
liquidate and dissolve the corporation against the will of its shareholders or management
(compulsory liquidation).763 Since this remedy involves the death of the corporate legal person,
commercial judges have held the request of the judicial dissolution to stringent standards. These
standards include the prosperity of the corporation, the size of shareholding under oppression, 764
and the availability of other remedies to the oppressed shareholders. These standards have been
utilized by the courts worldwide to mitigate not only the economic but also the noneconomic losses
and to balance the shareholders’ reasonable expectations.765
Returning to the hypothetical discussed above in which Saad (oppressed minority shareholder)
thinks about requesting judicial dissolution, the commercial judge would be likely to dismiss
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The rationale behind the nullification of mandatory buyouts is that at least one party to the transaction
is bound to the deal by force and not by his free will, which makes the transaction lack the fundamental
condition of voluntary affirmation and acceptance.
763
Article 205 (2).
764
Unlike other jurisdictions (i.e., Nevada, Ohio and Connecticut), the Saudi Law does not impose a
percentage as a prerequisite to initiate a judicial dissolution, which, I believe, offers greater protection for
minority shareholders regardless of how many shares a complaining shareholder has. Cf. Harry J.
Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of Involuntary Dissolution Suits as a Remedy for Close Corporation
Dissension, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 25, 40 (1987).
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Steven C. Bahls, Resolving Shareholder Dissension: Selection of the Appropriate Equitable Remedy,
15 J. CORP. L. 285, 287 (1990) (likening dissension in close corporations to dissension in a marriage as in
both situations “complex emotional and financial relationships exist that courts cannot easily dissolve
without losses.”)
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Saad’s request for the judicial dissolution, given the corporation’s prosperity and profitability, or
at least would not find the judicial dissolution to be the most appropriate, equitable remedy. The
prosperity and profitability factors influence the availability to grant the shareholder’s request to
dissolve the lucrative business. However, assuming that Saad and his brother acted as a group, the
judicial dissolution may be justified on the grounds of deadlock, at least in theory. 766
All in all, even though the judicial dissolution is a statutory remedy that is available to the
dissenting shareholders, the courts have absolute discretion whether to grant such a relief. Except
in rare circumstances (i.e., deadlocks), courts may find compulsory dissolutions inequitable, and
thus grants another, yet less aggressive remedy.
2. Invalidation of Corporate Actions
Another statutory relief the Law empowers the judiciary to grant is to invalidate the corporate
action or resolution the court determines to be against the Law. In several stances of the Law, the
Saudi legislature gives the power to the judicial authority to invalidate corporate actions, whether
in the form of a contract, resolution, or provision. For example, Article 99 stipulates the
shareholder’s right to request the invalidation of an assembly resolution running afoul of the
corporation’s constitutional documents. 767 Another example is that if the board member fails to
comply with the disclosure requirements concerning a related-party transaction, the Law allows
the corporation or any stakeholder to petition the court to invalidate the suspicious contract.
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Harry J. Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of Involuntary Dissolution Suits as a Remedy for Close
Corporation Dissension, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 25, 34 (1987) (supporting the judicial dissolution of
successful corporation on the grounds of deadlock instead of limiting this remedy to only corporations on
the brink of insolvency).
767
As a matter of statute of limitation, the Law dismisses invalidation requests after the lapse of one year
from the issuance of the resolution. See Article 99.
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3. Court-Ordered Payment of Dividends
Another alternative remedy the court may order⎯instead of dissolving the corporation⎯is to
order the corporation to pay dividends.768 As explained earlier, one issue minority shareholders in
close corporations confront is that the dominant shareholders secure returns on their investments
in the corporation in forms of salaries and rewards and thus withhold the distribution of dividends,
leaving the minority with no returns on their capital investments at all. Nevertheless, this remedy
is not stipulated in the Law, but rather it is a judicially-created relief. The plaintiff (the minority
shareholder) has to show that although the corporation gains profits, the management (i.e., the
dominant shareholder) declines to distribute dividends, as in the motivating hypothetical.
The premise of this remedy can be traced to the central component of the statutory definition
of the corporation, the sharing of profits and losses. If the corporation is making profits,
yet⎯without proper justification⎯it denies some of its shareholders returns of their capital
investments, the judge has the power to intervene to remedy the deprived shareholders. One
drawback of this remedy, however, is that it is contingent upon how the judge construes and apply
the Law and whether he is willing to make such an order. Given the fact that the Saudi judiciary
is not precedent-oriented, the uncertainty to prevails in these claims may make shareholders
reluctant to initiate them in the first place. In addition, the absence of this relief in the Law raises
concern about its availability, whereas the concern should be whether the circumstances justify
such a relief, as in the judicial dissolution.
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In search for answers, I had an informal meeting with a senior judge at the Dammam Commercial
Court, where I asked him several questions about the court’s roles in some corporate instances, one of
which was withholding dividends. He answered me confidently that in such cases the judge might order
the corporation to distribute dividends despite the fact that such a power was not stipulated in the Law.
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C. Overall Assessment
Thus far, the judicial role in the private enforcement cases may not be as well-defined and
predictable as it should be. As per the Law, the court has undisputable powers to adjudicate cases
where the subject is an infringement of the law that has caused harm to the plaintiff (i.e., the
minority shareholder). It also asserts the court’s power to remedy the complaining shareholders
with the invalidation of corporate resolutions and actions or⎯in some harsh instances⎯ with the
dissolution of the corporation. In the absence of the statutory definition of oppression, however, it
remains questionable whether a by-the-book action could be challenged in a court of law. Such
recognition may only come from the statutory distinction between the public corporations (which
the Law mainly focuses on regulating) and the close corporations. In addition, the Law fails to
recognize other equitable remedies in cases of dissensions and clashes among shareholders, or at
least to give the power to the judiciary to fashion equitable remedies on a case-by-case basis, which
produces judicial uncertainty about how to resolve such issues. With no evidence to support the
court-ordered payments, for example, there is no statutory or judicial ground upon which the
shareholder may confidently bring a lawsuit against a legitimate corporate action.

Conclusion
In reviewing the judicial role in the public and private enforcement, one may conclude that as
the commercial judiciary develops, the legislative body seems to overlook the supplementary and
gap filling role the judicial body could play. The judicial branch should have statutory leeway to
assess whether the shareholder has committed oppressive conduct and thus determine what
remedy is equitable. The ambiguity of the judicial role regarding some corporate affairs generates
unpredictability and uncertainty that adversely impact the corporate arena in the region. Prior to
2015, the chaos of the judiciary might have been understandable as the judicial jurisdiction was
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disputed. Nevertheless, with the establishment of the commercial courts after 2015 and the
appointment of specialized judges, the Law should broaden and entrust the judiciary with more
powers to review and determine other disputed corporate affairs (e.g., director’s compensation)
instead of being limited to what the current Law asserts for it.
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Concluding Chapter
“The close corporation, long the orphan of corporate law.”769

Part One: Summary
This research analyzed and examined the corporate governance structure offered by the Saudi
Companies Law of 2015 as a device to protect the interests of the minority shareholders in close
corporations. It began with an exploratory dive into the terminology of close corporations and
minority shareholders, and it highlighted the most pervasive issues associated with this group of
shareholders in this form of enterprises. Despite the tradability feature of shares, shares in close
corporations lack access to a secondary market, which makes it difficult for shareholders to exit
the corporation for fair value. Due to the small number of shareholders and the interpersonal
relationships among them, furthermore, the shareholders often have the expectation that they
would run the business and participate in its management, obviating the principle of majority rule.
Therefore, once this expectation of the minority shareholder is frustrated, clashes and tensions
among shareholders will arise, crippling the business and destroying the social and familial bonds.
Another commonplace issue is the majority shareholder opportunism and oppression, which, as
explained earlier, may be in the form of freeze-out or squeeze-out conduct. Three strategies have
been implemented to overcome these issues and protect the minority shareholders from any
oppressive or opportunistic conduct, either statutorily, judicially, or contractually.
Chapter two offered a general overview of the legal framework for corporations in the country
and the structure of its ownership as it has played a vital role in shaping the current Law and
favoring the shareholder-oriented corporate law. It is crucial to understand the backstage story of
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Abram Chayes, Madame Wagner and the Close Corporation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1960).
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the corporation to evaluate the core subject of the research better and assess the circumstances that
contributed to the contemporary form of corporate law and corporation.
Chapter three provided an in-depth analysis of the regulatory frame for close corporations,
including its incorporation, management, and supervision. It comprehensively scrutinized the roles
of the board directors and the shareholders under the Law, and it highlighted some criticism of
some rules and possible ripple effects they would generate when they were applied. This chapter
showcased the excessive use of mandatory rules to regulate the corporate affairs as a unique aspect
of the Companies Law of 2015, which was the main reason why this research focused on the
statutory protection of minority shareholders as a strategy to overcome the close corporations’
issues.
Chapter four showcased how the implementation of several rules of the Law address some
issues of the minority shareholders in close corporations. It started with a thorough explanation of
the rights the Law asserts for the shareholders, and how certain statutory rights constitute a potent
arsenal for the minority shareholders against the shareholder opportunism. Other rules of the Law
come to protect the shareholder’s expectations as these rules activate the shareholder’s role in the
management through the right to elect directors and the mandatory use of the cumulative voting
system. Another statutory solution to the dilution of shareholder’s interests is the strict quorum
requirement for a share issuance by the Law along with the assertation of the preemptive rights for
shareholders. To mitigate the side effects of the reality of share unmarketability, the research
underscored several rules of the Law regulating the share transferability and ensuring that shares
of joint-stock corporations are eventually tradeable even if they are subject to permissible
restrictions. Also, other rules of the Law constitute protection for the minority shareholders as they
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strictly regulate related-party transactions and corporate repurchases in the fight against the
shareholder opportunism and reinforcement for corporate integrity and fairness.
As part of the argument with which the research began, chapter five analyzed the enforcement
component of the Law and examined its efficiency to uphold the Law in one hand and penalize
those who violate it on the other. It bisected the enforcement element into public and private, and
it explained in length the authorities in charge of each sort of enforcement. Moreover, as part of
the enforcement, the research shed light on the judicial role in implementing the Law and on the
statutory remedies it has.

Part Two: Results and Recommendations
After a thorough investigation and analysis of the minority shareholders status under the
Companies Law of 2015, the research concludes with several results and recommendations. It is
wished that this study contributes to the ongoing debate over the protection for the minority
shareholders in close corporations and propose⎯as one of the research questions⎯a host of legal
measures to bring about the necessary improvements for the existing laws and regulations.
First of all, the minority shareholders of close corporations are susceptible to several risks
caused by the exceptional nature of the close corporation. Unless the minority shareholders bargain
for their protection, they are vulnerable to shareholder oppression and opportunism. The reality
deficits, therefore, necessitate the establishment of a protective system of the minority
shareholders’ interests. The source of this protection may vary from laws and regulations or
judicial rulings or a combination of both. It mainly depends on the sophistication of the legal
system and the institutions of the country. As for Saudi Arabia, such protection is best to be derived
from the statutory laws given the legal structure and the limited role of the judiciary to establish
such protection in the status quo.

205

Nevertheless, one disappointing finding is that despite the satisfactory level of protection for
the minority shareholders in joint-stock corporations (public and close), the Saudi legislators have
yet to realize the close corporations as separate entities⎯with their issues and ways of governing⎯
from public ones. The Ministry of the Commerce and Investment (by its regulatory role) issued
some regulatory and procedural rules for the unlisted corporations, yet these rules hardly cover the
issues of the minority shareholders. Instead, they provide instructive and implementing steps on
how to apply the rules of the Law, which, similar to its predecessor, has ignored recognizing the
close status for joint-stock corporations. The absence of the close corporations in the Law reflects
the gap in the Saudi legal scholarships that fail to distinguish between the public and private
corporations. During 2015 and 2016, four out of six GCC countries⎯namely Saudi Arabia, the
United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Kuwait⎯ updated their corporate legislations by introducing
new corporate laws. Three of which (the Emirati, Qatari and Kuwaiti corporate laws) have treated
the close corporation as a different entity that requires special rules, making the Saudi Companies
Law the only in the region that has no mention of the close corporation. Thus, a supplementary
regulation or some reforms to the current laws are of the dire need to recognize the close
corporations as entities that, despite their similarities with public corporations, have distinct
features (e.g., lack of marketability, small number of shareholders, and stable shareholdings)
requiring a regulatory framework different from the existing one.
That being said, the Law falls short of regulating some close corporations’ affairs. Such affairs
include the shareholder deadlock and squeeze-out regulations. The Law provides no mechanism
to resolve the shareholder deadlocks, which commonly occurs in a two-shareholder corporation.
If the shareholders fail to resolve the deadlock contractually, it is incumbent upon the law to
propound some mechanisms that would protect profitable businesses from dilapidating.
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Furthermore, unlike other corporate laws, the Saudi Companies Law of 2015 has no right or rule
by which the 90% shareholder would exclude the minority shareholders from the corporation. That
contributes to the problem of the minority shareholder control and opportunism, as discussed
below.
Moreover, the research found that the Law promotes an effective reporting system coupled
with statutory rights for shareholders to stay informed and make informed decisions. Through case
laws, the right to access corporate information and inspect the corporation’s books and records has
always been honored and upheld. As a director of the corporation, the Law specifies directorial
duties to report to shareholders as a separate organ about corporate activities and potential selfdealing, which makes directors an indispensable player in the statutory protection of minority
shareholders’ interests.
As a matter of conceptual view, the research found that the use of prescriptive and mandatory
rules in regulating the internal affairs of the corporation may result in opportunistic and abusive
behaviors by minority shareholders. There are scenarios where theoretically majority shareholders
rely on the cooperation of minority shareholders. For share issuance, the Law requires, for
instance, the approval of at least 75% of the shares in a special shareholder assembly attended by
at least two-thirds of the outstanding shares. Unless the dominant shareholder possesses 75% of
the outstanding shares, he has to seek assistance from minority shareholders to issue more shares.
To address this issue, the research suggests that the Law impose a duty on shareholders to prevent
them from abusing their voting rights in harming the general welfare of the corporation or to the
detrimental of the corporation or its dominant shareholder. Another solution is to subject the
unfounded refusal to issue some shareholder resolutions to the judicial scrutiny and statutory
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sanctions. For example, the court may consider their votes as inconsistent with the overall interest
of the corporation.
Moreover, with the legislative absence in reforming and addressing the needs of close
corporations, the study calls for widening the role played by the judiciary in protecting minority
shareholders in Saudi close corporation. Courts should advance to widen their repertoire of
remedies when it comes to tensions and clashes among shareholders in close corporations. In
reviewing the judicial role in the enforcement of the Companies Law, one may conclude that as
the commercial judiciary has been developing, the legislative body seems to overlook the
supplementary and ‘gap filling’ roles the judicial body could play. Ideally, with the establishment
of commercial courts in late 2017 and the appointment of specialized judges, the Saudi legislature
should broaden and entrust the judiciary with more powers to review and determine corporate
disputes (e.g., opportunistic and abusive behaviors by minority shareholders) instead of being
limited to the boundaries of the current CL. Also. It should have statutory leeway to assess whether
a shareholder has committed oppressive conduct and thus determine what remedy is equitable.

Part Four: Concluding Remarks
As Saudi Arabia continues to advance its transformative 2030 Vision and enact laws and
regulations deemed necessary to accomplish its economic and social goals, this study contributes
to the improvement of the current laws and a prescription to fix the regulatory framework of one
of the predominant business vehicles, close corporations. A robust legal system is a crucial element
in any endeavor to boost economic prosperity and captivate foreign direct investments.
Nevertheless, these changes have yet to be implemented in a way that ensures the stability of the
market, gains reliability of its business owners, and reinforces the predictability of its judiciary.
Hence, with more data in the near future, further studies ought to focus on the impacts and
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ramifications of some mandatory rules of the Law (e.g., the regulatory cap on director
compensations) on the corporation’s performance and its management freedom.
This research contributes to the ongoing debates over contractual and legislative approaches
as it provides a case study of a legislative approach to minority shareholder protection. Albeit some
of its shortcomings, it proves that company laws may have a stronger protective role than what
contractarians and advocates of the contractual approach claim. Countries with similar features (
weak institutions and developing judiciary) may find the corporate governance in this research an
effective approach to protecting minority shareholders in close corporations, while importing
corporate governance of advanced economies (the U.S. and the U.K.) require more than laws.
In the end, by analyzing and criticizing the statutory protection for minority shareholders in
Saudi Arabia, this research is a humble contribution to the international debates over minority
shareholders’ protection as well as to the national endeavors to modernize the country and update
its legal system.
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RESEARCH AND TEACHING INTERESTS
•
•
•
•
•

Corporate Law: Corporate Governance, Corporate Finance, and Startup and family Businesses
Mergers and Acquisition
Securities Regulation
Law and Economics
Legal Profession

https://www.linkedin.com/in/abdulrahmanalsaleh

SOCIAL SERVICES AND VOLUNTEERING
•
•
•
•

•
•
•

Language Exchange Partner, Indiana University Bloomington, August 2016–July 2019
Volunteer in the Islamic Center in Bloomington, August 2016–July 2019
Volunteered in the administration and organization of Arab Conference titled “Arab Visionaries:
Claiming Tomorrow” at Harvard Law and Business Schools, November 2017
Volunteered in a number of Student-led associations sponsored by the Saudi Arabian Cultural
Mission in several U.S. institutions, including the University of California Los Angeles,
University of Southern California, and Indiana University Bloomington, October 2012 – April
2019
Mediator, Community Justice and Mediation Center, Bloomington, Indiana, September 2016May 2017
Registered Volunteer in Gouth Team in association with the General Directorate of Civil
Defense, Saudi Arabia, 2009- Present
Language Exchange Partner, University of California Los Angeles, 2012 – 2014

LANGUAGE SKILLS
•
•

Arabic (Native)
English (Professional Fluency)

https://www.linkedin.com/in/abdulrahmanalsaleh

